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For more than six million Venezuelans, crossing international borders has become imperative to ensuring security
and a livelihood that their country has failed to assure.
These migrants and refugees, particularly young women and
children, are vulnerable to many depredations, criminal
acts, and the risk of becoming trafficking victims for forced
labor and sexual slavery. This article focuses on State responsibility for migrant populations and analyzes conditions
in Venezuela that caused a massive migration, the conditions
in Colombia as a host State, the uncertain status of
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INTRODUCTION
Conflict and internal unrest that cause displacement and mass
migration intensify the vulnerability of affected populations to human trafficking and related crimes. In 2016, the United Nations Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Trafficking in Persons called for prioritizing the protection of people, especially
women and children, from all forms of human trafficking during
conflict and while fleeing unrest, violence, and abuses in their home
country. 1 States have individual and shared responsibilities under
international law to “act with due diligence to prevent trafficking, to
investigate and prosecute traffickers and to assist and protect trafficked persons.” 2 Yet, it has been challenging for States to develop
meaningful and effective responses with solid resources, programs,
and processes when so many migrants and refugees are involved.
The displacement and migration of more than 1.8 million Venezuelans into Colombia due to the effects of violent crime, human
rights abuses, state repression (including mass arrests and extrajudicial killings), and a collapsing economy have created a logistical
nightmare for the Colombian State to fulfill its obligations under

Maria G. Giammarinaro, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking
in persons, especially women and children, at 4, Art. III, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/41
(May 3, 2016).
2
U.N. Off. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts, Recommended Principles and
Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and Social Council
at 1, U.N. Doc. E/2002/68/Add.1 (July 2002) [hereinafter Recommended Principles and Guidelines].
1
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international law. 3 Specifically, the Colombian State is required “to
take measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human
rights of migrants, migrant workers and their families, to eliminate
the increasing acts of racism and xenophobia in many societies and
to promote greater harmony and tolerance in all societies.” 4 The
challenge for Colombia to prevent human trafficking and exploitation of Venezuelan migrants and refugees is compounded by the
country’s current status as a “post–conflict” State, in which several
areas of its national territory remain in conflict. 5 Additionally, the
government is struggling to implement the Peace Agreement signed
with the FARC–EP 6 insurgent group in 2016, 7 build and strengthen
Refugees and migrants from Venezuela, INTER–AGENCY COORDINATION
PLATFORM FOR REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS FROM VENEZUELA, www.r4v.info/en
/refugeeandmigrants (last updated Feb. 8, 2022).
4
G.A. Res. 55/2, Millennium Declaration, ¶ 24 (Sept. 18, 2000).
5
See M. Panić, Post–conflict countries: aid effectiveness and permanent
peace, UN (2008), www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_bg_pa
pers/bp_wess2008_panic.pdf; see also Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses
by Armed Groups, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 28, 2022), www.hrw.org/ne
ws/2022/03/28/colombia/venezuela-border-area-abuses-armed-groups.
6
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo,
“FARC–EP” (The FARC–EP is the oldest insurgency group in Latin America
with roots going back to the early 1950s); see Colombia: FARC, INSIGHT CRIME
(May 1, 2013), https://insightcrime.org/colombia–organized–crime–news/farc–
profile/; see also Sibylla Brodzinsky, Colombia signs historic peace deal with
FARC, GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2016), www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/
colombia–signs–historic–peace–deal–with–farc–rebels (explaining how since the
early 1990s, the FARC has steadily transformed into a transnational criminal organization involved in many criminal enterprises, including drug production/trafficking, weapons trafficking, human trafficking, illegal mining and cattle rustling); see also Luz E. Nagle, The FARC: Doing What Any Multinational Corporation Would Do: Diversify, 28 NO. 5 INT’L ENF’T L. REP. 178 (2012).
7
The final agreement was signed in Bogotá, Colombia on November 24,
2016, ending the armed conflict between the FARC–EP rebel group and the Colombian government and building a stable and lasting peace. See Acuerdo Final
para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera, JURISDICCIÓN ESPECIAL PARA LA PAZ (Nov. 24, 2016),
www.jep.gov.co/Documents/Acuerdo%20Final/Acuerdo%20Final.pdf
(Three
years later, the Peace Agreement was largely in tatters and left many Colombians
angry and resentful toward the political actors who brokered the deal); see also
Juan Arredondo, The Slow Death of Colombia’s Peace Movement, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 30, 2019), www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/12/colombiapeace-farc/604078/ (The Peace Agreement remains a highly controversial issue
in Colombian society and politics, and rather than bringing stability the
3
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institutions and communities, quell impunity, fight organized crime,
sustain law and order, and suppress animosity and resentment toward the neighboring nation from which migrants emanate.
The human rights impact of the Venezuelan government’s actions and omissions has rendered individuals and communities vulnerable to traffickers at home and pushed these individuals to take
uncertain and dangerous journeys across a hazardous frontier, into a
transforming and unstable “host” nation of Colombia. 8 The risks
they face from abuse and exploitation increase at each stage of their
journey because their resilience weakens and their vulnerability to
criminal victimization and human trafficking intensifies. Instead of
protecting individuals from violations of their human rights, Venezuela has created a fertile ground for criminal groups and human
traffickers to prey on a large population of citizens at home and migrants and refugees in Colombia. 9
Human trafficking within the post–conflict context has received
little attention. In this article, we analyze the Venezuelan–Colombian migration crisis with a human rights approach that demonstrates that migrants and refugees lack the international mechanisms
to protect themselves from becoming victims of human trafficking
and exploitation. Although numerous measures have been taken attempting to prevent these human rights violations, important principles of international law––particularly the Optional Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women
and Children (known as the “Palermo Protocol”) 10––are absent
along the Colombia/Venezuela border. As such, both nations are
Agreement has caused social anxiety, discontent, and continuing low–intensity
conflict in many areas of the national territory).
8
Anastasia Moloney, Desperate Venezuelan Migrants Fall Prey to Sex Traffickers in Colombia, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2018), www.reuters.com/article/us–colombia–venezuela–slavery–idUSKCN1NX22X; see also Venezuela: Events of
2019, HUM. RTS. WATCH, www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/venezuela (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).
9
Venezuelan Migrants High Risk for Trafficking and Abuse, RELIEFWEB
(June 19, 2019), https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/venezuelan-migrants-highrisk-trafficking-and-abuse.
10
PROTOCOL TO PREVENT, SUPPRESS AND PUNISH TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, SUPPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, G.A. Res. 55/25
(2000), www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/ProtocolonTrafficking.pdf [hereinafter
Palermo Protocol].
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failing in their individual and shared responsibility to protect the impacted populations.
The first part of this article provides a description of a State’s
responsibility under international law to confront human trafficking
and protect vulnerable populations from becoming trafficking victims. The second part discusses the conditions in Venezuela that resulted in a mass exodus into Colombia. Turning to conditions in Colombia, this note will analyze the factors that compelled over a million Venezuelans to move there at a time when the country struggles
to emerge as a post–conflict State after five decades of internal
armed conflict. The note considers how the COVID–19 pandemic
worsened the migrant crisis and enabled criminal actors to exploit,
abuse, and traffic vulnerable persons among the migrant population.
The third part of the article will address Colombia’s duty to protect
migrants from trafficking and to what extent the nation has succeeded or fallen short in fulfilling its international commitments to
them. Lastly, the Note concludes with a discussion on what should
be done to improve the protection of vulnerable migrant populations.
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN TRAFFICKING 11
Under international law, States possess shared and separate responsibilities to their individual societies. 12 Nations are responsible
for breaches of international law that can be directly or indirectly
attributed to that nation. Breaches result from States’ failure to fulfill
obligations emerging from ratified treaties 13 and customary
Id. at art. 3(a) (defining human trafficking as the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse
of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person,
for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal
of organs”).
12
For a detailed discussion see Anna Stilz, Collective Responsibility and the
State, 19 J. POL. PHIL. 190 (2011).
13
Ratified treaties “define the content of the international obligations, the
breach of which gives rise to responsibility.” The core human rights treaties include, among many others: (i) International Convention on the Elimination of All
11
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international law. 14 Responsibility applies “to the whole field of the
international obligations of States, whether the obligation is owed to

Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; (ii)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 173; (iii) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/13 (Oct. 2, 2000); (iv) International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; (v) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), G.A. Res. 34/180, (Sept. 3, 1981), 1249
U.N.T.S. 13; (vi) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; (vii) Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; (viii) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families (ICMW), Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; (ix) International Convention for the Protection of All Person from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), Dec. 23, 2010, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3; (x) Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. Treaty content
is subject to interpretation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31–33. International organizations in carrying out their functions may “take a position on whether a State has
breached an international obligation.” Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, at 31 (2001). For instance, there are ten human rights treaty bodies that
monitor implementation of the core international human rights treaties: Human
Rights Committee (HRCttee); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR); Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW); Committee against Torture (CAT); Committee on the Rights of the
Child (CRC); Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW); Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); Committee on Enforced Disappearances
(CED); Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT). For video presentations
on each committee, see U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High Comm’r for Human
Rights,
Human
rights
treaty
bodies,
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx (last visited Feb. 3,
2022).
14
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, supra note 13, at 141 (Commentary to Article 56 of the International Law
Commission articles on State Responsibility first “preserves the application of the
rules of customary international law concerning State responsibility on matters
not covered by the articles. Secondly, it preserves other rules concerning the effects of a breach of an international obligation which do not involve issues of State
responsibility but stem from the law of treaties or other areas of international
law.”).
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one or several States, to an individual or group, or to the international community as a whole.” 15
A State that has ratified an international treaty “must incorporate
into its domestic laws the changes required to ensure the implementation of the obligations it has assumed.” 16 But, to guarantee the
rights contained in the treaty, “the measures under domestic law
must be effective.” 17 States party to the Palermo Protocol and those
included in its parent Convention, the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), 18 acquired obligations to adopt legislative measures 19 to criminalize and prosecute
human trafficking. Therefore, nations must criminalize human trafficking as well as participation in an organized criminal group, laundering proceeds of crime, corruption, obstruction of justice, and establish administrative, criminal, or civil liability of legal persons.
Consequently, training programs for officials and personnel related
to the prevention, identification, investigation, and prosecution of
human trafficking must also include UNTOC crimes and its related
sections such as the necessary measures for care, protection, and assistance of victims and witnesses of crime. 20
Id. at 32.
Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 3181, ¶ 409 (Oct. 20,
2016), www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_318_ing.pdf.
17
Id.
18
Convention Against Transactional Organized Crime and the Protocols
Thereto, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
19
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, App. No. 25965/04, ¶¶ 289–292 (May 10,
2010), https://rm.coe.int/16806ebd5e (holding that Cyprus immigration policy
was inadequate and contradictory to that of human trafficking. The Court noted
that legislative shortcoming and absence of policy in the regime of artiste visas
encouraged trafficking of women to Cyprus to work as cabaret performers and
that requiring the cabaret managers to “make the application for an entry permit
for the artiste rendered women dependent on her employer or agent, and therefore
increased her risk of falling into the hands of traffickers.”) (To afford practical
and effective protection against trafficking and exploitation, the legislative framework must be comprehensive and include other policies such as immigration. Governments must make certain that all the regimes do not contradict the
measures taken against trafficking by rendering them ineffective).
20
See Palermo Protocol, supra note 10 (States party to the Palermo Protocol
assume the following duties: (1) adopt legislative measures to criminalize and
prosecute human trafficking (art. 5, as well as those crimes included in UNTOC).
This means also criminalizing laundering of proceeds, all forms of corruption,
15
16
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When developing training, states have a duty to consider the
“general backdrop of trafficking issues” in their countries so that law
enforcement and relevant officials are “aware of circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion that” an individual is at “immediate
risk of being, a victim of trafficking and exploitation.” 21
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
Responsibility is attributed to States when “its organs of government or others who have acted under the direction, instigation, or
control of those organs” are agents of the State. 22 An example would
be corruption of law enforcement, prosecutors, and the judiciary
through bribery of public officials (legislators, ministers, ambassadors) involved in operating sexual or labor recruiting schemes or
transporting/transferring through sexual service imposed on the victim. Corrupt officials can be facilitators by transporting victims,
including liability for natural and legal persons—civil, criminal, or administrative,
obstruction of justice, asset confiscation; (2) aid and protection to the victims and
witnesses (art. 6.); and (3), allow foreign victims to remain in the country permanently of temporarily); see also LUZ E. NAGLE, UNDERSTANDING HUMAN
TRAFFICKING, CORRUPTION, AND THE OPTICS OF MISCONDUCT IN THE PUBLIC,
PRIVATE, AND NGO SECTORS: CAUSES, ACTORS, AND SOLUTIONS 42–43 (2017).
21
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, supra note 19 (arguing that training must
include the distinctive circumstances taking place in each country. Incorporating
that uniqueness into the investigations and inquiries provides clear “background
of facts” and aids in determining if someone is a victim of trafficking in need of
protection. In Rantsev, Cyprus had a serious problem involving young foreign
women forced to work in the sex industry, and the “authorities were aware that a
substantial number of foreign women,” particularly from the former Soviet Union,
were being trafficked to Cyprus on artist visas, only to be sexually exploited by
cabaret owners and managers. Rantseva, a young Russian girl entered Cyprus
with a cabaret artiste visa that allowed her to work in a cabaret for her artistic
agent. After a month, she left her employment without warning and moved out of
the accommodation provided to her. Her employer had her passport and other
documents. The Court held that Cyprus had a “positive obligation to investigate
without delay” and protect Rantseva. The police investigation was deficient because it failed to inquire into the “background of facts,” and to take Rantseva’s
statemen when she “insisted that she be detained.” That information would have
aided in determining if she had been trafficked. Instead, she was released to the
custody of the trafficker).
22
ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING
223 (2010); see also Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, supra note 13, at 38.
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allowing illegal entries or exits, falsifying documents, ignoring suspicious activities, protecting or patronizing commercial premises using the services of victims of trafficking, 23 obstructing prosecutions,
or reducing sentences. 24
It is also imputed as an act of the State when an individual acts
in an apparent official capacity or under color of authority––regardless as to whether the individual possesses ulterior motives or abuses
public power. 25 When the violation is carried out by private actors,
which is often the case in human trafficking, States may also be responsible for a failure to act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, or prosecute. 26
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, supra note 13, at 42; see generally GALLAGHER, supra note 22, at 223–26;
see also NAGLE, supra note 20 (providing an extensive examination of corruption
and human trafficking).
24
See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, LEGISLATIVE GUIDES FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO 85 (2004),
www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf; see also INTERNATIONAL BAR ASS’N,
HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION: A REPORT BY THE IBA’S
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE AGAINST HUMAN TRAFFICKING (2016),
www.ibanet.org/MediaHandler?id=E34FFA1D–8038–4AEC–A631–
E0E2A7E0AD86.
25
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, supra note 13, at 42; Gallagher, supra note 22, at 226; see also Velásquez
Rodríguez vs. Honduras, Judgment, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, at ¶¶ 170
and 172 (July 29, 1988) (holding that “under international law a State is responsible for the acts of its agents undertaken in their official capacity and for their
omissions, even when those agents act outside the sphere of their authority or
violate internal law,” and that “any violation of rights recognized by the Convention carried out by an act of public authority or by persons who use their position
of authority is imputable to the State.”).
26
See Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 435–
508 (The Inter–American Court of Human Rights decided a case against Brazil
involving 85 workers, some of them children, in a privately–owned estate “Hacienda Brasil Verde,” who were subjected to slavery practices and human trafficking on that property. Thousands of employees were subjected to forced labor servitude in the Hacienda, and the State was well aware of the existence of these
practices but neither adopted measures to prevent the abuses, nor offered any assistance or reparations to protect the rights of the victims. The Court established
the test: “At the time of the events, it must be determined whether the State authorities knew or should have known about the existence of a situation that poses
a real immediate risk to the life of an individual or a group of individuals, and the
23
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A State’s responsibility goes beyond the actions and omissions
imputed to state actors and agents. The inability to exercise effective
control over “the presence, power, and influence” of non–state actors, such as armed criminal groups and drug traffickers, can render
a State responsible for their actions. 27 Responsibility is justified if it
can be shown that the State failed to use whatever means it had available to prevent the breach and, if prevention was not possible, the
State was unable to punish the culprits appropriately. 28
In the human rights context, every State party to a treaty “has an
obligation to take steps to ensure that everyone in the State can enjoy
the rights set out in the treaty.” 29 The principle of State responsibility as it operates in this context confirms that the State is held to a
certain standard of care––even in situations where it is not the primary agent of harm, but still fails to sanction third parties.
Human trafficking is a violation of the “basic human rights to
which all persons are entitled.” 30 Therefore, all human rights treaties
and customary international law containing such fundamental rights
are germane and supplement the Protocol, making States responsible for “their acts and omissions that cause or otherwise contribute
to trafficking.” 31 The content and interpretation of the UNTOC, Protocol, and each treaty germane to human trafficking also determines
necessary measures were not applied within the scope of their authority, to prevent
or avoid this risk.”)
27
GALLAGHER, supra note 22, at 249.
28
Id. at 248–49.
29
Human rights treaty bodies, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R,
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx (last visited Feb. 25,
2022).
30
Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human
Trafficking: Commentary, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R, at 3, 16 (2010),
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Commentary_Human_
Trafficking_en.pdf (the Principles and Guidelines are not per se the basis of legal
obligation upon states. However, they contain existing compulsory rules of international law, which are a source of legal responsibility for States. Moreover, Principles and Guidelines create a framework “for State practice that may provide the
source for emergent customary international law.”).
31
See GALLAGHER supra note 22, at 218; Cf. Draft Articles on Responsibility
of Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 13 (according to the International
Law Commission, commentary State responsibility for internationally wrongful
acts, the term “internationally wrongful act” includes “an omission and extends
to conduct consisting of several actions or omissions which together amount to an
internationally wrongful act.”).
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if “a particular obligation is breached upon a failure to act on the
part of the responsible State, or whether some further event must
occur.” 32
A nation has a positive obligation 33 “to act with due diligence to
prevent trafficking, to investigate and prosecute traffickers and to
assist and protect trafficked persons.” 34 Since human rights are implicated through the various phases of trafficking and exploitation,
States possess a positive obligation to act with due diligence to protect such rights in each stage of trafficking or exploitation. For instance, the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health freedom and security, of association, to an adequate
standard of living are relevant to the causes of trafficking—factors
that make people defenseless and vulnerable to trafficking. 35 The
right not to be submitted to slavery, to servitude, forced labor, or
bonded labor is also relevant to the process of trafficking. The right
of access to courts, specifically equality before the courts and a fair
trial, are relevant to the response. 36

Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, supra note 13, at 36 (arguing that human trafficking is a crime of a complex
nature because it violates multiple rights, including individual liberty and safety,
dignity and privacy, freedom of movement and residence, and the prohibition
against discrimination); see also Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil, supra
note 16, at ¶ 223.
33
See Akkoç v. Turkey, Nos. 22947/93 and 22948/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 77
(2000) (the European Court of Human Rights addressed States’ positive obligations and duty to safeguard lives of those within its jurisdiction. A State must take
“appropriate steps to safeguard” their lives, and its primary duty is “to secure the
right to life by putting into place effective criminal–law provisions to deter the
commission of offences” and law–enforcement to prevent, suppress and punish
the breaches, that such duty may extend “to a positive obligation on the authorities
to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at
risk from the criminal acts of another individual.”).
34
Recommended Principles and Guidelines, supra note 2, at 1.
35
An Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability, Impact and Actions,
U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME 2–3 (2008), www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/An_Introduction_to_Human_Trafficking_-_Background_Paper.pdf (arguing that to prevent human trafficking, states need to reduce the factors that make individuals vulnerable to being trafficked).
36
Id. at 3; see also Recommended Principles and Guidelines, supra note 2,
at 52–56 (providing an expanded list of the rights, obligations, and legal sources
most relevant to trafficking).
32
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Finding a State responsible for its obligation to prevent and respond to human trafficking depends on establishing whether the
State (1) “failed to secure recognized rights and freedoms” in its domestic law or (2) failed to take “reasonable and appropriate”
measures of protection,” and (3) if a breach occurred, that the State
failed to sanction the culprits appropriately. 37 In fulfilling their obligation to prevent human trafficking, states must ensure the creation
of the conditions required to guarantee that violations of inalienable
rights of every person subject to their jurisdiction do not occur. 38
While endeavoring to meet those special duties, it is not sufficient
that States simply abstain from violating rights. Instead, they must
adopt measures based on individuals’ particular needs as determined
by their places in society, such as being migrants and refugees particularly susceptible to exclusion and discrimination. 39 They must
also adopt measures based on the specific situation in which individuals find themselves, such as extreme poverty, lack of education,
health, and other basic needs, and conditions resulting from marginalization, and structural discrimination. 40 One’s status exposes their
particular vulnerabilities, which requires implementing specific protective actions with an intersectional approach, including––among
other aspects––immigration status and national origin. 41
GALLAGHER, supra note 22, at 307.
Id. at 248–49; see also Joy Ezeilo (Special Rapporteur), Thematic Report
on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, at ¶ 41, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/26/37 (Apr. 1, 2014) (indicating that poverty is a significant vulnerability
factor in human trafficking); see also Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil,
supra note 16, at ¶ 317 (holding that “States have the obligation to ensure the
creation of the conditions required to guarantee that violations of this inalienable
right do not occur and, in particular, the duty to prevent its agents as well as private individuals from violating it.”).
39
GALLAGHER, supra note 22, at 249.
40
Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil, supra note 16, at ¶ 25, n.31 (asserting that States must realize their human rights obligations related to sanitation
in a non–discriminatory manner. They are obliged to pay special attention to
groups particularly vulnerable to exclusion and discrimination in relation to sanitation, including people living in poverty [ . . . ]. Priority should be given to meeting the needs of these groups and, where necessary, positive measures should be
adopted to redress existing discrimination and to ensure their access to sanitation.
States are obliged to eliminate both de jure and de facto discrimination on [different] grounds.).
41
Id. at ¶ 226, ¶338 (holding that Brazil incurred international responsibility,
when it knew about the existence of structural discrimination, but failed to adopt
37
38
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Furthermore, States have an international obligation to understand the meaning of vulnerability in the human trafficking context
and identify it to implement effective preventive measures “before
the occurrence of a potential danger, trauma or abuse, thereby lessening its human, economic and social consequences.” 42 In a human
trafficking setting, vulnerability “refers to the condition of a person
in a specific context”, meaning that a proper response demands the
consideration for all the external conditions affecting an individual,
as well as “the coping mechanisms that enable the individual to protect him– or herself against a negative impact from those external
conditions.” 43 Understanding vulnerability allows the government
and local authorities to implement measures “before the occurrence
of a potential danger, trauma or abuse, thereby lessening its human,
economic and social consequences.” 44
A State’s responsibility to prevent human trafficking is not limited to its citizens. It includes protection of migrants and non–citizens, regardless of their immigration status. Nations have an obligation “to protect and promote the rights of all persons within their
specific measures with regard to the particular situation of victimization that reveals the vulnerability of a universe of individualized persons and that the victims
of human trafficking in Brasil Verde Workers were Afro–descendant and mulatto,
from extremely poor Brazilian states. According to the Court, the State failed to
comply with its obligation to remove the obstacles to access to justice based on
the victims’ origin, ethnicity, race, and economic status, which permitted the subsistence of factors of structural discrimination”).
42
See An Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability, Impact and Actions, supra note 35, at 68; see also Palermo Protocol, supra note 10 (Article 3
states “abuse of a position of vulnerability” in the human trafficking definition.
This precedent establishes that prevention includes preventing a crime and reducing the conditions that make an individual vulnerable to trafficking. States have a
duty to understand the meaning of vulnerability to criminalize and prevent human
trafficking).
43
An Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability, Impact and Actions,
supra note 35, at 68 (understanding of and focusing on vulnerability allows governments to implement measures “before the occurrence of a potential danger,
trauma or abuse, thereby lessening its human, economic and social consequences.” “Vulnerability refers to the condition of a person in a specific context.
A response to vulnerability needs therefore to take into account the external conditions of an individual as well as the coping mechanisms that enable the individual to protect him– or herself against a negative impact from those external conditions.”).
44
Id.
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jurisdiction.” 45 Such responsibility emanates from Article 28 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that
“[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international order in which
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.” 46 Also, under Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol a State party
has a shared responsibility to “take or strengthen measures, including through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, to alleviate the factors that make persons, especially women and children, vulnerable
to trafficking.” 47 Signatory States also have a shared responsibility
“to discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of
persons, especially women and children, that leads to trafficking” 48
by adopting legislative, educational, social, or cultural measures. Finally, the Palermo Protocol comprises am international cooperation
framework —either bilateral or multilateral— to discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons “that would
impose obligations on states under their particular place in the trafficking cycle.” 49
VENEZUELA’S SOCIO–POLITICAL MELTDOWN
The political, socio–economic, and human rights situation in
Venezuela has been deteriorating from the time Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías came to power in 1999 and worsened during the regime of
Chávez’s hand–picked successor, Nicolás Maduro Moros. 50 In
Sigma Huda, Special Reporter on Trafficking in Persons statement at the
CSW–
Beijing
+
10
Review,
UN
3
(Mar.
7,
2005),
www.un.org/webcast/csw2005/statements/050307traffickinginpersons-e.pdf.
46
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 28, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948); see also Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human
Rights and Human Trafficking: Commentary, supra note 30, at 3.
47
Palermo Protocol, supra note 10, at art. 9 ¶ 4.
48
Id. at art. 9 ¶ 5.
49
GALLAGHER, supra note 22, at 556–82.
50
See generally Introduction: Chávez Revolution in Perspective, BROOKINGS
(2016),
www.brookings.edu/wp–content/uploads/2016/07/dragoninthetropics_chapter.pdf; see also Robert Plummer, Hugo Chávez leaves Venezuela in economic muddle, BBC (Mar. 5, 2013), www.bbc.com/news/business-20795781; see
also Amelia Cheatham & Rocio Cara Labrador, Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of
a Petrostate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Jan. 22, 2021 10:30 AM),
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela–crisis (Venezuela owns one of the largest
oil reserves in the world and, until Chávez came to power, was considered the
45
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2010, the country’s economic conditions reflected the world economic crises impacting many struggling governments. Chávez declared “an economic war” against private businesses and what he
called the “cheap bourgeoisie” 51, which resulted in a collapsing
economy and hyperinflation due to state appropriation of private enterprise, systematic violations of human rights against opposition
activists, unchecked corruption and crime, and an increasing humanitarian emergency profoundly affecting marginalized and vulnerable
groups. 52 The devastated economy and breakdown of the civil society led to more than 5 million Venezuelans leaving the country,
making the exodus among the world’s major recent displacement
crises. 53 Since 2014, Venezuelans seeking refugee status increased
8,000 percent, mainly in the Americas. 54 As of 2019, 64.8 percent
of Venezuelan households experienced “multidimensional poverty,” the highest proportion in Latin America. 55

wealthiest and most stable country in Latin America, with a robust middle class
and high living standard); see also Statistical Review of World Energy, BP,
www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energyeconomics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf (last visited
Feb. 3, 2022).
51
Chávez declara “guerra económica” a burguesía en Venezuela, EL
UNIVERSO (Jun. 2, 2010 3:53 PM), www.eluniverso.com/2010/06/02/1/1361/chavez-declara-guerra-economica-burguesia-venezuela.html; see also Larry Elliot,
Global financial crisis: five key stages 2007–2011, GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2011
11:49AM), www.theguardian.com/business/2011/aug/07/global-financial-crisiskey-stages.
52
See generally U.N. Human Rights Council, Detailed findings of the independent international factfinding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/48/CRP.5 (Sep. 16, 2021), www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFMV/A-HRC-48-CRP.5_EN.pdf.
53
Venezuela Situation, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2022) (according
to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as of 2021, there are 5.4 million
Venezuelan refugees, over 800,000 asylum–seekers, 2.5 million living under
other legal forms of stay in the Americas, and over 140,000 recognized refugees
worldwide).
54
Id.
55
There is no wealth to distribute: Venezuela poverty rate surges,
ALJAZEERA (July 8, 2020), www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/7/8/there-is-nowealth-to-distribute-venezuela-poverty-rate-surges (stating that multidimensional
poverty considers income as well as access to education and public services.).
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Corruption 56 and low government approval ratings became the
status quo rather than symptoms of a failing state, with regular polling showing that 80 percent of the population disapproves of the
government. 57 Rather than respond to civil instability and dissatisfaction, Nicolás Maduro further entrenched government policies
through denial, propaganda, and when necessary, brutal force. Venezuela’s constitutional institutions fractured, and encounters with
opposition movements and civil unrest led to violence and unprecedented insecurity nationwide. 58 By 2020, Venezuela had become
one of the most violent countries in the region, with the United
States Department of State reporting alarming rates of 60.3 deaths
per 100,000 citizens. 59 The high rate of murders, kidnapping, armed
robbery, street gangs, and other organized criminal groups has
robbed most Venezuelans of their right to live safely in their own
country. 60 For those citizens who remain in Venezuela, most indicate that they no longer feel secure or protected by their
Gustavo Coronel, The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela, CATO (Mar.
4, 2008), www.cato.org/commentary/corruption–democracy–venezuela (arguing
that prior to the Chávez regime taking power, Venezuela had long struggled with
public and private corruption.); see also Giulia Saudelli, How millions of ‘dirty
dollars’ were laundered out of Venezuela, DW (Mar. 13, 2019),
www.dw.com/en/how-millions-of-dirty-dollars-were-laundered-out-of-venezuela/a-47867313 (stating that under Chávez and Maduro, billions of dollars have
been embezzled by the “Chavistas” and public officials.); see also Nicolás Maduro 2016 Person of the Year in Organized Crime and Corruption, ORGANIZED
CRIME & CORRUPTION REPORTING PROJECT, www.occrp.org/en/poy/2016/ (last
visited Feb. 3, 2022).
57
Few Venezuelans say they trust their government, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan.
25, 2019), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/25/venezuelans-have-littletrust-in-national-government-say-economy-is-in-poor-shape/.
58
Venezuela: Hunger, punishment and fear, the formula for repression used
by authorities under Nicolás Maduro, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 20, 2019), www.amnistia.org/ve/noticias/2019/02/9375/venezuela–hunger–punishment–and–fear–
the–formula–for–repression–used–by–authorities–under–nicolas–maduro.
59
Venezuela 2020 Crime & Safety Report, OVERSEAS SEC. ADVISORY
COUNCIL (July 21, 2020), www.osac.gov/Country/Venezuela/Content/Detail/Report/0e6ed0e0-eb8e-44cc-ab81-1938e6c8d93f.
60
U.N. Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, at 2, Res. 42/25, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/42/25 (Oct. 8,
2019) (“Violations of the rights to food and health, violence and insecurity, the
collapse of basic services, the deterioration of the education system, lack of access
to pre– and post–natal care, and insufficient mechanisms for protection from violence and persecution on political grounds.”).
56
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Government, nor are they able to exercise their rights. 61 When such
insecurity is “systemic and the result of government enacted policies, it is the responsibility of States to ensure the protection of vulnerable individuals in their midst.” 62 Venezuela has failed in this
obligation.
PUSH FACTORS DUE TO VENEZUELA’S FAILURES TO FULFILL STATE
RESPONSIBILITIES
The relentless nationwide hardship and oppression triggered a
mass Venezuelan exodus, and Colombia became the primary receiving State at a time when it was ill–prepared to host nearly two million Venezuelan migrants and refugees. The migrant population
comprises a diverse group that includes young people between 18
and 29 years of age, well–educated people, skilled workers, 63 as well
as urban and rural poor, political dissidents, indigenous, 64 and individuals whose minority status subjects them to various manifestations of xenophobia and discrimination. 65 Among the migrant population are also many essential workers, healthcare professionals,

See generally Venezuela 2019, AMNESTY INT’L, www.amnesty.org/en/
countries/americas/venezuela/report–venezuela/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2022).
62
An Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability, Impact and Actions,
supra note 35.
63
A study in Peru, for example, indicated that 42% of Venezuelan migrants
are between 18 and 29, come from urban areas, and are well–educated. See Venezuelan Migration: The 4,500–Kilometer Gap Between Desperation and Opportunity, THE WORLD BANK (Nov. 26, 2019), www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2019/11/26/migracion-venezolana-4500-kilometros-entre-el-abandono-y-laoportunidad.
64
The indigenous Wayuu occupy a region along the northern Venezuela–Colombia border around La Gajuira. In Venezuela the Wayuu comprise around 57
percent of the country’s indigenous population. Economic instability, lack of resources, especially access to water, and political conflict and violence have compelled many Venezuelan Wayuu to cross into Colombia. See Carlos Salamanca
Villamizar, Colombia–Venezuela: the Wayúu face poverty and violence, IWGIA
(Dec. 2021), www.iwgia.org/en/colombia/4581–back–and–forth–across–the–colombia%E2%80%93venezuela–border–the–way%C3%BAu–face–poverty,–
drought,–dispossession–and–violence.html.
65
See John Otis, Large Venezuelan Migration Sparks Xenophobic Backlash
In Colombia, NPR (Dec. 29, 2020), www.npr.org/2020/12/29/949548865/large–
venezuelan–migration–sparks–xenophobic–backlash–in–colombia.
61
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and teachers, whose decision to flee Venezuela created a vacuum in
crucial services. 66
Venezuelan push factors significantly increase displaced peoples’ vulnerability to organized criminal syndicates and those who
take advantage of people to profit from their desperate situations.
Displacement makes people particularly vulnerable to exploitation
at the beginning, in transit, and end of their journeys. 67 Among the
most egregious vulnerabilities is susceptibility to becoming a victim
of human trafficking. Yet, because conditions that result in rendering people vulnerable are often “systemic and the result of government enacted policies [or an absence thereof], it is the responsibility
of States to ensure the protection of vulnerable individuals in their
midst.” 68
Violations and abuses of various rights, including human rights,
economic, social, and cultural rights recognized under international
law perpetrated by the Venezuelan government are push factors for
people to migrate to neighboring countries by any means available. 69 The government’s practices and policies that have failed to
See generally Erica Sánchez & Leah Rodriguez, 4 Ways the Venezuelan
Crisis in Affecting Children´s Education, GLOB. CITIZEN (Jun. 14, 2019),
www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/venezuela-crisis-childrens-education/.
67
There is no agreement on the conditions that lead to vulnerability to human
trafficking. However, various reports reflect a consensus on the factors that make
individuals vulnerable. Yet, more research is needed to focus on specific benchmarks such as geographical regions, ethnicity, and political orientation. For an in–
depth discussion on understanding vulnerability within the context of human trafficking, see Abuse of a position of vulnerability and other “means” within the
definition of trafficking in persons, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS CRIME 13–15 (2013),
www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2012/UNODC_2012
_Issue_Paper_-_Abuse_of_a_Position_of_Vulnerability.pdf.
68
An Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability, Impact and Actions,
supra note 35, at 8.
69
See generally U.N. Human Rights Council, Outcomes of the investigation
into allegations of possible human rights violations of the human rights to life,
liberty, and physical and moral integrity in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/44/20 (July 2, 2020) [hereinafter “Outcomes of the investigation into allegations of possible human rights violations”] (The United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) compiled a sobering list of
the human rights violations that are primary reasons for migration); see also Human Rights Violations in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: a downward spiral with no end in sight, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (Jun. 2018),
66
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ensure equal access and protection to all members of the Venezuelan
society result in conditions of vulnerability for them to be exploited,
abused, and trafficked. 70
Vulnerability is not a static, absolute state, but one that changes
according to a particular context and the capacity for individual response. 71 Vulnerability also refers to “a condition resulting from
how individuals negatively experience the complex interaction of
social, cultural, economic, political and environmental factors that
create the context for their communities.” 72 Forced migration and
the decision to leave one’s homeland results from several identifiable “push factors.” 73 The primary “push” factors that caused people
to flee Venezuela may be summarized in: (i) A progressive decline
in the country’s oil–based economy; (ii) Government censorship and
suppression; (iii) widespread human rights abuses including repression of political dissidents, arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, torture; (iv) Abuses against indigenous and Afro–Venezuelan
populations; (v) Food and water shortages and lack of access to basic
services; (vi) Lack of physical and mental health services; and (vii)
Excessive use of force, killings, arbitrary detentions, violence, and
crime against the civil society. Let’s take a closer look on each factor:

www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/VenezuelaReport2018_EN.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights Violations in Bolivarian Republic]; see also Vivian Sequera, Venezuelans report big weight losses in 2017 as hunger hits, REUTERS
(Feb. 21, 2018), www.reuters.com/article/us–venezuela–food/venezuelans–report–big–weight–losses–in–2017–as–hunger–hits–idUSKCN1G52HA (A university study on the impact of a devastating economic crisis and food shortages
revealed a rapid increase in poverty and hunger.).
70
An Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability, Impact and Actions,
supra note 35 (Political, social, cultural, or economic practices and policies that
fail to ensure equal access and protection to all members of a society result in
conditions of vulnerability.).
71
Id. at 71 (explaining how political, social, cultural, or economic practices
and policies that fail to ensure equal access and protection to all members of a
society result in conditions of vulnerability).
72
Id. at 8.
73
Human Rights Violations in Bolivarian Republic, supra note 69; see generally Outcomes of the investigation into allegations of possible human rights violations, supra note 69, at 30; see also Sequera, supra note 69.
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i)

A progressive decline in the country’s oil–based economy 74
Venezuela’s enviable status as a stable, cosmopolitan, oil–producing nation throughout much of the late 20th century was squandered when the Chávez government set out to transform Venezuela
into a socialist state by nationalizing oil, agriculture, finance, various industries, gold mining, steel manufacturing, power generation,
and tourism. 75 The country’s mineral and oil wealth throughout the
early 2000s was redirected into the pockets of Chávez’s cronies, and
production capacity floundered as private investment and infrastructure upkeep broke down. 76 The Chávez and Maduro governments
retained complete control of the nation’s economy by introducing
currency and price controls and serving as the exclusive provider of
the official currency (bolivars). The transformation into a state–run
economy resulted in hyperinflation over the last decade and a rapid
increase in poverty. A national survey completed in 2021 suggested
that 76.6 percent of Venezuela’s 28 million citizens now live in extreme poverty—an 11 percent increase from the prior year. 77 Beginning around 2012, unequal wages compounded by skyrocketing inflation contributed to impoverished conditions for many

See generally Statistical Review of World Energy 69th edition, BRITISH
PETROLEUM
(Jun.
2020),
www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/businesssites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf.
75
See generally Factbox: Venezuela’s nationalizations under Chavez,
REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2012), www.reuters.com/article/us–venezuela–election–nation
alizations/factbox–venezuelas–nationalizations–under–chavez–
idUSBRE89701X20121008.
76
Marcela Escobari, Testimony: Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis
in Venezuela and US Policy Responses, BROOKINGS (Feb. 28, 2019), www.brookings.edu/testimonies/made-by-maduro-the-humanitarian-crisis-in-venezuelaand-us-policy-responses/ (noting that “[t]he oil boom of 2004–12 was misused to
fund consumption through imports while dismantling the productive capacity of
the country.”).
77
Manure Quintero, Extreme Poverty in Venezuela Rises to 76.6% – Study,
REUTERS (Sep. 29, 2021), www.reuters.com/world/americas/extreme-povertyvenezuela-rises-766-study-2021-09-29/.
74
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Venezuelans. 78 Venezuela’s inflation rate is the highest in the world
and in March 2022 stood at 340.40, down from 472.00 in February
2022. 79
Such rapid economic decline had a profound impact on the population’s universally recognized “right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health and the right to
an adequate standard of living, including right to adequate food, related to the collapse of public services.” 80 Under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 81 Venezuela’s
obligation to achieve economic, social, and cultural rights exists independently of the nation’s capability to increase its resources. It
requires an equitable and effective use of and access to the available
resources. 82 The reality is that the available resources have not been
used equitably and effectively. 83 On the contrary, resources have
been depleted due to corruption and mismanagement. 84 Instead of
taking adequate measures to realize the people’s economic, social
and cultural rights, the Venezuelan government uses its resources to
pay strategic allies and political elites in exchange for loyalty and
heavily subsidized consumables. 85

For example, the overall inflation rate increased from 340.40 percent in
January 2022 to 472 percent in February 2022. Inflation in Venezuela reached an
astounding 344509.50 in February 2019. See Venezuela Inflation Rate, TRADING
ECONOMICS (Mar. 2022), https://tradingeconomics.com/venezuela/inflation-cpi.
79
Id.
80
Situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, supra note 60, at 3.
81
Status of Ratification: Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R, https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2022) (Venezuela signed into the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1969 and ratified it in 1978).
82
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts, Rep. on Substantive Issues Arising
in the Implementations of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/13, at ¶ 23 (Oct. 2, 2000).
83
See id. at ¶ 27.
84
Escobari, supra note 76 (stating that “Maduro has continued to print
money, driving up inflation and making products unaffordable for average Venezuelans. He instituted price controls and fixed the exchange rate (giving preferential rates to his allies)”).
85
Id. (“[i]nstead of investing in PDVSA, the national oil company, which
comprises 95 percent of Venezuelan exports, it used its proceeds to pay its cronies
and political elite in exchange for loyalty and subsidize food. The regime uses
78
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ii)

Government censorship and suppression 86
Even though online and media censorship began during the Chávez regime, 87 Maduro expanded the government’s suppression of
information dissemination. In 2013, a special government agency 88
was created to “classify and censor any information it sees as a threat
to national security.” 89 Television stations were removed from cable
networks and social networking services, such that government–run
media became the primary source for news and propaganda. 90 The
government’s censorship apparatus continues targeting media outlets, journalists, and other media workers perceived to represent the
opposition. 91
stockpiles of food in exchange for political loyalty, but even that is only reaching
less than 30 percent of the population.”).
86
Venezuela: Ever more authoritarian, REP. WITHOUT BORDERS, https://
rsf.org/en/venezuela (last visited Feb. 7, 2022) [hereinafter “Reporters Without
Borders”]; see also Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Rep. on Concluding
Observations on the Third Periodic Report of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, U.N. E/C.12/VEN/CO/3, at ¶ 31 (July 7, 2015) (“The Committee urges that
State party to adopt effective measures to remove restrictions on the freedom of
expression and information.”).
87
Marianne Diaz, Venezuela: Twitterers, Bloggers and Forum Members, in
the Eye of the Justice, GLOBAL VOICES (Jun. 28, 2010, 5:23PM), https://advox.globalvoices.org/2010/06/28/venezuela-twitterers-bloggers-and-forummembers-in-the-eye-of-the-justice/ (stating that “[V]enezuelan Vice–President,
Elias Jaua, declared that President Hugo Chávez ordered the Ministry of Interior
and Justice to initiate a thorough and systematic investigation in order to identify
the sources of the rumors about the instability of private banking. Jaua stated that
generation of rumors is a ‘crime punishable by imprisonment from nine to 11
years’” arising from the interventions to banks in Venezuela between 2009 and
2010); see also Marianne Diaz, Venezuela: Two people arrested for tweeting
about banking rumors, GLOBAL VOICES (July 12, 2010, 12:24 PM), https://advox.globalvoices.org/2010/07/12/venezuela-two-people-arrested-for-tweetingabout-banking-rumors/.
88
2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Venezuela, U.S. DEP’T
STATE (2019), www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rightspractices/venezuela/.
89
Danny O’Brien, Venezuela’s Internet Crackdown Escalates into Regional
FRONTIER
FOUND
(Feb.
20,
2014),
Blackout,
ELECTRONIC
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/venezuelas-net-crackdown-escalates.
90
Reporters Without Borders, supra note 86.
91
See Brian Knight & Ana Tribin, Opposition Media, State Censorship, and
Political Accountability: Evidence from Chavez’s Venezuela, NBER (Oct. 2019),
www.nber.org/papers/w25916.
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The National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL)
targets Twitter use and identifies IP addresses and other information
for the authorities to locate users who are later detained and arrested
by the Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN). Venezuelans have
been detained, arrested and subsequently prosecuted for posting
comments on social media such as, “A tweet can take away your
freedom in this democratic country,” and “People, stop it with the
hashtag #subversivetweet because [if] the #CICPC 92 puts us in jail,
where are they gonna put so many people?” 93 Such postings are considered destabilizing and are therefore an excuse to monitor social
media messages. The government has been creative with the charges
some individuals face, including violent outrage, hatred, public instigation, incitement, insulting a public official, fostering unrest
among the citizenship, disturbing public order, conspiracy, outrage,
and espionage. 94
Under international law, Venezuela is obliged to facilitate freedom of association, 95 expression, 96 and political rights, 97 as articulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to
which Venezuela is a party. 98 Yet, the government stigmatization,
harassment, and repression of the media violates the Covenant and
Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas Penales y Criminalísticas (CICPC),
GOBIERNO BOLIVARIANO DE VENEZUELA, http://www.cicpc.gob.ve (last visited
Feb. 3, 2022) (Ven.).
93
Sonia Doglio, Venezuela: Twitter User Detained for Spreading “DestabiGLOB.
VOICES
(Mar.
14,
2013,
11:17
lizing”
Information,
PM), https://globalvoices.org/2013/03/14/venezuela-twitter-user-detained-forspreading-destabilizing-information/.
94
Human Rights Violations in Bolivarian Republic, supra note 69, at 39 (asserting that the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) has passed vague and
broad laws allowing the government to criminalize dissent.); see also Jesus
Yajure, @Conatel Elaboro Informer Para el @Sebin_Oficial Sobre Tuiteros Deternidos, RUNRUN (July 03, 2015), https://runrun.es/investigacion/210909/conatel
–elaboro–informes–para–el–sebin_oficial–sobre–tuiteros–detenidos/ (providing
a detailed dossier on various accounts and charges to Twitter users).
95
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Venez., art. 22, 1966,
99 U.N.T.S. 171, 173.
96
Id. at art. 19.
97
Id. at art. 25.
98
Status of Ratification: Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. HUM. RTS., https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2022)
(Venezuela signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in
1969 and ratified it in 1978).
92
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constitutes an “attack against the freedoms of expression and of access to information, and infringes upon the important contributions
by these organizations to expose human rights violations committed
by the Venezuelan authorities.” 99 As a result, people have been prevented from reporting on the gravity of the country’s deterioration,
leading to widespread uncertainty about the actual state of the country. 100
iii)
Widespread human rights abuses including repression of
political dissidents, arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings,
torture 101
The Venezuelan government has employed ongoing, excessive
and, at times, lethal use of force during internal security operations. 102 Extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detentions are often
done under the veil of actions carried out nation–wide as a main
strategy to fight criminality, referred to as the Operations for the
Liberation of the People (OLPs). 103 Security forces have been observed breaking into houses without a judicial warrant and subduing
victims before opening fire at close range without any justification. 104 They then “cover up the killings by simulating a [gun]fire
exchange, suggesting the victims had opened fire first.” 105 Security
forces have also disguised themselves by wearing balaclavas,

Venezuela: Attacks Against Freedom of Expression Must Cease ImmediRTS.
WATCH
(Jan.
14,
2021,
2:36
PM),
ately,
HUM.
www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/14/venezuela-attacks-against-freedom-expressionmust-cease-immediately.
100
Venezuela: Ever more authoritarian, REP. WITHOUT BORDERS, https://rsf.
org/en/venezuela (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
101
U.N. Human Rights Council, Oral Update on the Human Rights Situation
in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Sept. 9, 2019), www.ohchr.org/EN
/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24958&LangID=E [hereinafter
Oral Update on Hum. Rts. Venezuela] (There is a “lack of effective protection
mechanisms for witnesses and family members of the victims, the majority of
whom are women.”).
102
Human Rights Violations in the Bolivarian Republic, supra note 69, at 14.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 18.; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Venez., art. 2(1), 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171, 173.
105
Human Rights Violations in the Bolivarian Republic, supra note 69, at 17.
99
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helmets, and skeleton masks. 106 During raids, they destroy belongings, seize money and steal food. They are known to cover windows
with sheets, lock up other family members in separate rooms and
interrogate young men. 107 After victims including women and children are killed, CICPC officers have entered to remove the bodies,
taken them to a hospital as if they were injured, and later deposited
victims in the morgue. 108 The CICPC, allegedly responsible for
most extrajudicial killings, is also in charge of conducting all forensic examinations in cases of violent death. 109
Members of the Special Action Forces (FAES) of the Bolivarian
National Police have also been attributed with repression of political
dissidents, extrajudicial executions, and forced disappearances. 110
Actually, the U.N. Human Rights Council’s Fact–Finding Mission
has documented several cases of arbitrary detentions, torture, and
other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. 111 That report found
that abuses committed by government actors since 2014 amounted
to crimes against humanity. 112
Impunity exists because the judiciary ceased to be an independent branch of government able to hold the CICPC and other clandestine government forces accountable 113 for abuses committed, not
See Venezuela is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (signed in 1969 and ratified in 1978),
and its Optional Protocol, https://indicators.ohchr.org/.
107
Id. at 14–15.
108
Id. at 18.
109
Id. at 18–19.
110
Oral Update on Hum. Rts. Venezuela, supra note 101 (Members of the
Special Actions Forces of the Bolivarian National Police (FAES) committed extrajudicial executions in targeted areas of the country).
111
Situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, supra
note 60, at 5 (In 2019, the United Nations Human Rights Council established the
Independent International Fact–Finding Mission in Venezuela to assess alleged
human rights violations committed since 2014).
112
Detailed findings of the independent international factfinding mission on
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, supra note 52.
113
Concerns with the lack of independence of the justice system have been
expressed in various international reports. see generally U.N. Off. High Comm’r
for Hum. Rts., Independence of the justice system and access to justice in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, including for violations of economic and social
rights, and the situation of human rights in the Arco Minero del Orinoco region,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/54 (Sept. 29, 2020); see also Rep. of the U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm., Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the Bolivarian
106
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to enforce the law or combat crime, but to “punish people for their
perceived political views.” 114 According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), political persecution forced increasing numbers of Venezuelans to
flee. 115
iv)
Abuses against indigenous and Afro–Venezuelan
populations
Indigenous peoples face individual and collective challenges,
threats, and human rights abuses in Venezuela, including marginalization, forced removal or relocation, and denial of land rights,
Republic of Venezuela, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/VEN/CO/4* (Aug. 14, 2015); Rep. of
the Hum. Rts. Comm., Views adopted by the Committee under article 5(4) of the
Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2203/2012, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/121/D/2203/2012 (Feb. 1, 2018); Rep. of the U.N. Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined third and fourth periodic reports
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/VEN/CO/3–4 (Dec.
12, 2014).
114
Venezuela, the International Criminal Court, and Impunity, HUM. RTS
WATCH (July 21, 2021, 5:45 PM), www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/21/venezuela-international-criminal-court-and-impunity.
115
Oriana Van Praag, Understanding the Venezuelan Crisis, WILSON CTR.
(Sept. 13, 2019), www.wilsoncenter.org/article/understanding–the–venezuelan–
refugee–crisis; see also Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. HIGH
COMM’R FOR REFUGEES ¶ 51–52 (Apr. 2019), www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/5ddfcdc47/handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-statusunder-1951-convention.html (addressing the elements of persecution in determining refugee status: “There is no universally accepted definition of ‘persecution’,
and various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little success.
From Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, it may be inferred that a threat to life or
freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership
of a particular social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights – for the same reasons – would also constitute persecution. Whether
other prejudicial actions or threats would amount to persecution will depend on
the circumstances of each case, including the subjective element to which reference has been made in the preceding para. graphs. The subjective character of fear
of persecution requires an evaluation of the opinions and feelings of the person
concerned. It is also in the light of such opinions and feelings that any actual or
anticipated measures against him must necessarily be viewed. Due to variations
in the psychological make–up of individuals and in the circumstances of each
case, interpretations of what amounts to persecution are bound to vary.”).
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among others. 116 Their economic and social rights are disproportionately affected by the humanitarian crisis, especially their rights
to food and health. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights (UNHCR):
Indigenous peoples’ collective rights to their traditional lands,
territories and resources are being violated. They have lost control
of their land, including form militarization by State actors. The presence of State actors has led to violence and insecurity in indigenous
peoples’ territories in recent years, in addition to the presence of organized criminal gangs and armed groups. 117
Violations against Venezuela’s indigenous and Afro–Venezuelan communities are particularly egregious where Venezuelan and
Colombian irregular armed groups exercise control over gold mines
in Venezuela’s southern state of Bolívar. 118 The armed groups operate there with government acquiescence, and in some cases, active
government participation. According to indigenous leaders, state security agents––including a high–ranking official in the Maduro government––routinely visit mining sites to collect bribes and harass the
local communities. 119 The armed groups maintain tight control over
these vulnerable populations by imposing “abusive working conditions and viciously threatening those accused of theft and other offenses.” 120 In some of the worst cases, alleged offenders have been
dismembered and killed in front of co–workers to set an example
and instill terror. 121 Similar conditions exist in Southern Colombia
where illegal armed groups assert control over illegal mining operations and exact a tax from the miners, who work in some of the
harshest conditions. 122
Venezuela: Indigenous peoples face deteriorating human rights situation
due to mining, violence and COVID–19 pandemic, INT’L COMM. JURISTS (Sept.
30, 2020), www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Venezuela-COVID19indigenous-News-Feature-articles-2020-ENG.pdf.
117
U.N. High Comm’n Hum. Rts., Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/18, at 12–13 (Oct. 9, 2019).
118
Venezuela: Violent Abuses in Illegal Gold Mines, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb.
4, 2020), www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/04/venezuela-violent-abuses-illegal-goldmines.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
See Fernando Vergara et al., Colombia Police, Military Raid Illegal Mining
Operation, APNEWS (Apr. 23, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/latin-america116
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In addition to violations committed by irregular armed groups,
the UNHCR is aware of direct involvement by the special forces
units (FAES) of the Bolivarian National Police and Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) units in acts of violence and killings in indigenous territories. 123 For instance, the military was accused of the killings of a Curripaco indigenous leader in Amazon state, indigenous
Warao youths, a pregnant Warao woman, and a six–year–old Warao
girl. 124
In addition, since 2016, the government mandated mining development in many rural areas, leaving women, children, and the elderly especially vulnerable to exploitation, forced displacement,
sexual abuse, labor servitude, and human trafficking. Presidential
Decree 2248 established the Orinoco Mining Arc National Strategic
Development Zone, opening gold extraction in a territory inhabited
by several Afro–Venezuelan and indigenous ethnic groups who
were ignored or not consulted before the project was implemented. 125 According to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Venezuela’s failure to
consult and obtain informed consent from indigenous communities
prior to granting concessions for the exploration and development
of natural resources has impeded their “free exercise of their economic, social and cultural rights.” 126 Given such actions by the
State, indigenous and Afro–Venezuelan populations are left with no
choice but to abandon their lands and flee the country, with the primary destination being Colombia. 127
environment-and-nature-colombia-business3cf59910784353df7c2d030c123ad7c7.
123
Oral Update on Hum. Rts. Venezuela, supra note 101.
124
Id.
125
Informe sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en el Arco Minero y
el territorio venezolano ubicado al sur del río Orinoco, Plataforma contra el Arco
Minero del Orinoco, el Centro para la Reflexión y Acción Social (CERLAS) y
colaboradores, 2019 (Venez.), www.civilisac.org/civilis/wp-content/uploads/Informe-sobre-la-situaci%C3%B3n-de-derechos-humanos-en-el-Arco-Minero-yel-territorio-venezolano-ubicado-al-sur-del-r%C3%ADo-Orinoco.pdf.pdf.
126
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, ¶ 9,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/VEN/CO/3 (2015).
127
Roberto Briceño–León and Gloria Perdomo, Violence against indigenous
children and adolescents in Venezuela, at 6, CADERNOS DE SAÚDE PÚBLICA
(CSP), doi: 10.1590/0102–311X00084718 (2019) (Venez.), https://institutolacso
.org/wp–content/uploads/2019/10/Brice%C3%B1o–Le%C3%B3n–Perdomo201
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v)
Food and water shortages and lack of access to basic
services
Corruption and the government imposition of austere economic
and social policies have undoubtfully affected almost every aspect
of the right to basic services. As reported by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2018, “State control over food prices
and foreign currency exchange, the mismanagement of confiscated
arable land, state monopoly on agricultural supplies, the militarization of food distribution, and the implementation of social programs
without clear nutritional objectives . . . has resulted in critical levels
of food unavailability and a situation where large segments of the
population cannot afford to buy food at market price.” 128
Due to the dismantlement of the domestic food production system and the increased dependency on food imports, government policies have seriously affected access to food and potable water. Food
shortages and scarcity of basic necessities have become widespread
and constant 129 to the point that 60 percent of Venezuelans have “involuntarily lost 19 pounds in one year, and 1.3 million people suffer
from malnutrition,” 130 a condition Venezuelans pejoratively refer to
as the “Maduro Diet.” 131 The figures represent a fourfold increase
in undernourishment since 2014, which corresponds with a period
of severe recession and hyperinflation 132––and it has been the working poor and indigenous communities most impacted by chronic
malnutrition. 133 In an effort to ease food distribution problems, the
9_Violence_against_Indigenous_children_Venezuela_1678–4464–csp–35–s3–
e00084718.p.
128
Human Rights Violations in Bolivarian Republic, supra note 69, at v.
129
AMNESTY INT’L, Amnesty International Report 2020/21, AI Index POL
10/3202/2021, at 390–95 (2021).
130
See generally Escobari, supra note 76. The World Food Programme has
estimated that seven million Venezuelans, or about one in three individuals, face
acute food insecurity and are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. Office
of the U.N High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/45/20, at 2 (Oct. 13, 2020).
131
Moises Rendon, Commentary, The Maduro Diet” Food v. Freedom in
Venezuela, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (July 9, 2018),
www.csis.org/analysis/maduro-diet-food-v-freedom-venezuela.
132
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, at 28 (2020).
133
Briceño–León and Perdomo, supra note 127, at 6.
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Maduro regime initiated “a politically motivated subsidized food
distribution system called Local Committees for Supply and Production, or ‘CLAP’ in Spanish.” 134
The CESCR recommended that the Venezuelan government “increase investment in local agricultural production,” to improve “the
productivity of small farmers and their access to local markets,” and
to “adopt emergency measures to address the shortage of food and
basic necessities.” 135 Such recommendations appear to have been
ignored by the Maduro administration. Lack of state relief in response to food shortages and access to drinkable water sources becomes a powerful “push” factor for Venezuelans to leave the country.
vi)

Lack of physical and mental health services
Preventative health services to the poorest neighborhoods were
intended to be covered entirely by oil revenues from Petróleos de
Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the Venezuelan state–owned oil and natural gas company. 136 However, during Maduro’s mandate, Venezuela’s policies have adversely affected the basic right of its citizens
to health care. In fact, health expenditures and budget allocations in
the Ministry of Health dropped drastically during the last decade,
causing the health care system to collapse. The U.N. Human Rights
Council, in a mandate of its Fact–Finding Mission, expressed “great
concern at the severe economic and social crisis” in Venezuela that
has led to the ultimate collapse of public services. 137 Moreover, the
latest phenomenon has had “a profound effect on the right to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health and the right to an adequate standard of living, including the
right to adequate food.” 138
A fundamental human right is the right to health care that is of
“sufficient quantity and quality. States must ensure access to
Rendon, supra note 131.
U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations,
¶ 26, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/VEN/CO/3 (2015).
136
U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14,
U.N. Doc., E/C/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
137
U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 45/20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/45/20, at
2 (Oct. 13, 2020).
138
Situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, supra
note 60, at 3.
134
135
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preventive, curative and rehabilitative health services.” 139 However,
severe shortages and the irregular supply of basic medicines, vaccination shots, and medical equipment are a constant problem in
Venezuela. Patients are often required to buy medicines and medical
supplies, including syringes and sterile gloves, in order to be treated
in hospitals 140 that are described as being in a “poor state of repair”
and dangerously understaffed by medical personnel. 141
viii) Excessive use of force, killings, arbitrary detentions,
violence, and crime against the civil society
Venezuela’s constitutional institutions have splintered, and encounters with opposition movements and civil unrest have led to violence and unprecedented insecurity nationwide. 142 By 2020, Venezuela had become one of the most violent countries in the region,
with the World Health Organization (WHO) reporting an alarming
number of deaths at a rate of 81.4 deaths per every 100,000 citizens. 143 The high rate of murders, kidnapping, armed robbery, street
gangs, and other organized criminal groups has robbed most Venezuelans of their right to live safely in their own country. 144 For those
“One of the essential elements of the right to health is the availability of
health care facilities, goods and services in sufficient quantity and quality. States
must ensure access to preventive, curative and rehabilitative health services.”
General Comment No. 14 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, op. cit. ¶¶ 12 and 17, Human Rights Violations in Bolivarian Republic,
supra note 69, at 41.
140
Id.
141
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations
(2015), ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/VEN/CO/3; see also Situation of human rights in
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, supra note 60, at 4.
142
AMNESTY INT’L, Venezuela: Hunger, Punishment and Fear, the Formula
for Repression Used by Authorities under Nicolás Maduro (Feb. 20, 2019),
www.amnistia.org/ve/noticias/2019/02/9375/venezuela–hunger–punishment–
and–fear–the–formula–for–repression–used–by–authorities–under–nicolas–maduro.
143
OVERSEAS SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL (OSAC), VENEZUELA 2019 CRIME &
SAFETY REPORT (June 18, 2019), www.osac.gov/Country/Venezuela/Content
/Detail/Report/b0933dac–4154–4dc2–89c1–160ca3b2c4c2.
144
“Violations of the rights to food and health, violence and insecurity, the
collapse of basic services, the deterioration of the education system, lack of access
to pre– and post–natal care, and insufficient mechanisms for protection from violence and persecution on political grounds.” Situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, supra note 60, at 2.
139
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citizens who remain in Venezuela, most indicate that they no longer
feel secure or protected by their Government, nor are they able to
exercise their rights. 145
While Venezuelans from all walks of life and social status are
vulnerable to crime and violence due to the socio–political crisis and
breakdown of government stability, women and children are particularly at high risk of exploitation and abuse. Too often they are
viewed not as subjects entitled to rights, but as “objects” for the State
and criminal actors to use, barter, and exchange. In one instance, a
3–year–old boy was kidnapped for a month by GNB soldiers attached to the National Anti–Kidnapping Command (Conas) in order
to force the father to surrender for suspected theft of government
weapons. 146 Throughout the ordeal, various government agencies
and those from the Miraflores Palace ignored the mother’s plea for
help. Impunity for criminal actors and corrupt government officials
is a serious problem.
Venezuela ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) on August 29, 1990. 147 Ten years later, Venezuela adopted
the internal norm implementing the CRC’s comprehensive protections by creating the Organic Law for Protection by Children and
Adolescents (NNyA). 148 Article 10 refers to children and adolescents as subjects of rights and absolute priority, 149 while Article 8
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 142.
Members of Conas, General Directorate Against Military Intelligence and
Special Action Forces were seeking to arrest Luis (the boy’s father) on suspicion
of stealing weapons from a military facility in Caracas. When the soldiers raided
the home, they took the boy after his mother insisted that she did not know her
husband’s whereabouts. The soldiers left a phone number for Luis to contact them
with a warning that “either the weapons appear, or Luis appears.” Vanessa Moreno Losada, Delsa Solórzano confirma liberación de niño secuestrado por militares del Conas, EFECTO COCUYO (Sept. 12, 2018, 12:28 PM), https://efectococuyo.com/sucesos/delsa-solorzano-confirma-liberacion-de-nino-secuestradopor-militares-del-conas/.
147
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/44/49,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
148
Ley Orgánica Para La Protección De Niños, Niñas Y Adolescentes [Organic Law for Protection by Children and Adolescents], G.O. (5.859 Extraordinaria), www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/mesicic4_ven_ley_org_prot_ninos_adolc.pdf
[hereinafter NNyA].
149
Id. at art. 10. “Todos los niños, niñas y adolescentes son sujetos de derecho;
en consecuencia, gozan de todos los derechos y garantías consagrados en favor de
las personas en el ordenamiento jurídico, especialmente aquellos consagrados en
145
146
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establishes the Best Interest of the Child as an essential principle of
“mandatory compliance” when taking “decisions concerning children and adolescents.” Children’s interests must prevail when conflict arises between their rights and interests and “other equally legitimate rights and interests.” 150
In 2014, the U.N. OHCHR’s Committee on the Rights of the
Child recommended to Venezuela adopt “all the necessary measures
to effectively implement legislation relating to children’s rights in
all areas by providing adequate human, financial and technical resources,” 151 to “finalize the National Plan of Action for Children and
Adolescents” (2015–2019). Additionally, based on that National
Plan of Action, Venezuela was to develop a strategy that “includes
mechanisms for its application, monitoring and evaluation.” 152 The
Committee stressed that the State should provide “adequate human,
technical and financial resources for the strategy.”153 Moreover, the
action plan must “be in full harmony with other sectoral plans in the
area of children’s rights,” including “strengthening its technical cooperation with” UNICEF. 154 But in Venezuela, fulfilling duties under international law does not take precedent over controversial domestic policies and agendas, particularly when it comes to exploitation of natural resources and mineral extraction projects in which
la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño.” [All children and adolescents are
subjects of law; Consequently, they enjoy all the rights and guarantees enshrined
in favor of persons in the legal system, especially those enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child].
150
Id. at art. 8. “El Interés Superior del Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes es un
principio de interpretación y aplicación de esta Ley, el cual es de obligatorio cumplimiento en la toma de todas las decisiones concernientes a los niños, niñas y
adolescentes. Este principio está dirigido a asegurar el desarrollo integral de los
niños, niñas y adolescentes, así como el disfrute pleno y efectivo de sus derechos
y garantías.” [The Best Interest of Children and Adolescents is a principle of interpretation and application of this Law, which is mandatory in making all decisions concerning children and adolescents. This principle is aimed at ensuring the
integral development of children and adolescents, as well as the full and effective
enjoyment of their rights and guarantees.]
151
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts. Concluding Observations, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/VEN/CO/3–5 at ¶ 9 (2015), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15
/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC/C/VEN/CO/3–
5&Lang=En.
152
Id. ¶ 11.
153
Id.
154
Id. ¶¶ 11, 18.
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the prevalence of child labor 155 threatens the social fabric of the society.
When granting concessions for the exploration and development
of natural resources, indigenous peoples and affected communities
are not consulted. 156 The criminal gangs and government officials
involved in mineral extraction routinely violate workers’ rights, particularly with regard to children and adolescents. 157 In southern
Venezuela, 45 percent of mine laborers are children and adolescents, 158 while many children are left unattended by their family
members who go to the mines to obtain more income. Tragically,
children oftentimes lose a parent and become orphaned due to acts
of violence promoted by groups in control of the extraction of gold
or through frequent mining accidents. When left alone in the mining
camps, children––especially young girls––and adolescents are
bought and passed around to be raped, beaten, and forced to get involved in criminal activities by corrupt military personnel, miners,
and irregular armed groups. Girls and adolescents are often displayed like consumable goods for sale as forced labor or sexual
slaves and bartered for between five and ten grams of gold. The
youngest go for the highest number of grams, while older women go
for less grams and are considered an “economical bargain.” 159
155
In its Concluding Observations in 2015, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recommended the government to improve “the fight
against the economic exploitation of children, by ensuring that legislation is vigorously enforced and by strengthening child labour monitoring mechanisms and
support measures for poor families.” U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations (2015), ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/VEN/CO/3–5, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC/C/VEN/CO/3–5&Lang=En.
156
Id. ¶ 9.
157
Informe sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en el Arco Minero y
el territorio venezolano ubicado al sur del río Orinoco, Plataforma contra el Arco
Minero del Orinoco, el Centro para la Reflexión y Acción Social (CERLAS) y
colaboradores, ¶ 65 (2019) (Venez.), www.civilisac.org/civilis/wp-content/uploads/Informe-sobre-la-situaci%C3%B3n-de-derechos-humanos-en-elArco-Minero-y-el-territorio-venezolano-ubicado-al-sur-del-r%C3%ADo-Orinoco.pdf.pdf.
158
Losada, supra note 146.
159
Between 5 and 10 grams of gold. The youngest are more expensive. Informe sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en el Arco Minero y el territorio venezolano ubicado al sur del río Orinoco, ¶ 64 Plataforma contra el Arco
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Therefore, the Venezuelan government has failed its international responsibility to protect its citizens and maintain public order. 160 Instead, it is committing egregious human rights violations
and is unwilling to prevent these atrocities. Human Rights violations
and crimes are “highly coordinated pursuant to State policies, and
part of a widespread and systematic course of conduct, thus amounting to crimes against humanity.”
COLOMBIA’S POST–CONFLICT STATUS AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
Like Venezuela, Colombia is afflicted by multidimensional socio–economic and humanitarian challenges related to economic,
gender and social inequities, extreme violence, poverty,

Minero del Orinoco, el Centro para la Reflexión y Acción Social (CERLAS) y
colaboradores, 2019, www.civilisac.org/civilis/wp-content/uploads/Informe-sobre-la-situaci%C3%B3n-de-derechos-humanos-en-el-Arco-Minero-y-el-territorio-venezolano-ubicado-al-sur-del-r%C3%ADo-Orinoco.pdf.pdf.
160
As a party to numerous multilateral and regional human rights instruments,
Venezuela is under “international obligations to ensure respect for the promotion
and protection of the human rights of all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction.” Situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, supra note 60, at 1. Among others, Venezuela accepted obligations from
the following international instruments: (i) International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Optional Protocols, ratified 1978; (ii) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Optional Protocol, ratified
1978; (iii) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, ratified 1967; (iv) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women and the Optional Protocol thereto, ratified 1983;
(iv) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ratified 1991; (v) Convention on the Rights of the Child,
ratified 1990; (vi) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 2002; (vii)
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified 2003; (viii) International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, ratified 2016; and (ix) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
and the Optional Protocol, ratified 2013. A complete list of instruments to which
Venezuela is a Party may be found at the UNHCR Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, https://indicators.ohchr.org/.
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discrimination, 161 corruption, 162 impunity, 163 and the unanticipated
COVID–19 pandemic and its disastrous effects. 164 Displaced Venezuelans arrive in post–conflict Colombia, a nation facing the challenges that arise from the transition of over five decades of armed
conflict to the end of the warfare with former guerrilla FARC–EP as
a result of the Peace Agreement signed in 2016. However, during
this historical period of socio–political transition, where the
161
Emily Y. Massel, Colombians See Wider Divide Between Rich and Poor,
GALLUP (Dec. 19, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/272324/colombians–
wider–divide–rich–poor.aspx (discussing Colombia’s inequality rates compared
to other Western Hemisphere states and how most Colombians struggle to afford
the basics); Poverty & Equity Brief Colombia Latin America & the Caribbean,
WORLD BANK (Apr. 2021), https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/987B9C90–CB9F–4D93–AE8C–750588BF00QA/AM2020
/Global_POVEQ_COL.pdf (highlighting the increase in poverty from 34.7 percent in 2018 to 35.7 percent in 2019, resulting in an additional 662,000 thousand
people falling into poverty); Samira Akbary, 3 Aspects of Inequality in Colombia,
THE BORGEN PROJECT (Aug. 2020), https://borgenproject.org/inequality–in–colombia/ (discussing Colombian inequality in income, land, and for women and
children).
162
Colombia’s experience with corruption is roughly average, ranking 92d
among the 180 countries catalogued. Colombia received a score of 39/100, where
a score of 0 indicates high level of corruption and 100 indicates very low or clean
level of corruption. Corruption Perceptions Index 2020, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
(Jan.
2021),
https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2020_Report_EN_0802–WEB–1.pdf.
163
Colombia ranks sixth in America in the Global Impunity Index 2020, behind Costa Rica, U.S.A, Barbados, Panama, and Canada, and forty–ninth in the
international arena of the sixty–nine countries measured. Colombia’s worst rated
area is its justice system obtaining a score of 88.91. Juan Antonio le Clercq Ortega
& Gerardo Rodríguez Sánchez Lara, Índice Global de Impunidad 2020, Escalas
de Impunidad en el Mundo, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS SOBRE IMPUNIDAD Y JUSTICIA
(CESIJ), UNIVERSISDAD DE LAS AMÉRICAS PUEBLA (UDLAP), at 61, 69, 176
(2020), www.udlap.mx/cesij/files/indices-globales/0-IGI-2020-UDLAP.pdf.
164
See Gladys Rocio Ariza–Sosa et al., Crisis humanitaria de emergencia en
Colombia por violencia contra las mujeres durante la pandemia de COVID–19
[The Emergency Humanitarian Crisis in Colombia Due to Violence Against Women During the COVID–19 Pandemic], 51 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DERECHO
Y CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS (UPB), at 125 (Jan. 1, 2021), https://revistas.upb.edu.co/index.php/derecho/article/view/7006; Hayley Evans and Prisyll
Avoine, An Intersectional Approach to Colombian Transitional Justice and
(Jan.
15,
2021),
http://opiniojuCOVID–19,
NEWSTEX BLOGS
ris.org/2021/01/15/an-intersectional-approach-to-colombian-transitional-justiceand-covid-19/.
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implementation of the peace process mechanisms is crucial, organized crime benefits from institutional instability, as “warlords who
profited from arms and other illicit trades during conflict [now] seek
out new criminal opportunities.” 165
Venezuelan refugees and migrants—especially those who are
undocumented—have come to join the struggles and fate of internally displaced Colombians (IDPs). 166 Fomenting displacement in
Colombia has long been a strategy by armed groups to maintain territorial control. 167 It is also an expression of power among actors
fighting for regional hegemony and the accumulation of wealth and
resources. 168 Colombian IDPs have been excluded from many opportunities and stigmatized for being displaced. 169 This stigma puts
many at risk, especially women and girls who become displaced due
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Countering Trafficking in Persons in
Conflict Situations, at 2 (2018), https://unodc.org/documents/human–trafficking
/2018/17–08776_ebook–Countering_Trafficking_in_Persons_in_Conflict_Situat
ions.pdf.
166
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines internally displaced persons (IDPs) as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or
obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular
as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human–made disasters,
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, at ¶ 2
(on file with the authors).
167
For a comprehensive analysis of how the Colombian conflict and displacement ignited human trafficking, see Luz E. Nagle, How Conflict and Displacement Fuel Human Trafficking and Abuse of Vulnerable Groups: The Case of Colombia and Opportunities for Real Action and Innovative Solutions, 1
GRONINGEN J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).
168
See National Center for Historical Memory, Una nación desplazada: informe nacional del desplazamiento forzado en Colombia, Bogotá, CNMH –
UARIV, 2015, www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2015/
nacion–desplazada/una–nacion–desplazada.pdf.
169
Colombia’s Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) face great stigmatization.
IDP women in urban areas told U.N. Secretary–General Representative that they
were reduced to work as house employees and were faced with the particular stigmatization of being IDPs and, thus, considered to be a prioris and untrustworthy.
See Walter Kälin (Representative of the Secretary–General on the human rights
of internally displaced persons), Report on Implementation of General Assembly
Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council”, Addendum: Mission to Colombia, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/38/Add.3 (Jan. 24, 2007)
(on file with authors).
165
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to sexual violence. To avoid the stigma, most women neither register
as displaced individuals nor report the crime.
Women and children in the comunas [informal settlements and
neighborhoods] are particularly vulnerable to false opportunities to
get out [of the living conditions]. They are coerced, trafficked or
forced to become prostitutes in a flourishing domestic sex tourism
industry fueled by foreign visitors, or become forced laborers in
manufacturing and agriculture production. They are also recruited
to become combatants and child soldiers, consorts/concubines, and
camp followers for male combatants. 170 Violence against women by
abusive male partners is a constant problem, and children are often
seen as an impediment to surviving in the urban landscape. Human
traffickers exploit all the social conditions rampant in the comunas. 171 Now, Venezuelans receive similar unwelcoming treatment and face a similar fate of exploitation and chronic displacement. 172
Despite signing the Peace Agreement with the FARC–EP in
2016, the factors that contributed to both human and drug trafficking
during the conflict did not cease. 173 Perhaps even more concerning
Even though the recruitment of children into armed groups is an example
of trafficking in persons, the Colombian government does not qualify it as such.
Instead, the government addresses it as a violation under international humanitarian law. For an analysis on the treatment of child soldiers under Colombian law,
see Alarcón–Palacio and Yadira Elena, Reclutamiento forzado de niños y niñas
en el conflicto armado Colombiano: los menores de 18 años como víctimas con
protección especial reforzada en el DIH y DIDH, Vniversitas, No. 138, Enero–
Junio
2019,
https://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/index.php/vnijuri/article/view/26150.
171
How Conflict and Displacement Fuel Human Trafficking and Abuse of Vulnerable Groups: The Case of Colombia and Opportunities for Real Action and
Innovative Solutions, supra note 167, at 10.
172
Venezuelans are not IDPs because they “have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra
note 166, at ¶ 2.
173
In the Colombian conflict, several factors increased vulnerability to trafficking. Forced displacement, socioeconomic hardship and suffering, humanitarian exigence, impunity, deterioration of the rule of law. For an extensive analysis
of human trafficking during the Colombian conflict, see How Conflict and Displacement Fuel Human Trafficking and Abuse of Vulnerable Groups: The Case
of Colombia and Opportunities for Real Action and Innovative Solutions, supra
note 167; see also Estudio Nacional Exploratorio Descriptivo sobre el Fenómeno
de Trata de Personas en Colombia (Feb. 2009), www.unodc.org/documents
170
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is the government’s failure to consider lessons learned from the disasters of the de–mobilization by the paramilitary groups, and the
subsequent commission of those same mistakes with enhanced ramifications. 174
Implementation of the Peace Agreement has been slow, uneven,
and sparse. 175 Colombia struggles in its post–conflict status to fortify brittle institutions, contend with the persistent conditions that
fueled a five–decade conflict that affected over nine million victims, 176 and address instability caused by 8.1 million internally
/frontpage/Investigacion_Trata_CO1.pdf (analyzing a 2009 human trafficking
study by the Colombian government including several factors — poverty, violence, internal armed conflict, and drug trafficking and their illicit crop — that
created conditions for human trafficking).
174
In 2005, the Colombian government enacted Ley 975 de 2005, Diario Oficial No. 45.980 de 25 de julio de 2005 [Justice and Peace Law], a peace agreement
with the paramilitary groups (AUC) under which the AUC would agree to “total
cessation of hostilities and gradual demobilization of its 30,000 members, bring
to justice the main leaders, confession of crimes, restitution for victims, and re–
integrate AUC members into the society.” Significant lack of resources, inadequate staffing and coordination, and failure to process victims’ claims contributed
to the collapse of the process. The demobilization process also triggered the emergence of the criminal gangs called BACRIM. These criminal gangs target displaced people, victims of the conflict in an already vulnerable situation, for exploitative crimes. For more information, see How Conflict and Displacement Fuel
Human Trafficking and Abuse of Vulnerable Groups: The Case of Colombia and
Opportunities for Real Action and Innovative Solutions, supra note 167.
175
Sibylla Brodzinsky, Colombia signs historic peace deal with FARC,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2016, 2:45 PM), www.theguardian.com/world/2016
/nov/24/colombia–signs–historic–peace–deal–with–farc–rebels. Three years
later, the Peace Agreement was largely in tatters and left many Colombians angry
and resentful toward the political actors who brokered the deal. See generally Juan
Arredondo, The Slow Death of Colombia’s Peace Movement, ATLANTIC (Dec. 30,
2019),
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/12/colombia–peace–
farc/604078/.
176
According to the Victims Unit, five decades of internal conflict produced
9,165,126 victims with 1,069,810 people killed, 8,176,460 people displaced,
187,379 cases of forced disappearances, 33,874 cases of sexual crimes and gender–based violence, and the forced recruitment of 8,833 children and youth. Unidad para la atención y reparación integral a las victimas [Official figures by the
Government’s Victims Unit], www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro–unico–de–
victimas–ruv/37394 (last visited Feb. 22, 2022); see also !Basta ya! Colombia:
Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad [Report by the National Center for Historical
Memory] (2013), www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes
2013/bastaYa/basta–ya–colombia–memorias–de–guerra–y–dignidad–2016.pdf.
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displaced Colombian citizens (IDPs), 177 which is second only to
Syria as the highest number of displaced people in the world. 178 Notwithstanding the ongoing transitional process in Colombia, the nation has yet to address many of the psychological, moral, political,
and socio–cultural damages caused by decades of violent conflict. 179
For example, the slow response to human rights violations that
have occurred before, during and following forced internal displacement, including acts such as the destruction of homes and communities, the murder of family members, and ongoing discrimination
on several levels only intensifies the vulnerabilities of IDPs to abuse
and exploitation. 180 IDPs belong to the more marginalized sectors of
As a consequence of the armed conflict in Colombia, according to the
Global Internal Displacement Observatory (IDMC), there were around 5.6 million
internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of December 31, 2019. Más de un millón y
medio de víctimas de desplazamiento en Colombia han avanzado hacia soluciones duraderas, Unidad para la Atención y la Reparación Integral a las Víctimas
(Apr. 27, 2020) (citing to report from El Observatorio Global del Desplazamiento
Interno (IDMC)), www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/victimas-en-el-exterior/masde-un-millon-y-medio-de-victimas-de-desplazamiento-en-colombia-han.
178
In 2020, Colombia was among the five countries––Afghanistan, Colombia,
DRC, Syria, and Yemen––that accounted for more than half the total of IDPs displaced by conflict and violence. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global
Report on Internal Displacement at 11, (April 2020), www.internal–displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2020–IDMC–
GRID.pdf. Displacement is a plight principally of the more marginalized sectors
of society, “predominantly peasants, or campesinos . . . members of the country’s
indigenous and Afro–Colombian communities . . . [w]omen and children continue to make up the vast majority—approximately 80 percent—of the displaced.”
U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 55th sess.,
provisional agenda item 14(c), Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses
and Displaced Persons, Report of the Representative of the Secretary–General on
Internally Displaced Persons Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1999/47, Addendum: Profiles in Displacement: Follow–Up Mission to Colombia, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.1 (2000), ¶ 31 (on file with the authors).
179
The violence has included massacres, forced disappearances, forced displacement, kidnapping, sexual violence, along with impunity for crimes, and social indolence. !Basta ya Colombia! Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad [Report by
the National Center for Historical Memory] (2013), http://www.centrodememoria
historica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/basta–ya–colombia–memorias–de–guerra–y–dignidad–2016.pdf.
180
Cecilia Jimenez–Damary, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, 6,
U.N. Doc. A/73/173 (July 17, 2018) (on file with the authors). As of April 30,
2018, there were 8,679,002 reported victims of the conflict in the Colombian
177
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society—most live in poor rural areas, and many are members of
indigenous and Afro–Colombian populations who fled to urban centers like Medellín to settle in peripheral and vulnerable neighborhoods called comunas. 181 Comunas often lack essential services and
have very little consistent law enforcement presence, subjecting
IDPs to criminal gangs and paramilitary groups who prey on their
defenselessness and recruit, coerce, and force individuals into joining them. Also, adding to the cultural biases they already face,

Registry of Victims (RUV), the largest known repository of data about victims.
Informe de Gobierno, Política de atención y reparación a víctimas at 6 (July
2018), www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/sites/default/files/documentosbiblioteca/info
rmeactualizado2.pdf. Under Colombian Law 1448 of 2011, victims are those who
have suffered damage due to events that occurred from January 1, 1985, as a consequence of infractions of international humanitarian law or serious and manifest
violations of international human rights standards that occurred during internal
armed conflict. Among the recognized acts of victimization are forced displacement, threats to life, integrity and personal safety, terrorist acts, crimes against
sexual freedom and integrity, homicide, massacre, accident by antipersonnel
mines, ammunition without exploding and improvised explosive devices, kidnapping, torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and forced recruitment
of children. L. 1448 of 2011, Diario Oficial No. 48.096, Jun. 10, 2011, www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/sites/default/files/documentosbiblioteca/ley–1448–de–
2011.pdf.
181
Medellín’s official 2020 census indicates 2.569 million residents. Perfil
Demográfico 2016–2020 Total Medellín, www.medellin.gov.co/irj/go/km/doc
s/pccdesign/SubportaldelCiudadano_2/PlandeDesarrollo_0_17/IndicadoresyEstadsticas/Shared%20Content/Documentos/ProyeccionPoblacion2016–2020/Perfi
l%20Demográfico%202016%20–%202020%20Total%20Medellin.pdf.
However, unofficial estimates are in the range of three to four million. Medellín has
been a primary destination for IDPs, in part because it is the capital of the department of Antioquia where a great deal of internal armed conflict has occurred.
Also, as the second largest city in Colombia and its location in the northwestern
part of the country, the city draws IDPs from underdeveloped neighboring departments afflicted by internal armed conflict. “Since the 1970s, Medellín’s population has exploded each decade, with some thirty percent of housing comprising
the illegal settlements constructed up in the hillsides above Medellín’s urban centre during the last forty years. These settlements are called comunas and began
growing when campesinos were forced from their lands.” How Conflict and Displacement Fuel Human Trafficking and Abuse of Vulnerable Groups: The Case
of Colombia and Opportunities for Real Action and Innovative Solutions, supra
note 167, at 10.
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Colombian IDPs often become stigmatized for being identified as
displaced. 182
Conflict and violence has unfortunately continued in the post–
conflict era, 183 largely due to the Colombian government’s lack of
will and incapacity to implement the Peace Agreement while improving and increasing the necessary physical infrastructure and human capital in much of its marginalized and rural territories. 184 The
government has yet to implement safeguards to prevent the exploitation and abuse of vulnerable groups, such as to consolidate institutional practices, strengthen local protection and conflict resolution
mechanisms, and provide adequate economic opportunities for vulnerable populations. 185 On the other hand, Colombia did enact the
Victims’ Law, 186 which if properly executed in the post–conflict
stage, could aid in the prevention of trafficking of IDPs and other
victims. Under the law, municipal governments must provide victims of forced displacement with humanitarian assistance, including
shelter and food. The Law establishes that if a municipal
One can often see this in cities where street beggars (sometimes comprising
entire families) who are obviously not from the city due to their ethnic characteristics are generally shunned and ignored by busy urbanites. Arriving Venezuelans
often take on the burden of stigmatization that Colombia’s IDPs face for being
identified as displaced.
183
Jeremy McDermott, Op–Ed: The ELN as a Colombo–Venezuelan Rebel
Army, INSIGHT CRIME.ORG (Mar. 22, 2019), www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/op–ed–the–eln–as–a–colombo–venezuelan–rebel–army/.
184
The Colombian government lacked readiness “to fill the security vacuum
as FARC units demobilized in 2017.” Instead, other criminal groups, paramilitaries, FARC dissidents, drug cartels, “[have] rushed in or consolidated their control
of these territories [and] conflict dynamics have actually worsened.” Ted Piccone,
Peace with Justice: The Colombian Experience with Transitional Justice at 7,
FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS (July 2019), www.brookings.edu/wp–content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190708_colombia.pdf.
185
Colombia: Criminal elements use violence and intimidation to ‘stamp out’
leaders’ voices, UN NEWS (Jan. 21, 2021), https://news.un.org/en/story/2021
/01/1082712.
186
“The so–called Victims’ Law (“Ley de Victimas”) is the government’s first
serious attempt to address the conflict and its effects through legal mechanisms.
It provides a series of rights for victims—rights to reparation, truth, and justice—
and also establishes accountability for the various perpetrators involved. Most
significantly, the Victim’s Law declares a right of restitution for those who have
been dispossessed of their land or who have been forced to abandon it.” Nicole
Summers, Colombia’s Victims’ Law: Transitional Justice in a Time of Violent
Conflict?, 25 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 219, 220 (2012).
182
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government cannot offer this help, it must be done by the departmental government or a national body. 187 However, in 2017, the
Constitutional Court of Colombia concluded that municipal governments did not have budgets to assist IDPs in the Pacific region of
Nariño, 188 which may reflect similar circumstances in municipalities
across the nation, especially in conflict related or border areas.
The government’s delay to act and fill weaknesses in areas still
unsettled in post–conflict Colombia fosters a transformation of the
organized crime as well as illegal armed groups, boosting their criminal activities and allowing the proliferation of new criminal organizations and dissidents fighting for control of the criminal interests
vacated by the former guerrilla FARC–EP when it demobilized. 189
Post–conflict environments fuel organized crime and
provide opportunities for criminals to profit from institutional instability, as warlords who profited from
arms and other illicit trades during conflict seek out
new criminal opportunities. Such factors, combined
with the lack of access to economic opportunities and
social resources, increase the vulnerability of affected individuals and hinder State efforts to identify
and refer victims. 190
L. 1448 of 2011, Diario Oficial No. 48.096, June 10, 2011, art. 63; Presidential Decree 4800 of 2011, Diario Oficial No. 48.096, June 10, 2011, art. 108,
www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=43043
188
Corte Consitucional de Colombia, Auto 620–2017 [Constitutional Court of
Colombia, Order 620–2017], 15 de noviembre de 2017, www.funcionpublica.g
ov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=85747.
189
See Piccone, supra note 184, at 18 (detailing how several criminal groups
filled FARC–EP’s vacuum and play key roles in licit and illicit economies such
as cattle grazing, exploitation of minerals, drug production and trafficking, and
extortion. Today, there are several active armed groups and criminal organizations
throughout Colombia. Some FARC–EP dissidents and its splinter groups, and paramilitary splinter groups and criminal gangs are active in the forced recruitment
of minors. Other criminal organizations are active in sex and labor trafficking.);
see also Colombia Profile, INSIGHTCRIME.ORG (Jan. 21, 2021), https://insightcrime.org/colombia–organized–crime–news/colombia/#history.
190
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Countering Trafficking in Persons in
Conflict Situations, at 2, (2018) https://unodc.org/documents/human–trafficking
/2018/17–08776_ebook–Countering_Trafficking_in_Persons_in_Conflict_Situat
ions.pdf.
187
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The main battleground, both before and after the signature of
Peace Agreement, takes place on the rural side of the country, where
poor communities exist at the edge of urban centers 191 inhabited by
marginalized and isolated IDPs, who in many cases have been displaced once again as a consequence of confrontations among the
many criminal groups. 192 In 2020, the activities of the illegal armed
groups triggered 151,609 new cases of forced displacements within
the country. 193 The frequency of displacement in 2021 increased
alarmingly, “almost doubling the total of 2020, and exceeding the
total for each year since 2012.” 194
Even after the 2016 Peace Deal, continuing conflicts with the
FARC–EP persist, 195 especially in isolated rural and poor urban
Walter Kälin, Report of the Representative of the Secretary–General on the
human rights of internally displaced persons, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/38/Ad
d.3 (Jan. 5, 2010).
192
ABC de la entrega de bienes de las Farc: entienda la controversia entre
Gobierno y exguerrilla [ABC of the delivery of FARC goods: understand the controversy between the Government and the ex–guerilla], EL ESPECTADOR (Jan. 6,
2021),
www.elespectador.com/colombia–20/paz–y–memoria/abc–de–la–entrega–de–bienes–de–las–farc–entienda–la–controversia–entre–gobierno–y–
exguerrilla–article/; see also “Los ejércitos ilegales que enfrentará la nueva cúpula militar” [“The illegal armies that the new military leadership will face”], EL
TIEMPO (Dec. 21, 2018), www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/los–ejercitos
–ilegales–que–enfrentara–la–nueva–cupula–militar–305714; FARC Dissidents
Want Old Land Back in Colombia’s Caquetá and Meta, INSIGHT CRIME (July
23, 2021), https://insightcrime.org/news/farc–assets–center–of–dissident–disputes–colombia/; Disidencias de Las FARC: ¿Cuáles son, dónde están, qué
hacen? [FARC Dissidents: Who are they, where are they, what are they doing?],
FUNDACIÓN IDEAS PARA LA PAZ (Feb. 7, 2018), http://ideaspaz.org/especiales/infografias/disidencias.html; see also U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Resultados HNO 2020 [Results HNO 2020] at 14, https://
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Resultado
s%20HNO%202020.pdf.
193
Resultados HNO 2020, supra note 192.
194
Colombia: Impacto y tendencias humanitarias entre enero y julio de 2021
(a 30 de agosto de 2021) [Colombia: Impact and humanitarian trends between
January and July 2021 (as of August 30, 2021)], OCHA RELIEFWEB (Sept. 3,
2021), https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia–impacto–y–tendencias–
humanitarias–entre–enero–y–julio–de–2021–30–de–agosto.
195
Jeremy McDermott, Op–Ed: The ELN as a Colombo–Venezuelan Rebel
Army, INSIGHT CRIME (Mar. 22, 2019), www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/
op–ed–the–eln–as–a–colombo–venezuelan–rebel–army/. The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) is a longstanding Colombian Marxist/Leninist revolutionary
insurgency dating back to the early 1960s. See Colombia: ELN, INSIGHT CRIME
191
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areas where minorities live marginalized, isolated, and vulnerable to
powerful criminal actors. 196 Children and adolescents especially,
both males and females, face forced recruitment by FARC–EP dissidents and other armed groups to “replenish the ranks” 197 as combatants and in many cases concubines and servants. 198 Children are
also used by illegal groups to collect extortion payments, for work
in drug processing labs, 199 for prostitution, to sell and smuggle
(Oct. 27, 2020), https://insightcrime.org/colombia–organized–crime–news/eln–
profile/.
196
There are several reasons for the continuation and increase in violence, including ongoing disputes between FARC–EP fronts, conflict with dissident
groups struggling for hegemony throughout Colombian territory, and actions by
the insurgent group ELN to seize land once held by FARC–EP. See generally,
ABC de la entrega de bienes de las Farc: entienda la controversia entre Gobierno
y exguerrilla [ABC of the delivery of FARC goods: understand the controversy
between the Government and the ex–guerilla], EL ESPECTADOR (Jan. 6, 2021, 2:17
PM), www.elespectador.com/colombia–20/paz–y–memoria/abc–de–la–entrega–
de–bienes–de–las–farc–entienda–la–controversia–entre–gobierno–y–exguerrilla–article/; Los ejércitos ilegales que enfrentará la nueva cúpula militar [The
illegal armies that the new military leadership will face], EL TIEMPO (Dec. 21,
2018, 9:14 PM), www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/los–ejercitos–ilegales–que–enfrentara–la–nueva–cupula–militar–305714; Alicia Flórez y Luisa
Acosta, FARC Dissidents Want Old Land Back in Colombia’s Caquetá and Meta,
INSIGHT CRIME (July 23, 2021), https://insightcrime.org/news/farc–assets–center–of–dissident–disputes–colombia/; Disidencias de Las FARC: ¿Cuáles son,
dónde están, qué hacen? [FARC Dissidents: Who are they, where are they, what
are they doing?], FUNDACIÓN IDEAS PARA LA PAZ (Feb. 7, 2018), http://ideaspaz
.org/especiales/infografias/disidencias.html.
197
FARC’s demobilization left a vacuum in Colombia’s underworld, stoking
a growth of criminal factions and re–opening old wounds. Children “are the pawns
of the drug trade.” Mathew Charles, Investigations: Bajo Cauca and Vaupés—
Colombia’s Child Recruitment Hotspots, INSIGHT CRIME (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://insightcrime.org/investigations/bajo–cauca–and–vaupes–colombias–
child–recruitment–hotspots/.
198
Defensoría del Pueblo [Defense of the Town] (Colombia), Alerta Temprana [Early Warning] No. 026–2020, at 5 https://alertasstg.blob.core.windows.n
et/alertas/026–20.pdf.
199
COVID–19 influenced the recruitment of children. Armed groups took advantage of the fact that children and adolescents, mostly from rural areas, have no
way to receive virtual education. The groups promise children income by scraping
coca or with the collection of extortion. According to Julia Castellanos of the
Coalico Childhood and Conflict Observatory, the quarantine made visible the degree of inequality in Colombia. One situation is a child in the city with a computer,
Internet, and parents who can work from home. Another very different situation
is the child without the possibility of having a computer, and his mother has to
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drugs, and to conduct assassinations. 200 There are reports that illegal
armed groups used children “to manufacture, plant, and deploy anti–
personnel mines to commit terrorist attacks.” 201 Recent reports indicate that in 2020, the number of minors currently involved with illegal armed groups stands at the highest level since before Colombia’s Peace Agreement was signed in 2016—a 113 percent increase
since 2019. 202 In many cases, children are also threatened with death
for them or their families if they refuse to participate in the illegal
activities. Moreover, rural children face even greater risks as armed
clashes in the vicinity of some schools are not uncommon. 203
Perhaps the strongest safeguard against armed groups and criminal organizations is to consolidate institutional practices by
“strengthening local protection and conflict resolution mechanisms;
and providing decent economic opportunities for vulnerable

recharge the cell phone with $20,000 pesos a day for her son to get the homework.
Carolina Avila, Falta de clases aumentó el reclutamiento forzado en Colombia
[Lack of classes increase forced recruitment in Colombia], EL ESPECTADOR (May
17, 2020, 7:00 AM), www.elespectador.com/colombia–20/paz–y–memoria/falta–
de–clases–aumento–el–reclutamiento–forzado–en–colombia–article/.
200
For an in–depth examination of the various criminal roles played by child
recruits, see Mathew Charles, In Colombia, Child Soldiers Play Many Roles,
INSIGHT CRIME (Apr. 8, 2021), https://insightcrime.org/investigations/in–colombia–child–soldiers–play–many–roles/. Indigenous children are recruited to
guide criminals into the remote regions that serve as trafficking corridors. They
are little more than “pawns in the drug trade.” Id.
201
Luz E. Nagle, Prosecuting the Use of Anti–Personnel Mines by Illegal
Armed Groups: The Colombian Situation, 8 OR. REV. INT’L L. 231, 247 (2006).
202
Charles, supra note 197. The recruitment and use of minors “remain[s] a
widespread and systematic practice that adapts to the new demands of the armed
conflict. Threats, false promises of better conditions, break–ins into schools and
a weak government presence have led to thousands of children joining the ranks
of armed groups.” Adriaan Alsema, Child recruitment in Colombia continues to
be widespread and systematic, COLOMBIA REPORTS (Jan. 31, 2020), https://colombiareports.com/amp/child-recruitment-in-colombia-continues-to-be-widespread-and-systematic/.
203
At one point, even a grenade created by several seven–year–olds exploded
in a primary school. Fortunately, the facility was empty at the time because the
students and teachers had attended a cultural event. Violencia Reciclada Abusos
por grupos disidentes de las FARC en Tumaco, en la costa pacífica de Colombia
[Recycled Violence Abuses by FARC dissident groups in Tumaco, on the Pacific
Coast of Colombia], HUMAN RTS. WATCH 43 (2018), https://reliefweb.int/sites/r
eliefweb.int/files/resources/colombia1218sp_web.pdf.
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populations.” 204 Unfortunately, it is dubious whether this actually
happens. The Colombian government may have the will, but lacks
the capacity to improve and increase the necessary physical infrastructure and human capital in much of its rural territories, especially in borderlands. 205
In some areas, illegal armed groups have taken advantage of the
pandemic–related conditions to expand their territorial presence,
which has led to new hostilities and increased control over rural
communities, with a significant impact on indigenous and Afro–Colombian populations. 206 Such hostilities cause communities to isolate for some semblance of safety or be subject to forced confinement that impedes access to essential goods and services.
In Colombia’s post–conflict state, gender–based violence has intensified, as has the stress induced by violence within communities.
Gender–based violence is especially severe. One report suggests
that approximately 80 percent of displaced women and girls are assaulted, 207 while another source has reported that one in two
Colombia: Criminal elements use violence and intimidation to ‘stamp out’
leaders’ voices, UN NEWS (Jan. 21, 2021), https://news.un.org/en/story/2021
/01/1082712.
205
Piccone, supra note 189, at 7. The Colombian government lacked readiness
“to fill the security vacuum as FARC units demobilized in 2017.” Id. Instead,
other criminal groups, paramilitaries, FARC dissidents, and drug cartels “rushed
in or consolidated their control of these territories [and] conflict dynamics have
actually worsened.” Id.
206
See Annette Idler and Markus Hochmüller, Covid–19 in Colombia’s Borderlands and the Western Hemisphere: Adding Instability to a Double Crisis, 19
J. LAT. AM. GEOGRAPHY 280 (2020).
207
Representative of the Secretary–General, Specific Groups and Individuals:
Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons: Rep. of the Representative of the Secretary General on internally displaced persons submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 1999/47: Addendum: Profiles in displacement: Follow–up
mission to Colombia, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.1 (Jan.11, 2000) (on
file with the authors). In 2020, the National Victims’ Unit recorded 239 cases of
conflict–related sexual violence. 67 victims were Afro–Colombians and 15 were
individuals from indigenous communities. Sixteen cases concerned persons living
with disabilities. The Office of the Ombudsperson reported 189 cases of sexual
violence, primarily affecting women. The United Nations documented 32 cases
of sexual violence. Dissident fronts of FARC–EP were implicated in six of these
cases, and one case was attributed to Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN).
Members of the military were implicated in cases of sexual violence against three
indigenous girls. U.N. Security Council, Conflict–related sexual violence, U.N.
204
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displaced females are victims. 208 Human Rights Watch has noted in
its report on gender–based violence in Colombia the following:
Protection measures for victims of gender–based violence are available under several laws. Victims can
start the process of procuring orders for protection
measures through several government offices, including municipal officers, family commissioners,
courts, or prosecutors. Unfortunately, the system
does not always operate effectively. 209
Many women are raped and suffer other physical abuse by
spouses and others. 210 In the post–conflict stage, vulnerable, abandoned, and forgotten women are still impacted by forced displacement due to sexual violence 211 and abuse, including forced prostitution, sexual slavery, or human trafficking for sexual exploitation—
all persisting factors of forced displacement.
Although there are many protection measures and programs under several laws to assist victims of gender–based violence, their
shortcomings in implementation continue putting this group at risk
of abuses and trafficking. 212 For instance, achieving justice for
Doc. S/2021/312, ¶ 24 (Mar. 20, 2021), www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7
B65BFCF9B–6D27–4E9C–8CD3–CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2021_312.pdf.
208
Rights Out of Reach: Obstacles to Health, Justice, and Protection for Displaced Victims of Gender–Based Violence in Colombia, HUMAN RTS. WATCH, at
1 (2012), www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/colombia1112forUpload.pdf.
209
Id. at 4.
210
Id. at 21.
211
Id. at 2; José Miguel Vivanco, Las mujeres abandonadas de Tumaco,
HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Mar. 25, 2019, 12:15 PM), www.hrw.org/es/news/2019/0
3/25/las–mujeres–abandonadas–de–tumaco# (In 2017–2018, the coastal town of
Tumaco in southwestern Colombia received more than 70 reports of sexual violence linked to the armed conflict.).
212
See Decree 4796 of 2011, Diario Oficial No. 48.289, December 20, 2011,
http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Normativa/Decretos/2011/Documents/Diciembre/20/dec479620122011.pdf (Under art. 42 of Colombia’s Political Constitution,
“any form of violence in the family is considered destructive to the family’s harmony and unity and should be sanctioned in conformity to the law.” Political Constitution of Colombia, 1991, art. 42. L. 1257 of 2008, Diario Oficial No. 47.193,
December 4, 2008, sets out preventing and punishing violence and discrimination
against women, and reforming the criminal and procedural codes, and art. 15 of
L. 360 of 1997, Diario Oficial No. 42.978, February 11, 1997, establishes that
displaced women and girls have a right to free health services after sexual or
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displaced women and girls entails facing several traumatizing hurdles “including mistreatment by authorities, evidentiary challenges,
and fear of retribution.” 213 When seeking benefits given to displaced
families, like food and shelter, female victims of domestic violence
most often face the conundrum of remaining with the abuser or losing vital benefits. Still, laws and programs to assist victims of gender–based violence do exist on paper, at least. Colombian law requires the government to provide temporary housing, transportation,
and food to victims of sexual violence. 214 However, assistance is
rarely provided, many areas lack shelters, 215 and females continue
to be at risk of abuse, exploitation, and human trafficking.
The due diligence standard applied to nations in post–conflict
situations must consider whether the nation is unwilling or unable
to protect individuals from human trafficking and the violent criminal organizations or armed groups that engage in it. 216 Balancing
international obligations with a country’s internal conditions must
be a factor when addressing state responsibility. An objective test
should be developed to determine if the internal conditions affect a
nations’ response to human trafficking or if those conditions are not

intrafamilial violence. In December 2011, Presidential Decree 4796 implemented
L. 1257 of 2008 and directed the Ministry of Health and Social Protection to prepare the Ten–Year Plan of Public Health that would include the strategies, plans,
programs, actions, and resources for the eradication of different forms of violence
against women. The Law also defines actions necessary to detect, prevent and
attend to women victims of violence through the services guaranteed by the General System of Social Security in Health, and implement mechanisms to make
effective the right to health.).
213
Rights Out of Reach: Obstacles to Health, Justice, and Protection for Displaced Victims of Gender–Based Violence in Colombia, supra note 208, at 3.
(Women face daunting challenges, including delays in accessing forensic screening and police and prosecutors who will not take their cases seriously.).
214
Ley 1257 de 2008, art. 19, Diario Oficial No. 47.193 de 4 de diciembre de
2008.
215
Human Rights Watch, Violencia Reciclada Abusos por grupos disidentes
de las FARC en Tumaco, en la costa pacífica de Colombia (2018), at 62–63,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/colombia1218sp_web.pdf.
216
ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING
247 (2010) (According to Gallagher, inferring due diligence in the trafficking context is not straight forward. She asks, “what is the situation with regard to claims
that the State is unable (as opposed to unwilling) to protect its citizens and others
withing its territory from trafficking and related violations of human rights?”).
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a determinant on the lack of response, and if the response is instead
due to a lack of will by the government.
IMPACT OF THE COVID–19 PANDEMIC ON THE COLOMBIAN STATE
The onset of the COVID–19 pandemic has significantly aggravated Colombia’s post–conflict conditions and hindered government efforts to attend to the humanitarian needs of vulnerable population in most parts of the nation. 217 COVID-19 rapidly overtook
Colombia beginning in March 2020. The national government took
aggressive steps to contend with high infection rates, although the
harsh measures had significant adverse social impacts. 218 On March
12, Colombia’s Ministry of Health and Social Protection declared a
health emergency due to the rapid spread of COVID–19. On March
20, the Interior Ministry decreed mandatory isolation “for the elderly and the cessation of face–to–face academic activities in official colleges and universities.” 219 Less than a week later, the government locked down the country for all population sectors from
March 25 through April 13. Intensive isolation of the general population was partially lifted on September 1, 2020, with certain restrictions on crowd gatherings, and certain activities remaining in
place. 220 After two years from the beginning of the pandemic, as of
March 2022, more than 6 million cases of COVID–19 infections and

U.N. – Coordinated Support to People Affected by Disaster and Conflict,
Global Humanitarian Overview 2021, at 87, (Dec. 10, 2020), https://reliefweb.in
t/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GHO2021_EN.pdf.
218
See Ariza–Sosa et al., supra note 164, at 125.
219
Marcela Gutierrez Bernal, et al., Colombia: Mis Manos te Enseñan [My
Hands Teach You], ICBF (2020), https://oecdedutoday.com/wp–content/uploads
/2020/08/Colombia–Mis–manos–te–ensenan.pdf. (Early childhood development
programs closed, as well. In response, the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF) launched Mis Manos te Enseñan (My Hands Teach You) targeting
more than 1.7 million vulnerable children and pregnant women. Its aims were to
ensure that children’s comprehensive development would continue to be fostered
at home, and to contribute to the protection of children’s rights during the period
of social distancing.).
220
See Ariza–Sosa et al., supra note 164, at 125.
217
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139,650 deaths were reported nationwide by the Ministry of Health
and Social Protection. 221
The highly restrictive emergency measures had an adverse impact on women and children particularly, and extended into the Venezuelan migrant populations 222 where poverty, overcrowding, and
insufficient sanitation in migrant communities contributed to high
transmission rates. 223 Several feminist organizations found that isolation in a household exposed women and children to abuse and exploitation, and reports of widespread abuses suggested that steps
taken by the Colombian government to protect its citizens from the
spread of COVID–19 had the unintended consequence of increasing
violence against vulnerable people (and likely including the elderly). 224 In Colombia, pre–pandemic violence against women was
already considered a “political and health problem.” 225 As the pandemic spread throughout Colombia, emergency calls involving violence against women increased 99 percent between the March 25,
2020 lockdown to the lifting of restrictions on October 29, 2020.
Calls reporting domestic violence in general increased 116 percent
during the same time (more than 18 thousand calls). 226
Along the Colombian–Venezuelan border, the Colombian government closed official border crossings of migrants into Colombia
as soon as local authorities detected the first COVID–19 case in Colombia in March 2020. 227 The new restrictions on movement and
working imposed by Colombian authorities placed Venezuelan
See Situación actual Coronavirus (COVID–19), MINISTERIO DE SALUD Y
PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL, www.minsalud.gov.co/salud/publica/PET/Paginas/Covid–
19_copia.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
222
See Colombian Women’s Observatory, La violencia contra las mujeres migrantes en Colombia: una frontera por superar [Violence against migrant women
in Colombia: a hardship to overcome], https://observatoriomujeres.gov.co/arch
ivos/publicaciones/Publicacion_187.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
223
Hayley Evans and Prisyll Avoine, An Intersectional Approach to Colombian Transitional Justice and COVID–19, OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 15, 2021), http://op
iniojuris.org/2021/01/15/an–intersectional–approach–to–colombian–transitional
–justice–and–covid–19/.
224
Id. at 125.
225
Id. at 144.
226
Ariza–Sosa et al. supra note 164.
227
Disorder on the Border: Keeping the Peace between Colombia and Venezuela, INT’L CRISIS GRP. 28 (Dec. 14, 2020), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.
net/084–disorder–on–the%20border.pdf.
221
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migrants already in Colombia—migrants who depended on informal
economic jobs or employment opportunities—in dire circumstances. 228 By May 2020, most social services were sharply curtailed, including shelters and organizations feeding migrants which
switched from providing in–person meals to handing out food instead. 229
Despite the lockdown and the international borders closure, including the border between Colombia and Venezuela, the pandemic
did have the unintended consequence of an estimated 122,000 Venezuelans electing to return to their homes and family members in
Venezuela. 230 Instead of finding shelter among family and friends,
however, many returning migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers
were subjected to inhumane treatment and victimization by Venezuelan authorities. 231 Returnees were forced to quarantine for two
weeks in centers that were described as cramped, unhealthy and
dirty. Venezuelan colectivos 232 were reported to visit the centers
looking “for signs of political dissent” among the returning
Id.
Id.
230
Ángela Méndez–Triviño, Forced Back Home by the Pandemic, Venezuelan Grandmother Sees No Choice But to Flee Once Again, THE UN REFUGEE
AGENCY (Dec. 10, 2020), www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2020/12/5fd14a064/
forced–home–pandemic–venezuelan–grandmother–sees–choice–flee–once.html.
231
Id. (“With Latin America hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic, and lockdown and other restrictions taking a terrible economic and social toll throughout
the region, tens of thousands of the estimated 5.4 million Venezuelans refugees
and migrants living abroad have taken the drastic step of returning home over the
past months.”)
232
Colectivos are irregular armed gangs, para–police or paramilitary groups
loyal to the Maduro regime who serve to harass and terrorize government opponents and protestors. President Maduro refers to them as “angels of socialism”
stating: “I admire them. They are organisations created for the good of the community. The collectives work for society, for the sick, for peace, and against
crime. They have been around for 20 years as a form of organisation of the people.” While some colectivos do some community good and provide social services, the colectivos originated in the 1960s as leftist urban rebel criminal gangs
inspired by the Cuban revolutionary sentiments among Venezuela’s working
class. Today’s colectivos are “well known for carrying out extrajudicial killings,
kidnapping, running extortion networks and controlling lucrative food distribution networks in the community, as well as trafficking in petrol and drugs along
the border with Colombia.” Lucia Newman, Venezuela: Who are the Colectivos,
ALJAZEERA (May 9, 2019), www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/5/9/venezuela–
who–are–the–colectivos.
228
229
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migrants. 233 The Venezuelan government went so far as to accuse
Colombia of “planting” sick migrants back into Venezuela as “biological weapons” intended to spread the pandemic through the country. 234
That movement back into Venezuela slowed and again reversed
as the pandemic subsided and in proportion to Colombia reopening
its economy and easing restrictions on movement. In one case, it was
reported that some 3,000 Venezuelans in Táchira border state
crossed back into Colombia as of November 2020. 235 The anticipated return of Venezuelans into Colombia presented new challenges for Colombia and Venezuela to fulfill shared state responsibilities for the migrants and refugees. In December 2020, the International Crisis Group reported on then current conditions at the border:
The risk of uncontrolled disease transmission along
and across the border persuaded parts of the Venezuelan and Colombian state to resume working–level
contacts after over a year of total estrangement, although bilateral communication has largely ceased
since then. At the beginning of the COVID–19 outbreak, the Venezuelan and Colombian ombudsmen,
state agencies charged with protecting civil and human rights in each country, issued a joint statement
to activate a channel of communication. Both health
ministers also opened a line for joint consultation at
the same time. Venezuelan and Colombian authorities established a basic procedure for returnees to
cross the official border, although distrust between
the two states remains visceral and is reflected in the
treatment meted out to migrants. At present, Venezuela allows 200 people to cross back into the country over the Simón Bolívar bridge each day, and another 100 per day over the official border crossing
between Arauca and Apure. 236
233
234
235
236

INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 227, at 29.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 28–29.
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The COVID–19 pandemic did little to help Venezuelan migrants
assimilate into Colombian communities, as fears arising from the
pandemic increased hostility toward Venezuelans that had long simmered beneath the surface. 237 Many host communities in Colombia
believed the returning Venezuelan migrants were COVID–19 carriers and showed renewed discomfort toward their presence, a “not in
my backyard” attitude in municipalities or cities “through various
types of rejection actions such as protests, physical and psychological violence, hate speech, and discrimination.” 238 The negativity and
overt hostility toward the Venezuelan migrants occurred on top of
Colombians’ existing uncertainty about the migrants and Colombia’s overall role as a host country. 239
Nor did COVID–19 reduce the vulnerability of Colombians, migrants, and refugees to violence by armed groups and criminal organizations. In the first nine months of 2020 alone, illegal armed
groups launched at least 242 assaults on humanitarian medical missions and health workers, “representing a 63 percent increase in
comparison to the previous year. 240
PULL FACTORS, THE JOURNEY, AND COMPOUNDED
VULNERABILITIES
If England and the United States are two countries separated by
a common language, 241 Venezuela and Colombia are two countries
separated by a common history. 242 During the 1990s, “Colombia
See Lucia Ramírez Bolivar & Lina Arroyave Velazquez, Migración, pandemia y xenofobia en Colombia, Perú y Chile: tres palabras que nunca debieron
unirse, DEJUSTICIA 1, 4 (Sept. 2021), www.dejusticia.org/wp–content/uploads/2
021/09/DMAA–13.pdf.
238
The Caminantes: Need and Vulnerabilities of Venezuelan Refugee and Migrants Travelling on Foot, ASSESSMENT CAPACITIES PROJECT (ACAPS) 1, 9 (Jan.
2021), www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210121_acaps_thematic
_report_caminantes_in_colombia_and_venezuela.pdf. [hereinafter The Caminantes: Need and Vulnerabilities].
239
Id.
240
Part two: Inter–agency Appeals: Colombia, GLOB. HUMANITARIAN
OVERVIEW 2022, https://gho.unocha.org/colombia (last visited Feb. 12, 2022).
241
A popular invective most often attributed to George Bernard Shaw.
CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 302 (rev. 3d ed.).
242
Venezuela and Colombia once formed one country, in several manifestations, from liberation from Spain in 1819 until 1863 when Colombia became an
237
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was the largest country of origin of refugees in the Latin America
and Caribbean region” 243 with thousands migrating to Venezuela to
escape political violence and internal armed conflict. 244 Over the
last two decades, the deteriorating conditions in Venezuela triggered
a reverse migration between the two countries, as desperate Venezuelans were “pulled” to Colombia by the hope of relocating to a
place of opportunity, refuge, common cultures, and protection.
Among the migrants and refugees, half a million Colombian nationals who fled to Venezuela during the previous century joined the
flow west across the border, further impacting Colombia’s capacity
to deal with the massive influx of people. 245 What they found
brought them little relief from what they had left behind in Venezuela and they discovered that while the Colombian government
recognized its duty under international law to care for refugees, Colombians were not very welcoming or sympathetic to the plight of
their Venezuelan “neighbors.” 246 Moreover, since Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis was not provoked by armed conflict, Colombia is
not necessarily obligated to extend protections that refugee status
provides, 247 ignoring the international guidelines established in the
independent nation. See generally DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN
COLOMBIA: A NATION IN SPITE OF ITSELF, 42–102 (1993).
243
World Migration Report 2020, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
MIGRATION (IOM) i, 99 (Nov. 2019), www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr_20
20.pdf.
244
See Cruzando la frontera: memorias del éxodo hacia Venezuela. El caso
del río Arauca, NAT’L CENTER FOR HISTORICAL MEMORY 1, 26 (2014), www.cen
trodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2015/nacion–desplazada/cruzando–la–frontera.pdf.
245
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cancillería de Colombia, as of October 30, 2019, more than half a million Colombian nationals
returned from Venezuela. See #HazteVisible, el llamado de la Cancillería para
visibilizar a los colombianos que han retornado del exterior, CANCILLERÍA (Oct.
30, 2019), www.cancilleria.gov.co/en/newsroom/news/haztevisible–llamado–can
cilleria–visibilizar–colombianos–han–retornado–exterior.
246
See John Otis, Large Venezuelan Migration Sparks Xenophobic Backlash
In Colombia, NPR (Dec. 29, 2020), www.npr.org/2020/12/29/949548865/large–
venezuelan–migration–sparks–xenophobic–backlash–in–colombia.
247
Oriana Van Praag, Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis, WILSON
CENTER (Sept. 13, 2019), www.wilsoncenter.org/article/understanding–the–venezuelan–refugee–crisis. The Syrian refugee crisis should provide Venezuela with
a useful comparison of international management of a refugee crisis, especially
given that Venezuela ranks second to Syria in terms of people that have been
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1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. 248 This creates a problem
for the government as to how the Colombian people treat migrants.
i)

Vulnerabilities associated with irregular migration
By 2019, migrants with proper papers were exceeded by undocumented migrants in an irregular situation —"who are not authorized to enter, to stay or to engage in a State”— 249 often referred to
as caminantes (walkers), who crossed by foot into Colombian territory carrying all their belongings in backpacks or even plastic
bags. 250 The caminantes enter Colombia through trochas—irregular
routes along the border—to avoid having the required documentation or financial means to enter Colombia. 251 Taking the trochas involves “risking their lives and belongings along the way,” according
to Adriana Mejía Hernández, Colombia’s Vice–Minister for Multicultural Affairs. 252
Failure to prepare before departure without knowing their destination means no turning back for the caminantes once they choose
to leave everything behind in Venezuela. 253 Unforeseen
displaced across international borders. However, despite the magnitude of the
problem, the Venezuelan crisis has only received a fraction of the international
attention and funding dedicated to the Syrian crisis.
248
The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees “is the landmark regional
refugee instrument, which broadened the refugee definition for Latin America and
proposed new approaches to the humanitarian needs of refugees and displaced
with a spirit of solidarity and cooperation.” Cartagena+30, UNHCR, www.acnur.org/cartagena30/en/background–and–challenges/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2022);
see also Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, UNHRC (Nov. 22, 1984), www.unhcr.org/about–us/background/45dc19084/cartagena–declaration–refugees–
adopted–colloquium–international–protection.html.
249
Richard Perruchoud &Jillyanne Redpath–Cross, Glossary on Migration,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION 55 (2d ed. 2011), www.corteid
h.or.cr/sitios/observaciones/11/anexo5.pdf; see also World Migration Report
2020, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM) i, 99 (2019),
www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr_2020.pdf.
250
Tamara Taraciuk Broner, The Venezuelan Walkers, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Sept. 5, 2018), www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/05/venezuelan–walkers.
251
The Caminantes: Need and Vulnerabilities, supra note 238, at 1.
252
Adriana Mejía Hernández, Understanding Migration as an Asset: the Colombian Case, OECD DEV. MATTERS (May 5, 2021), https://oecd–development–
matters.org/2021/05/05/understanding–migration–as–an–asset–the–colombian–
case/.
253
The Caminantes: Need and Vulnerabilities, supra note 238, at 6.
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circumstances in their journey to Colombia increase vulnerability to
human rights violations, including human trafficking and other
forms of human exploitation. Children and unaccompanied minors,
elderly, and sick family members face daunting obstacles as they
simply seek to survive and flee the chaotic life they left behind.
ii)

Vulnerabilities associated with mental health issues
As a result, there is an increased risk of mental health issues
amongst migrants –a result that can be attributed to migrants’ vulnerability in the migratory cycle, to the characteristics of their personality and life stories, and to their individual capacity for resilience. 254 The mental health of the caminantes can be affected by several factors, making them more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.
Leaving a country and worrying about the wellbeing of the families
they have left behind causes depression, hopelessness, sleep disturbances, distress, concern, fear, somatizations, and difficulties in interpersonal relationships. 255 This can be due to the accumulation of
stressful situations to which they are exposed, such as separation
from loved ones, difficulties finding and keeping a job, inability to
have a decent home, financial need, the feeling of helplessness and
failure, loneliness, and the daily struggle to survive. Violence and
other traumatic experiences during the journey can cause post–traumatic stress or generate other psychological issues. 256 Additionally,
the emotional impact of migration on women and children can be
attributed to the familial disintegration and other challenges raised
by the migratory process. This can lead to the adoption of risky behaviors by children and young people, creating a greater vulnerability to violence, sexual abuse, and exploitation. 257

Luisa Fernanda Ruiz Eslava & David Alejandro Rodríguez Pérez, Percepción de las necesidades en salud mental de población migrante venezolana en 13
departamentos de Colombia. Reflexiones y desafíos, 19 REVISTA GERENCIA Y
POLÍTICAS DE SALUD (Oct. 2, 2020), https://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/index.php/
gerepolsal/article/view/31372.
255
Id. at 12.
256
Tamara, supra note 250.
257
Ruiz Eslava, supra note 254, at 11.
254

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER–AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

59

iii)

Vulnerabilities associated with lack of resources
Nearly half a million caminantes have remained along the border as they lack the resources and proper documentation to enter
further into Colombia, or because family members remain in their
homeland and they have no alternative but to stay closer to them,
despite the extremely complicated conditions. 258 There, they have
established informal communities. These settlements have spread,
exacerbating the already limited access to essential services, food,
health, and shelter. Most border towns are impoverished and poor,
causing tensions between the local population and Venezuelan migrants over employment opportunities and social services, increasing incidents of violence, discrimination, crime, and prejudice. 259
iv)
Vulnerabilities associated with crime and armed groups in
border crossings
Plagued with “[p]overty, corruption and booming black markets––including trade in the world’s largest concentration of coca
crops,” the border crossings are a magnet for transborder crime and
exploitation of vulnerable populations, “particularly on the Colombian side.” 260 Crime and smuggling of contraband have long been a
way of life in border towns. 261 What has changed in recent years is
258
“Individuals most vulnerable to harm are those with the fewest alternatives.” For research on the social, political, economic and cultural conditions that
could put Venezuelans at risk of being trafficking victims in Colombia, see Migración Venezolana y la Trata de Personas, MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR,
OBSERVATORIO NACIONAL TRATA DE PERSONAS (2018), https://tratadepersonas.
mininterior.gov.co/sites/default/files/migracion_venezolana_y_la_trata_de_pers
onas.pdf.
259
The primary border crossings are located in the towns Paraguachó in northeastern Colombia, Puerto Santander and Cúcuta/Santa Teresa in the central region
of the border, and Arauca in southeastern Colombia. For an in–depth report on
economic and social conditions in Colombia’s border towns along the Colombia–
Venezuela frontier, see Nubia Pedraza Palacios, Género, desplazamiento y
refugio. Frontera Colombia y Venezuela, UNIFEM (Dec. 2005), www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2006/4039.pdf.
260
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 227, at i.
261
The Venezuela–Colombia border has experienced a high level of gasoline
smuggling, which has become a highly lucrative black–market commodity. In
August 2016, the Colombian government broke up what authorities claimed to be
the largest gasoline transborder smuggling network. It was just one group of
smugglers among many following a similar modus operandi, and despite claims

60

INTER–AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:2

the overt increase in violence and clashes between illegal armed
groups that often catch migrants in the crossfire. 262 Thus, remaining
in these border towns is dangerous for migrants passing through. 263
During 2020 and 2021, border closings due to diplomatic confrontations and COVID–19 created new opportunities for criminal
groups and corrupt officials who extort migrants seeking to cross the
border. 264 Some migrants have been reported as “disappeared or
murdered, either for not paying extortion fees or because they are
suspected of collaborating with other bands . . . .” 265 Murders have
become almost a daily occurrence at the trochas. 266 Moreover, the
border areas where there is little government control have become
locations for sporadic clashes between rogue units of the FARC–EP
that did not demobilize in 2016 and militant National Liberation
Army (ELN) 267 guerrilla groups seeking control over the Colombian–Venezuelan border territory. 268 The fighting has risen to the
by the government, there is no reason to think that the enforcement effort has any
significant impact. The smuggling operation goes something like this: the gasoline is collected into convoys of trucks, nicknamed “caravans of death”, in Maracaibo, Venezuela, and moved at high–speed along clandestine border crossings
and rural roads to porous border crossings. Once across the border, the gasoline
is redistributed along black–market corridors in the eastern Colombian Department of César. This large–scale form of smuggling grew after Colombia and Venezuela closed the border for nearly a year due to increasing political tensions between the two governments involving armed insurgents. Before the borders
closed, smalltime smuggling of all manner of goods and consumables were flowing from Colombia into Venezuela (for generations), taking advantage of an easing of border restrictions under globalization policies. The small–time smuggling,
referred to as “smurfing,” went away when the borders were closed, which made
large–scale movement of contraband far more profitable, especially for organized
crime and illegal armed groups. See Luz E. Nagle, Transborder Crime, Corruption, and Sustaining Illegal Armed Groups in Latin America, SMALL WARS J.
(July 8, 2017, 2:08 AM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/transborder–crime–
corruption–and–sustaining–illegal–armed–groups–in–latin–america.
262
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 227, at 10 (Even though the Colombia
border is sparsely populated, it is one of the country’s most violent areas. Between
2012 and 2019, close to 5,000 people were killed.).
263
See id at i.
264
See id at ii.
265
Id. at 6.
266
See id. at 7.
267
Colombia: ELN, supra note 195.
268
According to the U.S. State Department as of 2021, “Illegal armed groups,
particularly in the departments of Chocó, Norte de Santander, Córdoba, Nariño,
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level of a low–intensity conflict 269 that has sucked the migrant population into the violence, including the forced recruitment of young
Venezuelans to become combatants. The armed groups operate
“with near–to–absolute impunity on both sides of the border,” posing an enormous threat, particularly for women and children. 270
Venezuelan and Colombian human trafficking networks abound
on each side of the border, often in collusion with corrupt law enforcement officers who belong to the networks. These networks
“impose their own rules, threaten residents, and punish those who
disobey, even with murder or months of forced labor in the
fields.” 271 Women unable to pay extortion to not be trafficked are
sexually abused and assaulted. Reports chronicle that some pregnant
migrants have sold “their unborn babies for a spot price at the informal crossings.” 272 In 2019, the Ombudsman’s Office issued an early
warning regarding human trafficking networks for sexual exploitation, and it documented recruitment in Venezuela at the border
crossing.
v)
Vulnerabilities associated with gender and sexual
orientation
Among the Venezuelan migrants and refugees, at–risk groups
include the indigenous Wayuú, Zenú, and Inga, individuals of

and Cauca, forcibly recruit children, including Venezuelan, indigenous, and Afro–
Colombian youth, to serve as combatants and informants and harvest illicit crops,
and to exploit them in sex trafficking.” 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, U.S. Dep’t of State. (June 2021), www.state.gov/reports/2021–trafficking–in–persons–report/colombia/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
269
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 227, at 10.
270
According to Human Rights Watch, illegal armed groups in the eastern
Colombian province of Arauca and the neighboring Venezuelan state of Apure
control the local population with extreme violence. The Colombian side is controlled by rogue FARC–EP and ELN units, and the Patriotic Forces of National
Liberation (Fuerzas Patrióticas de Liberación Nacional – FPLN) operates on the
Venezuelan side. These groups are known to sometimes cooperate with government security forces and local authorities. See “The Guerrillas Are the Police”
Social Control and Abuses by Armed Groups in Colombia’s Arauca Province and
Venezuela’s Apure State, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1, 1 (Jan. 2020),
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/colombia0120_web.pdf.
271
Id.
272
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 227, at 10.
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African descent and LGBT individuals. 273 The “feminization” and
sexualization of the Venezuelan tragedy is widespread and
gloomy. 274 Venezuelan women face great challenges, and prostitution and survival sex are a difficult result. 275 Regardless of their economic and educational status, the despair associated with migrant
women struggling to send food and medicine to their loved ones
back home has created “a breeding ground for trafficking, sexual
slavery, child exploitation, forced prostitution and survival sex.” 276
Venezuelan females are constantly subjected to “harassment and
sexual exploitation in exchange for food, water, medicine, personal
hygiene products and other basic goods.” 277
Venezuelan women and young girls are the most affected by human trafficking both in larger and smaller cities. 278 In one
Early Alert No. 039–19: Prevention and Protection, INDEPAZ (Sept. 16,
2019), www.indepaz.org.co/wp–content/uploads/2020/02/AT–N%C2%B0–039–
19–LAG–Maicao.pdf.
274
In macho societies, life for women is more difficult to navigate. They encounter situations of vulnerability and exposure to people taking advantage of
them. Venezuelan migrants endure “men sexually harassing and verbally abusing
them and pressing them for sex while they work as waitresses or cleaners.” The
“old and widely–known narrative of local beauties as an exportation product,” is
an added factor that fuels and facilitates violations of Venezuelan women rights.
See Noemí Pérez Vásquez, The ‘fallen’ Miss Venezuela: a tragedy of sexual slavery and trafficking, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Aug. 19, 2019), www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/the–fallen–miss–venezuela–a–tragedy–of–sexual–slavery–and–trafficking/ Vulnerable women migrants feel the most the effects of xenophobia. They are given derogatory names, chastised for having children and are verbally and sexually harassed and abused.
275
See Giacomo Tognini, Another Consequence of Venezuela Crisis: A Sex
Trafficking Boom, WORLDCRUNCH (Jun. 11, 2018), www.worldcrunch.com/worl
d–affairs/another–consequence–of–venezuela–crisis–a–sex–trafficking–boom.
276
Vásquez, supra note 274.
277
ALLISON B. WOLF, JUST IMMIGRATION IN THE AMERICAS, 160 (2020). The
hyper–sexualization of Venezuelan women and young girls puts them at grave
risk of sexual exploitation. See generally Victoria Capriles, Trata de Mujeres Venezolanas en el Contexto de la Crisis Migratoria: Respuestas de Colombia, México y Trinidad y Tobago (2017–2020), LIBRO HOMENAJE AL DOCTOR PEDRO
NIKKEN, TOMO I 419 (Allan R. Brewer–Carías and Carlos Ayala Corao eds.,
2021) www.researchgate.net/publication/353689995_Trata_de_mujeres_venezolanas_en_el_contexto_de_la_crisis_migratoria_y_de_refugiados_Respuestas_de_Colombia_Mexico_y_Trinidad_y_Tobago_2017–2020.
278
From 2016 to 2018, Bogotá authorities assisted 93 human trafficking victims. Eighty–two percent were women and 75 percent were from
273
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Colombian city bordering Venezuela, 80 percent of sex workers are
Venezuelans and include many minors who may receive as little as
the equivalent of about $1.00 USD for sex, or a little more for sex
without condoms. 279 Women and girls are also victims of femicide
at a rate of at least two femicides of Venezuelan migrant women in
Colombia per month since early 2018, “with no sign that the trend
is abating.” 280
The hook to attract and trap vulnerable Venezuelan women and
young girls is to offer them what they want and desperately need.
Their vulnerabilities make them susceptible to an array of tricks,
lies, and deceptions. The most prevalent means of recruitment is to
promise Venezuelan migrants and refugees decent jobs and permits
to reside in Colombia, often with false promises of work, only to
then be forced to sell drugs. Even more shocking was the recent discovery of a network “whose members posed as religious devotees
to lure some 60 Venezuelans into their clutches.” Instead of spirituality, the victims “were forced to perform sexual acts in front of web
cameras” and were found crammed into small, locked rooms. 281

Venezuela. According to reports, most of the victims were between the ages of 15
and 27, followed by adults between the ages of 28 and 59. Five of the cases involved trafficking of minors and only one case trafficking of older adults. Sixty–
four of the 93 cases were for sexual exploitation while the rest involved trafficking
for forced labor and servile marriage. Venezolanos, los más afectados por trata
de personas en Bogotá, EL ESPECTADOR (Jul. 30, 2018), www.elespectador.com/
bogota/venezolanos–los–mas–afectados–por–trata–de–personas–en–bogota–arti
cle–803244/.
279
Some pregnant Venezuelans have also “been denied pre–natal care, vaccines and medicines, despite a favorable decision of the Colombian Supreme
Court and the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) concerning the protection of migrant
women.” Vásquez, supra note 274.
280
For an in depth report on feminicide of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia
between January and April 2019, see Vivas Nos Queremos: Femicidio de Migrantes Venezolanas en Colombia Enero a Abril 2019, RED FEMINISTA
ANTIMILITARISTA, http://observatoriofeminicidioscolombia.org/attachments/arti
cle/391/Bolet%C3%ADn%20Vivas%20Nos%20Queremos%20–%20Feminicidi
o%20de%20mujeres%20migrantes%20venezolanas%20en%20territorio%20col
ombiano%20–%20Enero%20.pdf.
281
Human Trafficking in Colombia Increasingly Targets Venezuelan Migrants, INSIGHT CRIME (Oct. 24, 2018), https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/huma
n–trafficking–in–colombia–increasingly–targets–venezuelan–migrants/.
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Vulnerabilities associated with sexual orientation and gender
identity among the migrant and refugee population are also very
concerning. In January 2020, the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) also expressed concern over the increase in discriminatory practices, racial hatred, and
xenophobia especially towards LGBTQ+ and HIV–positive migrants. The Committee recommended the Colombian government
“take the necessary measures to prevent” discrimination “in their
access to health services and work, and to facilitate their access to
documentation, promote their integration and ensure that victims of
acts of discrimination have access to effective remedies.” 282
COMPOUNDED VULNERABILITY RESULTING FROM UNCERTAIN
MIGRATORY STATUS
The prolonged crisis in Venezuela, the increase of irregular entry
to Colombia, the emergence of an illegal economy of migrant smuggling in which the migrant population is victimized, and the risk to
migrants’ integrity in returning to Venezuela results in hundreds of
thousands of Venezuelans remaining in Colombia in vulnerable conditions and uncertain migratory status. Irregular migratory status facilitates the ability of criminal groups, and in some cases “police
officers or members of host communities,” to exploit them with

Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports of Colombia, COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION ¶ 11 (Jan. 22, 2020) www.undocs.org/en/CERD/C/COL/CO/
17–19. (The Committee recommended the government to:
a)
Take effective measures to prevent and combat hate
speech, incitement to racial discrimination and expressions of
racism;
b)
Ensure that all cases of xenophobia, hate speech, incitement to racial discrimination and racially motivated violence are investigated and that those responsible are prosecuted
and adequately punished.
c)
Carry out public awareness–raising campaigns on respect for diversity and the elimination of racial discrimination.
Criminalize the dissemination of ideas that justify or promote
racial hatred and prohibit organizations that promote and incite
racial discrimination, as previously recommended by the Committee.)
282
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impunity and creates a situation where the victims cannot obtain assistance from the host State. 283
Most of the caminantes lack visas, documentation, or permission
to stay, 284 and therefore lack access to formal work, basic sanitation,
shelter, water, health, education, among other things. 285 Because of
this, the migrants and refugees avoid reporting the exploitation and
abuse they are subjected to for fear of being detained or deported. 286
They face discrimination, xenophobia, labor exploitation, as well as
migratory–related crimes. 287 Some may become involved themselves in criminal activity. Arriving without resources and lacking
legal papers to work with a need for money, migrants take whatever
informal work they can find. Many are driven to sex work out of
necessity, and there are plenty of “pimps” who are “often women
previously introduced to sex work themselves, [who] are constantly
looking for new recruits.” 288
Worse still, migrant children are used by criminal groups for
begging. Begging, child labor, and other forms of exploitation of
minors are also unfortunately part of Colombia’s circumstances. 289
The Caminantes: Need and Vulnerabilities, supra note 238, at 1.
Many lack passports, some do not comply with the requirements for Special Permit of Permanence, and others fail to obtain a visa from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. See Decree 216 of 2021, Diario Oficial No. 51.603, March 1,
2021, https://dapre.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/DECRETO%20216
%20DEL%201%20DE%20MARZO%20DE%202021.pdf.
285
See Venezuelan Refugee and Migrant Crisis, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (Mar. 2020), www.iom.int/venezuelan–refugee–
and–migrant–crisis (on file with the authors).
286
Id.
287
See Nossa, González, Lawrence, Daly et. al., Xenofobia hacia personas
Venezolanas: manifestaciones en cinco ciudades colombianas, FRIEDRICH–EBER
T–STIFTUNG (2021), http://library.fes.de/pdf–files/bueros/kolumbien/17330.pdf.
288
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 227, at 10.
289
2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, www.state.gov/reports/2020–country–reports–on–human–rights–pract
ices/colombia/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2022); see also Child Labor and Forced Labor Reports: Colombia (2020), U.S. LAB. DEP’T, BUR. INT’L LAB. AFF.,
www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child–labor/colombia (last visited
Feb. 23, 2022) (Children in Colombia are subjected to the worst forms of child
labor, including commercial sexual exploitation and illicit activities, many times
as a result of human trafficking. During the COVID–19 pandemic in 2020, the
government conducted virtual labor inspections and training, including on child
labor. The U.S. Department of Labor reports that resource allocation for labor law
283
284
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Authorities are aware of them because there are plenty of reports on
those issues, 290 some are identified, 291 and many are posted on a
dedicated government information website called News Monitoring
– Crime of Trafficking in Persons. 292 “Parents rent out their children
for the day to criminal groups and receive about 10,000 Colombian
enforcement in rural areas is lacking, and that the existing social programs are
deficient to address the scope of the worst forms of child labor. Even if agencies
took action to combat child labor in 2020, labor inspections are insufficient, which
hinders adequate enforcement. For instance, prohibitions against children working in mining and construction are often ignored. Under the law, the minimum
age for employment is 15 years. It is 18 years of age for conducting hazardous
work. Children under 15 years old are only allowed to work up till 14 hours a
week, and only in the sectors of arts, sports, or recreational and cultural activities.); see Child Labor and Forced Labor Reports: Colombia (2020), U.S. LAB.
DEP’T, BUR. INT’L LAB. AFF., www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child–labor/colombia (last visited Feb. 23, 2022) (Various U.S. Labor Department–funded projects have also addressed and called attention to child labor
in Colombia. For example: “We Are a Treasure (Somos Tesoro)” to combat child
labor and promote safe work in the mining sector; Future Palm, (Palma Futuro),
preventing and reducing child labor and forced labor in palm oil supply chains;
Colombia Advances (Colombia Avanza). builds civil society’s capacity to combat
child labor and other abuses in Colombia’s coffee sector; and Cooperation on Fair,
Free and Equitable Employment (COFFEE), to help businesses establish systems
to prevent, detect, and eliminate child labor and other forms of exploitation from
their supply chains.).
290
See Carlos Ernesto Sánchez Hernández, Viajes y turismo asociados a la
explotación sexual comercial de niños, niñas y adolescentes en Colombia: pornografía infantil, 51 REVISTA IUSTA (2019); see also Maria Cristina Quevedo–
Gómez et al., Social inequalities, sexual tourism and HIV in Cartagena, Colombia: an ethnographic study, 20:1208 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH (2020).
291
Descubierta mafia israelí responsable de explotación y esclavitud sexual
de niñas, adolescentes y mujeres en Colombia, FISCALIA GENERAL (Dec. 10,
2018), www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/noticias/descubierta–mafia–israeli–respon
sable–de–explotacion–y–esclavitud–sexual–de–ninas–adolescentes–y–mujeres–
en–colombia/ (Police and prosecutors (“Fiscalía”) carried out a simultaneous operation in Cartagena, Santa Marta, Bogotá, and Medellín, in which they identified
and dismantled an international criminal network dedicated to sexual exploitation.); see also Lista de Chequeo de Investigación y Judicializacion de Violencia
Sexual, Module 2, FISCALIA GENERAL DE LA NACION (Aug. 2017), www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/wp–content/uploads/Modulo–2.pdf (Investigators have developed a checklist when investigating violence against women in which sex tourism is included.).
292
Monitoreo de Noticias, MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, https://tratadepersonas
.mininterior.gov.co/observatorio–del–delito–trata–de–personas/monitoreo–de–n
oticias (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER–AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

67

pesos (about $2.80 USD), plus an additional average of 5,000 pesos
(about $1.30 USD) in earnings.” 293 Some of these children are
raped. 294 The problem is compounded for children because many do
not have access to identification documents, which implies that legally, they do not exist and are essentially stateless. 295
Migrants’ irregular status forces many of them to accept unauthorized employment under miserable conditions. They are often recruited for involvement in illegal activities including fuel smuggling, manual labor in support of drug trafficking, and transporting
gold by foot across regulated and unregulated border crossings. 296
Even more concerning is that locating victims has proven highly
challenging since authorities are often unwilling to identify them, as
doing so may implicate law enforcement officials involved in migrant exploitation schemes and human trafficking networks. In several cases, it has been reported that authorities have extorted payments from Venezuelan migrants and refugees to cross the border
and, if the victims cannot pay the fees, they are often sexually
abused. 297 Despite the horrendous experiences victims endure, they
often refuse to report these experiences because they fear deportation to Venezuela. 298
The Colombian government has attempted to address the limitations derived from migratory status, and to grant benefits and protect
this vulnerable population. In 2018, Colombia developed a
Id. at 28.
Id.
295
Losada, supra note 146.
296
The shadow war on the Venezuela–Colombia border, THE NEW
HUMANITARIAN (May 5, 2020), www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2020/05/0
5/war–Venezuela–Colombia–border.
297
See Anastasia Moloney, Venezuela crisis forces women to sell sex in Colombia, fuels slavery risk, REUTERS (June 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/us–venezuela–colombia–trafficking/venezuela–crisis–forces–women–to–
sell–sex–in–colombia–fuels–slavery–risk–idUSKBN18W1EX.
298
Devon Cone and Melanie Teff, Searching for Safety: Confronting Sexual
Exploitation and Trafficking of Venezuelan Women and Girls, REFUGEES
INTERNATIONAL 9, (Aug. 2019), https://www.refugeesinternational.org /reports/2
019/8/2/searching–for–safety–venezuela–trafficking. (“Victims often fear that reporting could lead to violent repercussions against themselves and their family
members by traffickers. Trafficking is also underreported because undocumented
women and girls may fear negative consequences, such as deportation, if they
make themselves known to the authorities by making a complaint.”)
293
294
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“Strategy to Care for Migration from Venezuela” 299 to establish and
implement policies targeting health, education, early childhood,
childhood and adolescence, work, housing, and security. Emphasis
was placed on ethnic determinants in developing policies applicable
to specific groups of migrants as a means to alleviate violence and
reduce prejudice toward Venezuelans and other migrants. For instance, for those of a particular ethnicity—indigenous, Afro–descendants, Romani, and ethnic Caribbean creoles––it is “necessary
to determine care routes with an ethnic focus to allow these specific
populations to access the institutional offer.” 300 The main feature of
the Strategy was that the government should promote Venezuelan
migration as an opportunity:
Despite the enormous challenges posed by migration, there are
a number of benefits that migration can generate, not only for migrants who can increase their standard of living by settling in places
with greater economic opportunities . . . but also for the host country. 301
In March 2021, the government announced the creation of the
Temporary Statute of Protection for Venezuelan Migrants (TPS or
ETPMV, for its acronym in Spanish). 302 The ETPMV allows the
Document CONPES 3950, Estrategia Para La Atención De La Migración
Desde Venezuela Consejo Nacional De Política Económica Y Social República
De Colombia Departamento Nacional De Planeación (CONPES), at *69 (Nov.
23, 2018), https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%c3%b3micos
/3950.pdf.
300
Estrategia Para La Atención De La Migración Desde Venezuela, CONSEJO
NACIONAL DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA Y SOCIAL REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA
DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACIÓN 69 (Nov. 23, 2018), https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%c3%b3micos/3950.pdf.
301
Id. at 26 (Sección 2.4. Justificación de la política: la migración como oportunidad: “A pesar de los enormes retos que plantea la migración, existe una serie
de beneficios que esta puede generar, no solo para los migrantes que pueden aumentar su nivel de vida al establecerse en lugares con mayores oportunidades económicas (Mergo, 2016), sino también para el país receptor y el país de origen de
los migrantes.”
302
Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos, L. 216 of
2021, Diario Oficial No. 51.603, March 1, 2021, https://dapre.presidencia.gov.co
/normativa/normativa/DECRETO%20216%20DEL%201%20DE%20MARZO
%20DE%202021.pdf (establishes a visa registration process legalizing the immigration status of more than 800,000 undocumented Venezuelans, or about 50 percent of the more than 1.7 million Venezuelans displaced to Colombia. The program is implemented in three different stages).
299
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authorities to assemble information from migrants such as their
names, gender, and age to generate effective public policies to address their needs and expectations. The ETPMV also provides temporary protected legal status for Venezuelan migrants and refugees
and gives them up to ten years to acquire a resident visa. 303
These and other policies reflect the government’s commitment
to upholding migrants’ dignity and rights. However, proper implementation of good policy is key, and if requirements are not easy to
meet (such as finding a solution to the chronic problem of lack of
migrant identification and status documentation), many migrants
could be forced deeper into the shadows. 304 Policies for upholding
migrants’ dignity and rights go hand in hand with the duty of the
government to address discrimination.
Furthermore, the recognition of Venezuelan migrants as refugees is imperative not only to protect the victims and to expand the
protections of the number of migrants to legalize their status, but it
would also assist the host countries’ authorities to undertake a
smoother tracking and management of the migration process. An organized, efficient mechanism should be implemented to facilitate
the administrative steps for migrants to apply for refugee status,
starting with a coordinated response between Venezuela (the country in crisis) and Colombia (the hosting country). Monitoring can

Id. at 17. Under Article 4, ETPMV applies to Venezuelan migrants who
wish to remain temporarily in Colombia, and who meet any of the following conditions:
1. Being in Colombian territory on a regular basis as holders of
a Permit of Entry and Permanence (PIP), Temporary Permit of
Permanence (PTP) or of a Special Permit of Permanence (PEP)
in force, whatever its issuance phase, including the PEPFF.
2. Being in Colombian territory on a regular basis as holders of
a Safe–conduct SC–2 within the framework of the processing
of an application for recognition of refugee status.
3. Being in Colombian territory irregularly on January 31, 2021.
Entering Colombian territory on a regular basis through the respective legally authorized Immigration Control Post, complying with the requirements established
in the immigration regulations, during the first two (2) years of validity of this
Statute.
304
Natalia Banulescu–Bogdan and Diego Chaves, What Comes Next Now that
Colombia Has Taken a Historic Step on Migration?, MIGRATION PORTAL (Mar.
2021) www.migrationpolicy.org/news/colombia-historic-legalization-what-next.
303
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also help protect the migrants before, during, and following resettlement.
COLOMBIA’S RESPONSIBILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW—LAW
AND POLICY DISCONNECTED FROM EXECUTION
Post–conflict nations often encounter high levels of economic
and socio–political instability. They face critical challenges in
achieving a stable rule of law and implementing sound policies to
support sustained poverty eradication, peace, security, domestic stability, respect for human rights. Organized crime and corrupt actors
exploit weak institutions. Corruption becomes rampant, 305 and
fighting it becomes a triviality instead of a priority. Dysfunctional
institutions offer criminal networks ideal trafficking conditions. Ex–
combatants, gangs, and warlords turn to human trafficking to replenish revenue losses resulting from the national peace agreement.
Vulnerabilities transcend the point at which hostilities ceased.
Children, women, and girls victimized in many horrific ways during
years of internal armed conflict are particularly at high risk of being
re–victimized. A post–conflict nation needs time and money to rebuild, reform, and restore institutions and broken communities, attend to the needs of IDPs and provide the much–needed necessities
and services to extricate them from their exposure to vulnerability.
Hence, post–conflict Colombia, must find a way to put aside its political acrimony and attend to its citizens, thereby taking responsibility under international law.
Colombia’s legal framework to combat human trafficking is
generally comprehensive but does not comply fully with the Palermo Protocol and other international standards regarding prioritizing victims’ rights, nor by standards on prosecuting individuals and

FOREWORD, U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION, CH. VII AT 2349
U.N.T.S. 41 (2003). “Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of
corrosive effects on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads
to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish . . . . Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended
for development, undermining a Government’s ability to provide basic services,
feeding inequality and injustice and discouraging foreign aid and investment.”
305
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organizations responsible for the crimes 306. In fact, some key elements in the framework are missing. In addition to ratifying the Palermo Protocol, Colombia ratified several international instruments
specifically related to the trafficking of persons, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic of Women and
Children 307 and various ILO Conventions related to forced labor. 308
Colombia also ratified several instruments germane to human rights
over the course of several decades to debatable effect. 309

Kelly H Heinrich, “Ten Years After the Palermo Protocol: Where are Protections for Human Trafficking Victims?” HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF (2010),
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&con
text=hrbrief.
307
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and
Children, Sept. 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 415.
308
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (No. 105), June 25, 1957, 320
U.N.T.S. 291, ratified 1963; International Labour Organization Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29), June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55;
Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, No. 182, 17 Jun 1999 ILC 87, I.L.O;
see also Int’l Labour Organization (ILO), Ratifications for Colombia,
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_CO
UNTRY_ID:102595.
309
Colombia has ratified the following international instruments: (i) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), G.A. Res. 34/180, (Sept. 3, 1981), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, ratified 1982;
(ii) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (OP–CEDAW), Dec. 10,1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83, ratified 2007; (iii) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173, ratified 1969; (iv) International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/13
(Oct. 2, 2000), ratified 1969; (v) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, ratified 1991; (vi) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and
Child Pornography, ratified 2003; (vii) Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified
2005; (viii) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW), Dec. 18, 1990, 2220
U.N.T.S. 3, ratified 1995; and (ix) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3, ratified 2011. See UNHCF
Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, https://indicators.ohchr.org/.
306
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The government incorporated those international obligations
into domestic legislation 310 with the Law 800 of 2003 311 by including the United Nations Convention against Crime Transnational Organization and the Optional Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 312 and
enacting numerous subsequent laws and policies. 313 Trafficking of
COLOMBIA’S CONSTITUTION OF 1991 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2013
22, CONSTITUTE PROJECT (Aug. 26, 2021), www.constituteproject.org/constitutio
n/Colombia_2013.pdf?lang=en. Article 13 of the Constitution states: In accordance with art. 93 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution, treaties ratified by the Colombian Congress have constitutional rank All individuals are born free and equal
before the law, shall receive equal protection and treatment from the authorities,
and shall enjoy the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities without any discrimination on account of gender, race, national or family origin, language, religion,
political opinion, or philosophy. The State shall promote the conditions so that
equality may be real and effective and shall adopt measures in favor of groups
that are discriminated against or marginalized. The State shall especially protect
those individuals who on account of their economic, physical, or mental condition
are in obviously vulnerable circumstances and shall sanction the abuses or ill–
treatment perpetrated against them Article 17 of the Colombian Constitution also
outlaws slavery and servitude in no uncertain terms: “Slavery, servitude, and the
slave trade in all forms are prohibited.” See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA
REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1991), www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/constitucion_politica_1991.html.
311
L. 800 of 2003, Diario Oficial No. 45.131, Mar. 18, 2003, (Colom.).
312
Id.
313
Legislation for victims’ assistance includes:
L. 599 of 2000, Diario Oficial No. 44.097 de 24 de julio de 2000 amending the
Colombian Penal Code; L. 747 of 2002, Diario Oficial 44.872, de 19 de julio de
2002, adding crime of trafficking in persons, amending art. 188 of the Colombian
Penal Code; L. 800 of 2003, Diario Oficial No. 45.131, de 18 de marzo de 2003,
approving the Palermo Protocol; L. 985 of 2005, Diario Oficial No. 46.015 de 29
de agosto de 2005, adopting measures against human trafficking and rules for the
care and protection of victims; Decree 4319 of 2006, Diario Oficial No. 46.472,
December 4, 2006, which establishes the organization and operation of the special
account created for the fight against human trafficking. In addition, Decree 4786
of 2008, Diario Oficial No. 47.208, December 19, 2008, established a national
strategy for combating human trafficking. Decree 1066 of 2015, Diario Oficial
No. 49.523, May 26, 2015, established a Unique Regulatory Decree mandating
services and support for human trafficking victims and their dependents, including immediate and mediate medical and psychological assistance, education, job
training, human development, integration to productive projects or link to formal
employment, legal advice and support were contemplated and judicial representation, dignified accommodation in safe spaces and comfortable facilities, transportation service, and protection of relatives up to the first degree of consanguinity
310
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persons became a crime when Law 747 of 2002 314 amended the Penal Code with the addition of Article 188–A, 315 criminalizing individuals who participated in transferring a person, including migrants, from one place to another—within the national territory or
beyond national boundaries—for exploitative purposes. 316 However, the definition of human trafficking under Art. 188–A only contains two elements, the act and the purpose, and misses an essential
component: to complete the definition of human trafficking, the law
must include “the method used to accomplish the act.” 317 The means
for the victims. Furthermore, Decree 1036 of 2016, Diario Oficial No. 49.914,
June 24, 2016, approved the Comprehensive National Strategy on human trafficking for years 2016–2018. L. 747 of 2002, Diario Oficial No. 44.872, July 19, 2002,
amended the Penal Code with the addition of Art. 188–A. See IV Balance de la
implementación de las políticas anti–trata en Colombia, CORPORACIÓN SERVOZ
& CORPORACIÓN ESPACIOS DE MUJER (2019), www.espaciosdemujer.org/wp–
content/uploads/IV–BALANCE–2019.pdf. (In order to prevent trafficking, the
National Government promoted the design and implementation of strategies
aimed at informing, sensitizing and empowering the population and officials to
confront this problem. Notable initiatives include the Phone Line to Fight Human
Trafficking; as well as public information campaigns such as With Human Trafficking, There Is NO Deal; and Let’s Act on the Web, Let’s Be Aware of Trafficking. In addition to signing the Palermo Protocol and eight bilateral agreements
with other States, Colombia is part of the Program of Global Action to Prevent
and Combat Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (GLO.ACT), and
Conpes 3950 of 2018, established by the Colombian Interior Ministry’s Consejo
Nacional de Política Económica y Sociale, which created a strategy to care for
migration from Venezuela, including human trafficking.) Consejo Nacional De
Política Económica Y Social República De Colombia Departamento Nacional De
Planeación (CONPES), Estrategia Para La Atención De La Migración Desde Venezuela, at 69 (Nov. 23, 2018), https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes
/Econ%c3%b3micos/3950.pdf (on file with the authors).
314
L. 747 of 2002, Diario Oficial No. 44.872, July 19, 2002 (Colom.).
315
C. PEN. ART. 188–A.
316
L. 747 of 2002, supra note 313.
317
Annex II: The Definition of trafficking in persons and the mandate for the
Global Report, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (2016), www.unodc.org/doc
uments/data–and–analysis/glotip/Annex_II_–_Definition_and_mandate.pdf.
(Trafficking in persons is a process comprising three distinct elements: the act,
the means and the purpose (which is always exploitation).” The “means” refers to
the method used to accomplish “the act”. “Possible means are the threat or use of
force, deception, coercion, abduction, fraud, abuse of power or a position of vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits.” While these terms are not necessarily
precise from a legal point of view and may be defined differently in different jurisdictions, their inclusion completes the human trafficking process.)

74

INTER–AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:2

determine the actions by which people are exploited—abduction,
fraud, deception, coercion, abuse of power of the position of vulnerability, giving/receiving payment/benefits to attain the consent of a
person having control over another person. 318 Sex is a big business,
and legal in Colombia as Paid Sexual Activities, 319 which requires a
Palermo Protocol, art. 3 states: “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means
(emphasis added) of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs . . .
Art, 188–A of the Colombian Penal Code only includes two elements of the criminal conduct:
1. The acts: Whoever recruits, transfers, houses, or receives a
person, within the national territory or abroad, for the purpose
of exploitation . . .
2. The purpose: For the purposes of this article, exploitation
shall be understood as obtaining economic gain or any other
benefit for oneself or for another person, through the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or similar practices.
slavery, servitude, exploitation of the begging of others, servile
marriage, the extraction of organs, sex tourism or other forms
of exploitation.
The consent given by the victim to any form of exploitation in this article shall
not constitute grounds for exoneration from criminal responsibility. [Artículo
188–A. Trata de personas: El que capte, traslade, acoja o reciba a una persona,
dentro del territorio nacional o hacia el exterior, con fines de explotación, incurrirá
en prisión de trece (13) a veintitrés (23) años y una multa de ochocientos (800) a
mil quinientos (1.500) salarios mínimos legales mensuales vigentes. Para efectos
de este artículo se entenderá por explotación el obtener provecho económico o
cualquier otro beneficio para sí o para otra persona, mediante la explotación de la
prostitución ajena u otras formas de explotación sexual, los trabajos o servicios
forzados, la esclavitud o las prácticas análogas a la esclavitud, la servidumbre, la
explotación de la mendicidad ajena, el matrimonio servil, la extracción de órganos, el turismo sexual u otras formas de explotación. El consentimiento dado por
la víctima a cualquier forma de explotación definida en este artículo no constituirá
causal de exoneración de la responsabilidad penal.] Código Penal Artículo 188–
A, https://leyes.co/codigo_penal/188–A.htm.
319
For instance, the District of Bogotá has a Public Policy on Paid Sexual
Activities (PPASP). See Mayor of Bogotá D.C., Política pública de actividades
sexuales pagadas 2020 – 2029, Documento Conpes 11, District Secretary for
318
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much higher level of investigation to sort out who are trafficking
victims than most law enforcement officials want to go. 320 The effect of this missing means element is reflected in the lack of prosecutions and proper sanctions. Authorities often charge traffickers
not as traffickers but as criminals engaged in lesser crimes, such as
induction into prostitution or pimping.
Were the means element present, investigators would question
whether the individual that is engaged in prostitution is doing so
freely or because of force, fraud, coercion, or abuse of vulnerabilities, in order to properly identify human trafficking. Investigators
focus only on what they see—the prostitution, the begging—instead
of inquiring whether the acts are the result of someone having lost
the right to freedom to decide and to act, or the result of someone
being threatened, abused, or tortured into acquiescence. Looking at
instances of begging, would an investigator consider the abuse of
power or of a condition of vulnerability by a parent or family member who forces a child to beg on the street, or worse, rents the child
out to beg? 321 The result of the existing law is charging lesser
crimes, if at all, and goes also to the failure of victim identification. 322 Investigators are not looking at whether a victim was forced
Women, District Registry No. 6704, Dec. 27, 2019, www.sdmujer.gov.co/sites/d
efault/files/2021–02/documentos/conpes_11_sdmujer_doc_conpes_pp_asp–con
vertido.pdf.
320
Heidi Tamayo Ortiz, La prostitución se tomó la vida nocturna del parque
Lleras, EL COLOMBIANO (Sept. 27, 2021); Author’s note (Luz Nagle): Parque Lleras is a centrally located hotel, restaurant and bar venue in the very upscale El
Poblado financial district of Medellín. Having lived for several years three blocks
from this location, seeing sex tourism out in the open day and night was a constant
reminder that the government is too weak or indifferent to protecting citizens and
migrants from sexual exploitation and forced servitude. Sex tourism is big business, after all. When I interviewed a police commander in El Poblado about sex
trafficking, his answer what that the women are all prostitutes and not trafficking
victims.
321
Colombian authorities launched efforts in 2020 to combat child begging,
but they are focusing only on getting children off the street and fail many who
may be trafficking victims and in need of protection from the perpetrators who
are exploiting them. Sarah Hucal, How Bogotá is combating child begging, ABC
NEWS (Apr. 20, 2020) (discussing government efforts to get Venezuelan migrant
children off the streets).
322
“Implementation of proactive victim identification, funded victims services, and alternatives to detention and deportation would respect trafficked persons’ human rights and yield better prosecution results.”, Kelly Hyland Heinrich,
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or coerced. All they are looking for is the first and last elements—
were they harbored, transported, housed, and was there economic
gain or any other benefit through various forms of exploitation. 323
The “means” element goes to the heart of the Palermo Protocol,
being both a criminal justice and a human rights instrument. The
drafters of the Protocol understood that it is not possible to “consent” to trafficking, and that when the personal freedom to decide is
taken away by some means, consent is irrelevant. 324 Moreover, using the means element established by the Protocol allows the identification of several human rights violations suffered by the victim
(freedom of movement, freedom to decide, freedom from torture,
abuse and degrading treatment, etc.). The means element also guides
the type of protection and assistance that must be extended to the
victims who have experienced physical and emotional trauma. Further, the means element helps to understand the vulnerability factors
to tackle them appropriately through policies and legislation.
If the government is actually intent on effectively fighting human trafficking, it must include the means element because such
will force investigators to look for patterns, including the identification of those responsible for making job offers to migrants, what
methods are they using to publicize job offers (social media, message boards, flyers in cantinas and bars, at border crossings, etc.),
what the job offers entail, and whether they are legitimate. In cases
of “prostitution and escorting,” authorities are missing the opportunity to combat trafficking for sexual exploitation. Mapping the
tactics of the traffickers in known locations where so–called prostitution and escorting occurs (often in affluent tourist areas, like Cartagena, Santa Marta, and Medellín) is crucial to distinguishing human trafficking from voluntary sex work. 325 Rather than investigating and making arrests, authorities are giving a “get out of jail free
card” not only to those who exploit, but also to all members of the
Ten Years After the Palermo Protocol: Where are Protections for Human Trafficking Victims?, 18, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF, 2, 2 (2010).
323
C. PEN. ART. 188–A.
324
United Nations Sources – R 21.7.
325
See Preocupación en Medellín por aumento del turismo sexual, INFOBAE
(Sept. 28, 2021), www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2021/09/28/preocupacion
–en–medellin–por–aumento–del–turismo–sexual/ (Travelers from the United
States, Europe, Asia, Mexico, Puerto Rico, among others, go to Medellín to engage in the city’s burgeoning sex tourism industry).
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trafficking conspiracy—tour operators, homeowners, apartment
managers, taxi drivers, and other facilitators. Thus, including the
means element can ultimately increase the likelihood of human traffickers being held liable for their crimes by Colombian authorities.
The current approach taken by the Colombian government to address the root causes of the human trafficking problem is simply insufficient. The government is trying to meet international responsibility through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, various policies, 326 and additional legislative measures. 327 As required by the
Palermo Protocol, Colombia added a human rights response to the
existing criminal justice in order to protect and respect the human
rights of trafficked persons. 328 In fact, Law 985 of 2005 329 adopts
several “measures necessary to guarantee respect for the human
rights of the victims” and those at risk. The Law also creates a National Strategy for the Fight Against Human Trafficking in which
326
The government increases human trafficking awareness through various
campaigns, such as #AnteLaTrataNoSeHaga, targeting border population,
https://costarica.embajada.gov.co/node/videos/12220/video–antelatratanosehaga.
There is also the #EsoEsCuento campaign led by the Office of the Attorney General with the support of national authorities and international organizations, including the UNODC under its Global Action Program to Combat Trafficking in
Persons and Migrant Trafficking, www.esoescuento.com/. See also UNODC,
Campaña para la prevención del delito de trata de personas #EsoEsCuento fue
presentada durante CCPCJ en Viena (May 17, 2018), www.unodc.org/colombia
/en/campaa–para–la–prevencion–del–delito–de–trata–de–personas–esoescuento
–fue–presentada–durante–el–ccpcj27–en–viena.html.
327
Art. 9 of the Palermo Protocol sets out various measures States are to implement in preventing trafficking. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children – Annex II to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 3. Palermo Protocol, supra note 10.
328
In the Palermo Protocol, the rights of trafficked persons are fundamental,
as reflected in the following articles: Article 2(b), which states that the Protocol
is intended to protect and assist the victims of trafficking, with full respect for
their human rights; and Article 6, which refers to the various types of assistance
to and protection of trafficking victims, including, protecting their privacy and
identity, providing for the physical, psychological, and social recovery, housing,
counselling and information regarding their legal rights, in a language victims can
understand. Also, States must provide assistance and protection with due regard
“to the age, gender and special needs of victims of trafficking in persons, in particular the special needs of children, including appropriate housing, education and
care.” Palermo Protocol, supra note 10.
329
L. 985 of 2005, Diario Oficial No. 46.015, Aug. 29, 2005.
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human rights become paramount to preventing trafficking, and the
government “consider[s] factors that increase vulnerability to trafficking, including inequality, poverty, and discrimination in all its
forms, and [addresses] the cultural and ethnic diversity of possible
victims.” 330
The National Strategy established comprehensive policies, programs, and other criteria. Under the Strategy, the government committed to monitoring, evaluating, coordinating, and sustaining a different focus on (1) human rights, (2) gender, (3) generation and age,
and (4) differences (recognizing particularities of groups). 331 The
Strategy’s goals include informing, protecting, and assisting
The goal of the law is “to adopt prevention, protection and assistance
measures necessary to guarantee respect for the human rights of the victims and
possible victims of human trafficking,” (Art. 1). The State will act to prevent human rights violations “by reason of human trafficking.” (Art. 2 (2)). The law further states that the National Strategy is to include the “design and execution of
assistance programs aimed at their physical, psychological and social recovery,
and based on the protection of their Rights.” These actions must guarantee the
protection of the privacy and identity of the victims, and will include, at a minimum:
- Immediate assistance to return victims to their place of origin
if they request it, security, adequate accommodation, medical,
psychological and material assistance, and information and legal advice regarding the rights and legal procedures (Art. 7 (1)).
- Mediate assistance in providing job training and support in
finding opportunities for work; and legal support to take legal
actions to demand reparation (Art. 7 (2)).
It conditions “mediate assistance” to victims’ reporting trafficking to the authorities. “This condition may not be required for the provision of the immediate assistance.” (Art. 7 (1)). The Constitutional Court held that this requirement is “disproportionate, unnecessary and harmful of victims’ fundamental rights.” Sentencia C–470/16. The Law also establishes national and regional committees to
strengthen the act further. See also IV Balance de la implementación de las políticas anti–trata en Colombia, supra note 313.
331
The focus differential recognizes differences, inequities and inequalities
faced by different population groups due to the confluence and intersectionality
of characteristics, situations or conditions, such as ethnic–racial (indigenous peoples, Afro–descendants, ethnic Caribbean creoles (Raizales and palenqueras),
Romani and others), sexual and gender orientation (women and gender identity
and sexual orientation), class (belonging to or originating in an urban or rural area,
having a disability, being a victim of the armed conflict, generational (boys, girls,
adolescents), among others. All are factors that can influence the degree of vulnerability and risk to being trafficked. Decreto 1036 de 2016, Diario Oficial No.
49.914 de 24 de junio de 2016, art. 4.4.
330
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victims, strengthening investigations, promoting inter–institutional
work and coordination, international cooperation, encouraging research to generate information relative to causes, modalities, purposes of exploitation, trends, and regional particularities for consequences of trafficking. 332
In support of its prevention measures, strategies were established to inform, sensitize, and empower the population and officials. 333 These strategies resulted from collaboration among the different stakeholders, including the national Inter–Institutional Committee to Fight Human Trafficking, as well as departmental, municipal and district committees, and civil society organizations. Committees at the regional and local levels are responsible for coordinating prevention, investigation, prosecution, and assistance to victims
for acts in their respective territories. 334 However, few departments,
districts, and municipal governments have budgets 335 suitable to implement the national strategy to combat human trafficking, and most
of them approach it from a security and criminal prosecution perspective and not as a victim–centered approach (victim protection
Decreto 1036 de 2016, Diario Oficial No. 49.914 de 24 de junio de 2016,
art. 5.2.
333
In order to prevent trafficking, the National Government promoted the design and implementation of strategies aimed at informing, sensitizing and empowering the population and officials to confront this problem. Notable initiatives include the Phone Line to Fight Human Trafficking; as well as public information
campaigns such as With human trafficking, there is NO deal, and Let’s act on the
web, let’s be aware of trafficking. In addition to signing the Palermo Protocol and
eight bilateral agreements with other States, Colombia is part of the Program of
Global Action to Prevent and Combat Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of
Migrants (GLO.ACT), and Conpes 3950 of 2018, established by the Colombian
Interior Ministry’s Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social which created a strategy to care for migration from Venezuela and including human trafficking. Consejo Nacional De Política Económica Y Social República De Colombia Departamento Nacional De Planeación (CONPES), Estrategia Para La Atención De La Migración Desde Venezuela, at 69 (Nov. 23, 2018), https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%c3%b3micos/3950.pdf (on file with the
authors).
334
Under ART. 2.2.3.4.1, ¶ 2, the Strategy continues in force until the government adopts a new one. Decree 1036 of 2016, D.O. No. 49.914, June 24, 2016
(approving the Comprehensive National Strategy on human trafficking for years
2016–2018).
335
IV Balance de la implementación de las políticas anti–trata en Colombia,
supra note 313 at 4(4).
332
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and assistance). Helping female victims is not a concept in which
they are necessarily willing to invest time and training, when many
misogynistic male authorities, including police officers of prosecutors, may be prone to dismiss them as “prostitutes”. One wonders if
the government has taken any practical steps required to ensure that
victims of trafficking are quickly and accurately identified.
To allow the nation to face the current human trafficking trends,
the government adopted a new National Strategy for the Fight
Against Trafficking in Persons for 2020–2024. 336 This revised Strategy introduces new approaches and a novel course of action. It prioritizes migration and border–related risks, including armed conflict, violence, and sex trafficking, and emphasizes prevention
among migrant populations. It is organized around specific approaches. 337 And while the prior Strategy had four points of focus,
this new one has ten: (1) human rights, (2) gender, (3) sexual orientation and diverse gender identities; 338 (4) life course; 339 (5) differentials; 340 (6) ethnic identity; (7) intersectionality; (8) territorial
Decree 1818 of 2020, Diario Oficial No. 51.544, Dec. 31, 2020, Estrategia
Nacional para la Lucha Contra la trata de Personas 2020–2024, www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=154426.
337
The axis is the implementation paths, and there are several: coordination
and sustainability; protection and assistance; investigation and judicialization;
knowledge generation and management; prevention; international cooperation;
migration, and border security. This last one addresses the geopolitical importance
of Colombian borders due to drug trafficking and routes used by organized crime,
and stresses that to combat trafficking in persons in such a context requires the
planning of cooperation with neighboring countries, with those from the hemisphere, and with the assistance of international organizations. Id.
338
Id. at art. 4.2.3. (recognizing discrimination and marginalization of people
with diverse sexual orientations or gender identities, and the importance of understanding human trafficking based on discrimination, exclusion, and marginalization of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Intersex and Queer (LGBTIQ) individuals or individuals with diverse gender orientations or expressions; appropriate
policies and state actions require understanding of the dynamics, contexts and environments that affect them.)
339
Id. at art. 4.2.4. (facilitating the recognition of events in the lives of human
beings, according to one’s particularities—biological, psychosocial, emotional,
among other factors—which in turn are affected differentially by individual behavior, social and economic relations, environment, and policies specific to the
context in which people live).
340
Id. at art. 4.2.5. (providing guidance for the action of the State while appreciating and recognizing the difference and diversity in social classes and human groups since these characteristics, based on origin, territory, ethnicity,
336
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association; 341 (9) border and migration security; 342 and (10) criminological study. 343 In an effort to improve institutional capacity for
the exchange of information and best practices in the fight against
human trafficking, the Strategy incorporates a specific approach to
address the emerging challenges derived from the Venezuelan migration. 344 However, as Women’s Link Worldwide has warned, “by
not establishing specific and uniform criteria for the entire territory,
the care and protection of victims depends on the will and capacity
of local authorities, resulting in serious geographical differences.” 345
As to the issue of human trafficking in the forced recruitment of
children and women, Colombia considers forced conscription by illegal armed and organized criminal groups to be crimes under humanitarian law rather than a crime of human trafficking. 346 This disconnect in official policy hinders the gathering of meaningful
language and customs, as well as what concerns gender identity and sexual orientation, along with other elements of social construction, demand from public entities and from society in general the ability to apprehend and adapt their actions
to the multiplicity of populations).
341
Id. at art. 4.2.8. (describing that since crime trends change according to
cultural, ethnic, economic, political, legal, social and geographical regions, this
approach seeks to identify the divergences between regions and highlight their
particularities, so that government action can be effective).
342
Id. at art. 4.2.9. (considering the humanitarian crisis derived from massive
migration, migrants can be victimized in contexts of human trafficking in light of
their vulnerabilities. This approach recognizes the need for differentiated care at
the borders and throughout national territory).
343
Id. at art. 4.2.10. (explaining that under this approach, the commission of
trafficking in persons conforms to a series of multi–causal factors that must be
permanently investigated, analyzed, and studied in order to understand the different factors related to the emergence, transformation, increase or decrease of crime,
and to make permanent public policy decisions that contribute to its prevention,
investigation, prosecution and fight against crime from a national and transnational perspective).
344
Id.
345
La Trata de Personas en Colombia—Principales Fallas en el Sistema de
Protección, WOMEN’S LINK WORLDWIDE, (Mar. 2021), www.womenslinkworld
wide.org/files/3127/principales–fallas–en–el–sistema–de–proteccion–para–victi
mas–de–trata–en–colombia.pdf.
346
See also IV Balance de la implementación de las políticas anti–trata en
Colombia, supra note 313 (noting that international tribunals have jurisdiction
over illegal armed and organized criminal groups and considers trafficking a
transnational crime within domestic jurisdiction).
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statistics necessary to understand the scope of this particular human
trafficking activity, and this exclusion is troubling. 347 There are few
vigorous investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of trafficking
cases involving members of illegal armed groups or organized criminal groups involved in forced child recruitment or forced criminal
activity. 348 Could this also be the result of a lack of budget to address
the needs of child soldiers? Or could the lack of serious investigations be the result of inadequate training or ignorance and the relative invisibility of trafficking in the context of the conflict, as highlighted by the stories of thousands of adolescents and young men
forced to join armed groups, and women that have been sexually
exploited and considered little more than the spoils of war?
IT’S A MATTER OF TRAINING
Colombia’s actions in fighting trafficking also appear disconnected from its laws and policies. Despite the numerous legislative
initiatives, programs, and capacity development trainings, only 731
cases between 2013 and 2020 have been reported. 349 The government has performed poorly in its execution of victim identification, 350 in great part due to missing the “means” element required
Id.
2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, U.S. STATE DEP’T 1, 3
(2019), www.state.gov/reports/2019–trafficking–in–persons–report–2/colombia/
(In its 2019 TIP report, the U.S. Department of State recommended the Colombian
government to “vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict trafficking cases,
including cases involving members of illegal armed groups or organized criminal
groups involved in forced child recruitment or forced criminal activity.”).
349
Casos de trata de personas, MINISTERIO DE INTERIOR – GOBIERNO DE
COLOMBIA, https://tratadepersonas.mininterior.gov.co/observatorio-del-delitotrata-de-personas/casos-de-trata-de-personas (click on 1._casos_trata_de_person
as_2013–2020.xls) (last updated Nov. 30, 2020).
350
Child Labor and Forced Labor Reports: Colombia, U.S. LAB. DEP’T, BUR.
INT’L LAB. AFF. (2020), www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child–la
bor/colombia (“In 2020, the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) reported that out
of the criminal cases investigated pertaining to the worst forms of child labor, 11
percent were related to the use of children in illicit activities, 40 percent to the use
of children in pornography, and the remaining were related to forced recruitment,
commercial sexual exploitation, and human trafficking. Of the 71 individuals
charged, 35 percent were charged for the use of children in illicit activities. (4)
During the reporting period, 421 criminal investigators were trained on concepts
related to the worst forms of child labor, 75 were trained on identifying human
347
348
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under the Palermo Protocol. 351 The duty to identify human trafficking victims “is implied in all legal instruments that provide for victim protection and support,” 352 and any “failure to quickly and accurately identify victims of trafficking renders any rights granted to
such persons illusory.” 353 Due diligence requires identifying the suspected victims correctly. Not identifying at all or misidentifying
someone as a criminal or an irregular or smuggled migrant results in
a denial of that person’s rights and “directly affects that person’s
ability to access the rights to which she or he is entitled.” 354 In its
report on human trafficking issues in Colombia, the NGO Women’s
Link Worldwide noted the following:
One of the traditional problems that makes it difficult
to identify victims of trafficking is the lack of training by officials, as well as the ignorance of regulations and protocols or procedures to identify victims
and potential victims of human trafficking. The efforts that have been made in recent years to train judicial authorities and the Prosecutor’s Office on the
procedures of care and protocols for attention and assistance to victims have not been sufficient. 355
Identification and conviction rates remain too low. The duty to
identify victims requires the government to develop proactively intelligence–driven investigative techniques without reliance on the
testimony of victims. In fact, proper identification of a trafficking
victim is “a prerequisite for their access to assistance and
trafficking, and another 206 were trained on investigating and prosecuting human
trafficking crimes. (4) To better address human trafficking crimes, the AGO led
five inter–governmental trainings on trafficking identification for 5,431 government employees and 459 AGO investigators. The Ministry of the Interior (MOI)
also conducted mock trials as an educational tool for those involved in prosecuting
such crimes.”).
351
See generally id. (For example, authorities may confuse smuggling with
human trafficking.)
352
Human Rights and Human Trafficking, Fact Sheet No. 36, U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 12 (2014),
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS36_en.pdf.
353
Id.
354
Id.
355
La Trata de personas en Colombia, supra note 345.
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protection.” 356 Yet, the lack of proper identification of trafficking
victims and conviction rates for traffickers is troubling, as seen in
the low number of human trafficking cases reported between 2013
and 2020. According to the Colombian Family Welfare Institute
(ICBF), more than a million minors, alone, are exploited for labor.
Still, in 2020 only a paltry 300 were identified. 357 The U.S. State
Department’s 2021 Trafficking in Person Report (TIP) for Colombia presents additional discouraging statistics in the justice sector.
Since 2010, there have been only 54 convictions in 1,817 cases of
child sex trafficking prosecuted, a conviction rate of roughly three
percent. 358
The troubling investigation–to–prosecution ratio, as the State
Department suggested, may be due to the proliferation of so many
anti–trafficking laws in Colombia over the last two decades, which
has “caused confusion among law enforcement and the judicial process.” 359 The logical conclusion one draws is that without proper
training to keep law enforcement and the judicial system at an adequate level of competency, investigation and conviction rates will
remain disproportionate to the number of trafficking cases reported
each year by individuals and stakeholder organizations. 360
International Framework for Action To Implement the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME 1, 10 (2009), (Victims do not
self–identify for many reasons including lack of knowledge of their rights, understanding that they are victims, fear, mistrust of law enforcement, and not knowing
the language. Countries must develop or strengthen the identification process in
order to promote victims’ ability to self–identify).
357
Leonardo Sierra, Esclavitud infantil, AL PONIENTE (Nov. 7, 2020, 4:26
PM), https://alponiente.com/esclavitud–infantil/.
358
2021 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report: Colombia, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, www.state.gov/reports/2021–trafficking–in–persons–report/colombia/
(last visited Feb. 23, 2022) (Elected officials indicated that convicted traffickers
rarely receive sentences as prescribed in the anti–trafficking law and noted only
one of 43 traffickers convicted between 2013 and 2018 received a sentence as
prescribed in the anti–trafficking law.)
359
See id.
360
Luz E. Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin
America, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 345, 359–360 (2000) (“Judgeships have often
been the jobs no one seeks, unless the individual is either truly committed to social
justice or interested in a venue for acquiring wealth through bribery and corruption. Those who become lower courts judges for the sake of societal good, however, are soon stymied by their corrupt superiors who do not want reformers rocking the boat.”).
356
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The duty to investigate requires cultural competency in training
protocols that emphasizes the country’s uniqueness, especially the
vast differences at the local and regional levels. As a country
changes, training must evolve to adjust to the changes, such as the
increasing migration waves. Incorporating these individualities into
an investigative probe provides a clear “background of facts” and
aids in determining if someone is a victim of trafficking in need of
protection. 361 However, there is also a lack of clarity and irregularities in applying procedures for the identification and assistance of
trafficking victims—Law 985 and its regulatory norms are confusing regarding this process. The following are some illustrations.
In 2018, during a raid on several establishments in Cartagena,
23 undocumented Venezuelan youths were rescued for allegedly being trafficking victims for sexual exploitation. 362 Women’s Link
presented various petitions to the authorities requesting information
on protective actions taken. According to the Ministry of the
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS [ECHR] JULY 1, 2010, RANTSEV V.
CYPRUS AND RUSSIA, APP. NO. 25965/04 (“The Colombian government provides
training, in some cases with the support of international organizations, to immigration officials, police, and members of the Attorney General’s Office on the law
in understanding trafficker recruitment tactics, and the investigation and prosecution of trafficking crimes.”); see also 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, supra
note 348 (Such training, however, needs to include corruption and the uniqueness
of trafficking patterns, vulnerabilities, risks, and victims present in the country.).
362
The young women were convinced to travel to Cartagena to meet supposed
job expectations, when in fact they were forced into prostitution. The traffickers
kept them in precarious conditions in lodgings located in basements. They provided their victims with inadequate food, withheld their identity cards and passports to have control over their movements, sexually exploited them, and most of
the income obtained was taken by the criminal network as a “‘collection” for accommodation and maintenance. The Prosecutor’s Office found logbooks with the
lists of the enslaved young women. Next to each name, the traffickers recorded
the amounts each individual owed to her captors, as well as “fines” for the apparent breach of the restrictions imposed on them. The logbook also detailed the average sexual services that each victim had to fulfill in each day. Officials also
discovered a secret corridor that connected two establishments that were used by
johns for the sexual encounters or to evade the intervention of the authorities. Jhon
Montaño, Recscatan 49 mujeres que eran explotadas sexualmente en Cartagena,
EL TIEMPO (Aug. 20, 2018), www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras–ciudades/rescatan–49–mujeres–que–eran–explotadas–en–cartagena–23–eran–venezolanas–
257960 (Forty–nine young women were convinced to travel to Cartagena under
the false premise of meeting certain job expectations, when in fact, they were
forced into prostitution instead.).
361
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Interior, errors occurred with the identification because eight
women filled in the form reporting human trafficking. 363 The Ministry indicated that “according to what was stated by the twenty–
three (23), none of them identified themselves as a trafficking victim
for sexual exploitation.” 364
This case illustrates several problems due to improper training.
Identification and care procedures were applied without the minimum guarantees. No additional measures were adopted to examine
any risks the young women could face upon their return to Venezuela. Requiring the alleged victims to fill out a form for self–identification placed a disproportionate burden on the alleged victims
and revictimized them. While the women received hygiene kits and
medical care, this did not conform with the government’s immediate
care and assistance program. 365 Under that program the government
must guarantee the return of victims to their place of origin, if they
request it, and provide security, dignified accommodation, medical
and psychological assistance, and information and legal advice regarding their rights. 366
There appears to be a concerning, glaringly apparent detachment
between the laws and policies involving human trafficking and the
training of officials to understand and enforce them. 367 Investigators
need to know how to make inquiries and obtain actionable information to determine if someone is a victim or at risk of being trafficked. 368 Training needs to be comprehensive and tailored to the
uniqueness of the country’s situation, including combating corruption and all the human rights issues involved in human trafficking. 369
Informe sombra sobre el noveno informe de Colombia ante el Comité para
la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer, WOMEN’S LINK
WORLDWIDE (Feb. 2019), www.womenslinkworldwide.org/files/3079/informe–
sombra–sobre–el–noveno–informe–de–colombia–ante–la–cedaw.pdf (The Minister of Interior is a coordinator of the Inter–Institutional Committee to Combat
Trafficking in Persons.).
364
Id.
365
Decree No. 1066 of 2015, May 26, 2015; L. 49.523, May 26, 2015, art.
2.2.2.6, Diario Oficial (Colom.).
366
Víctimas de trata en América Latina: Entre la desprotección y la indiferencia, WOMEN’S LINK WORLDWIDE 1, 81–82 (2017), https://bit.ly/2xv3B0P.
367
Author’s observation based on interviews conducted in Colombia.
368
See 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report, supra note 268.
369
See Donny Meertens, et al., Estudio Nacional Exploratorio Descriptivo sobre el Fenómeno de Trata de Personas en Colombia, UNODC § 2.3 (2009),
363

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER–AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

87

Failures of training, however, are evident in the many cases where
authorities do not screen for trafficking indicators to recognize victims, or fail to protect them and provide adequate services. In many
cases, authorities have dealt with victims as criminals or unprotected
irregular migrants, denying them protection and assistance and punishing them in some manner, or subjecting them to deportation procedures. 370
The importance of training is underscored by the first and last
element of the Palermo Protocol. If the “means” element is missing
from the training, then authorities do know how to ask questions that
will provide them the red flags to determine if someone is a trafficking victim—questions like, “What job was offered to you and what
job did you end up doing?”; “Were you free to stop working?”;
“Were you able to determine who your client for sex work was going
to be and were you able to keep all the money you made?”. Police
and investigators appear not to be trained to ask, or those who are
being trained are too few in number and location. Again, to emphasize, training must target the uniqueness of the country as well as
the methods used to exploit the vulnerabilities of individuals due to
that uniqueness, 371 with a special focus on the vulnerabilities of the
migrant and refugee population.
Furthermore, the coordination and sustainability of state actions
are weak without an established and well–supported capacity to
train, implement, continually monitor the adherence to policies, and
hold accountable the officials responsible for carrying out the
www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Investigacion_Trata_CO1.pdf (A 2009
Colombian government publication includes several sections pertaining to gender
issues: incorporation of the perspective of Human Rights, gender in understanding
human trafficking, violence against women, the use of their bodies as spoils of
war, and sexual slavery and the promotion of prostitution.).
370
See Capriles, supra note 277; see also DOCUMENTO DE INSUMOS, REUNIÓN
SOBRE EL BORRADOR DE RECOMENDACIÓN GENERAL: TRÁFICO DE MUJERES Y
NIÑAS, CANCILLERÍA DE COLOMBIA (Feb. 22, 2019), www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/GRTrafficking/Colombia.docx; see also 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report, supra note 268.
371
See generally RANTSEV V. CYPRUS AND RUSSIA, supra note 361 (Cyprus
had a specific artiste visa that attracted young women from Eastern Europe, most
of whom ended up being exploited for sex. There were red flags the investigators
missed because of the uniqueness of Cyprus’ circumstances—the visa attracted
young women to be forced into sex trafficking and a significant increase in prostitution in the country.).
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policies. The latter is an issue because, at present, it is left up to each
territorial committee to determine what it considers pertinent in the
fight against trafficking. 372 These obstacles and shortcomings in inter–institutional training and coordination for adequate and comprehensive assistance re–victimizes trafficking victims, including a
great many Venezuelan migrants.
Training must also account for tendencies toward xenophobia,
misogyny, and sexism present in the minds of some investigators,
prosecutors, and judges, 373 with close attention paid to the unique
circumstances of vulnerable migrants. In a macho society like Colombia, however, the gender, age, sexual orientation, or disabilities
of some victims often render them “invisible” just because of who
they are. 374 Only training and constant monitoring and re–training
can help officials differentiate and target the needs of trafficking
victims in order to ensure effective protection. Another issue concerns the poor enforcement of anti–trafficking laws in labor cases.
While the government has made efforts to strengthen inspections
and enforce labor laws more broadly, proactive investigation of suspected cases or increased inspections of possible forced labor remain inadequate. 375
One of the most recent examples of Colombian authorities’ lack
of training concerns a Venezuelan migrant and her family members.
See also IV Balance de la implementación de las políticas anti–trata en
Colombia, supra note 313.
373
Author’s note (Luz Nagle): These are tendencies I personally encountered
often while I was a district judge in Medellín, Colombia in the 1980s, and still
encounter occasionally when conducting research and interacting with law enforcement officials in Colombia. To say that such backward thinking is widespread would be an injustice to many Colombian law enforcement and government lawyers and officials. But an encounter with just one misogynist or sexist
individual in a position of legal authority can do immeasurable harm to someone
who is a victim of gender–based abuse or human trafficking.
374
See generally La Trata de personas en Colombia: La esclavitud moderna,
CORPORACIÓN ESPACIOS DE MUJER, www.tipheroes.org/media/1597/la–trata–
en–colombia.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2022) (Females face more vulnerability
than males due to the ancestral permissiveness of the use of the female body as a
commodity. The notion of women as property is supported by asymmetric power
relations and ideologies of “macho” and patriarchal traditions.).
375
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2019 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (TIP) REPORT, 145–
46 (Jun. 2019), www.state.gov/wp–content/uploads/2019/06/2019–Trafficking–
in–Persons–Report.pdf.
372
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In 2019, Yolanda’s 376 neighbor offered her a job opportunity in Colombia. The offer included a paid trip from Venezuela to Colombia
for her, her husband, and their daughters, 6 and 7 years old. Yolanda
accepted the proposal, and upon crossing the border, a person transferred her to the place where she would reside and work. Her trafficking nightmare had begun. 377
Upon arrival at the site, Yolanda was told that instead of selling
coffee, she had to prostitute herself, and that her eight–year–old
daughter already had clients lined up, older men who like to be with
minors. Yolanda was threatened with a knife, and one of the traffickers sexually assaulted her. She and her family escaped from the
house when a man tried to abuse one of his daughters, and they spent
several nights sleeping on the street. One day, a police officer asked
them about their situation. After hearing her story, the officer stated
that he knew the trafficker and had heard those kinds of stories happening to Venezuelan women, but he did not offer them any help.
Fortunately, Yolanda came across an organization that helped people in vulnerable situations. The organization contacted national and
international organizations, and the police specializing in human
trafficking. But this police entity did not respond to the request immediately. Organizations provided basic assistance, such as the purchase of basic hygiene and food products, primary health, hotel accommodation, and protection measures, but it was always temporary. 378
Accompanied by one of these organizations, Yolanda filed a
complaint for the crime of human trafficking with the Attorney General’s Office. However, the Office of the Prosecutor staff determined that this case did not correspond to a crime of trafficking in
persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation, but rather of inducing
prostitution. This decision would subsequently have serious
Yolanda is a fictitious name to protect her identity and safety.
See Sergio Camacho, Histórica sentencia de la Corte Constitucional ordena mejorar el sistema de protección de víctimas de trata en Colombia,
WOMEN’S LINK WORLDWIDE (Oct. 11, 2021), www.womenslinkworld
wide.org/informate/sala–de–prensa/historica–sentencia–de–la–corte–constitucional–ordena–mejorar–el–sistema–de–proteccion–de–victimas–de–trata–en–
colombia.
378
Watch full testimony at WOMEN’S LINK WORLDWIDE, Yolanda: Trata de
mujeres venezolanas en Colombia (July 20, 2020), www.youtube.com/watch?v=l
PPfnZOicbw.
376
377
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consequences for recognizing Yolanda’s rights and protection
measures for her and her family.
Yolanda also went to the Ministry of Government to activate
protection and assistance for the care of victims of trafficking. However, the attending officials informed her that her case did not qualify to trigger such protections because, in the complaint to the Prosecutor’s Office, the crime registered was not trafficking in persons,
but induction to prostitution. Faced with the lack of protection due
to the government’s failure to identify her status as a victim of trafficking, and due to the serious economic situation in which she
found herself, Yolanda decided to return to Venezuela with her family. However, upon arriving in her hometown, Yolanda began receiving death threats against her and her family from the trafficking
network. She therefore ultimately returned with her daughters and
her husband to Colombia.
But once back in Colombia, the threats continued. Her situation
was brought to the attention of the Ombudsman’s Office and the
Prosecutor’s Office to grant protection measures, but Yolanda never
received a response. The competent authority for the protection of
victims of trafficking did not fully activate the procedures for protection and assistance to which she was entitled. Yolanda had no
access to housing, employment, the health system, or the minimum
conditions of survival. In addition, her daughters were out of school,
and they faced ongoing threats from the trafficking network, which
made Yolanda very afraid for her safety and that of her family, seriously affecting her psychological health.
Accompanied by Women’s Link Worldwide, Yolanda presented
her case to the justice system, where she finally reached the Constitutional Court. 379 In September 2020, the Court issued immediate
provisional measures of protection for Yolanda and her family, but
the competent authorities never complied with the Court’s orders. In
July 2021, through Sentencia T–236 of 2021, the Constitutional
Court ordered the protection of Yolanda and her family and dictated
structural measures to improve the protection system for victims of
379
See Women’s Link Worldwide, Histórica sentencia de la Corte Constitucional ordena mejorar el sistema de protección de víctimas de trata en Colombia
(Oct. 11, 2021), www.womenslinkworldwide.org/informate/sala–de–prensa/historica–sentencia–de–la–corte–constitucional–ordena–mejorar–el–sistema–de–
proteccion–de–victimas–de–trata–en–colombia.
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trafficking in Colombia, including orders to the Attorney General’s
Office, the Inter–Institutional Committee to Combat Trafficking in
Persons, the Ministry of Interior, Migración Colombia, the Ministry
of Defense, the Presidential Council for Rights Human and International Affairs, the Presidential Counsel for the Equity for Women,
and the Office of Inspector General (PGN for its acronym in Spanish). 380 This landmark decision was celebrated by the Inter–American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), stating that the ruling
incorporates an intersectional and gender perspective, in line with
inter–American standards. 381
Yolanda’s interactions with the Colombian authorities illustrate
the problems with Colombia’s human trafficking definition, approach, and execution of the laws and policies as well as the discriminatory attitudes towards women, migrants, and refugees by
those in positions of authority. For example, Yolanda’s first contact
with a government official, the police officer, highlights several
problems. Yolanda was:
- A young female (sex trafficking affects predominantly woman);
- From Venezuela (traffickers rely on manipulating
and abusing the many push factors in that country);
- The manner in which she arrived in Colombia
(crossing the border—with or without documents, on
foot or car);
- Promised a job selling coffee but forced to prostitute (deceived – fraud);
- Threatened with a knife (an effective control measure);

Sentencia T–236/21, CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA
(Jul. 23, 2021), www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/Relatoria/2021/T–236–21.htm.
381
See CIDH celebra decisión de la Corte de mejorar sistema de protección
a víctimas de trata de personas, INFOBAE (Oct. 16, 2021), www.infobae.com/am
erica/colombia/2021/10/16/cidh–celebra–decision–de–la–corte–de–mejorar–sist
ema–de–proteccion–a–victimas–de–trata–de–personas/.
380
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- Sexually assaulted (a means of dehumanizing and
subjugating a trafficking victim)
These are all indicators that call on the officer (1) to provide
Yolanda with information for an organization tasked with helping
vulnerable people, and (2) if within his jurisdiction, corroborate the
indicators with further inquiries or pass the case to the respective
officer. Certainly, there were enough indicators to trigger a proactive investigation, but he did nothing of the sort.
Yolanda filed a complaint with authorities, but the Attorney
General’s Office determined that her case was not human trafficking
for the purpose of sexual exploitation, but for the induction of prostitution. Such classification not only preempted Yolanda from obtaining recognition of her rights and protection measures as a victim,
but it re–victimized her by humiliating her and aggravating her
physical and psychological health. The human trafficking definition
under Colombian law (recalling that only two of the three elements
of trafficking are recognized) allows the Attorney General’s Office
to make a determination ignoring the actions by which people are
exploited—abduction, fraud, deception, coercion, abuse of power of
the position of vulnerability, giving/receiving payment/benefits to
attain the consent of a person having control over another person. 382
The law states that consent given by the victim to any form of exploitation shall not constitute grounds for exoneration from criminal
responsibility—this section does not call upon the officer to consider the actions by which people are exploited and which nullify
consent. Such a discretion violates the human rights of trafficking
382
See Palermo Protocol, supra note 10 (“Trafficking in persons’ shall mean
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation
shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs . . . .”); see also LEGAL

CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 13 (Apr. 11, 2011),

www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/66/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Colombi
a%20(S%20to%20E).pdf.
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victims, re–victimizing and preventing them from receiving the help
and benefits to which they are entitled. 383
Unfortunately, Yolanda’s case is not the exception but rather the
rule for most Venezuelan women and children seeking protection in
Colombia. 384 In practice, these obstacles continue to exist, especially when irregular migrant victims are involved. For instance,
some shelters for trafficking victims receive only women with authorized immigration status, 385 not only contravening the

See Corte Constitucional ordena protección para mujer venezolana víctima de trata de personas, RADIO NACIONAL DE COLOMBIA (Sept. 15, 2020
11:26), www.radionacional.co/cultura/corte–constitucional–ordena–proteccion–
para–mujer–venezolana–victima–de–trata–de–personas
(Women’s
Link
Worldwide took the case to the Constitutional Court. The Court ordered that
Yolanda receive psychosocial and legal help, security, education, accommodation, health affiliation and support to resolve her immigration status—rights that
were denied since she arrived. As a provisional measure, the Constitutional Court
ordered the Secretary of Government or the Technical Secretariat of the Municipal
Committee to Combat Trafficking in Persons to activate the trafficking procedures for the benefit of Yolanda and her family. Additionally, the Court requested
information from the Inter–Institutional Committee for the Fight against Human
Trafficking on the problem with Venezuelan migrants and the measures adopted
to confront it and requested information from different authorities on the specific
measures that were taken in Yolanda’s case.).
384
A similar situation, demonstrating the link between identification and protection, was denounced by Women’s Link Worldwide, which documented the
case of a Venezuelan girl whose father relocated her to Arauca (Colombia) to
exploit her sexually. Colombian authorities, specifically the Colombian Institute
of Family Welfare (ICBF) and the Ombudsman’s Office, did not consider her a
victim of human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Consequently, the authorities
initiated the girl’s expulsion without considering the risk that she would suffer in
her home country. See PLATAFORMA CONTRA EL ARCO MINERO, ET AL., INFORME
SOBRE LA SITUACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN EL ARCO MINERO Y EL
TERRITORIO VENEZOLANO UBICADO AL SUR DEL RÍO ORINOCO 25 (2009), www.civilisac.org/civilis/wp–content/uploads/Informe–sobre–la–situaci%C3%B3n–de–
derechos–humanos–en–el–Arco–Minero–y–el–territorio–venezolano–ubicado–
al–sur–del–r%C3%ADo–Orinoco.pdf.pdf.
385
Colombia can grant a distinct treatment afforded to documented Venezuelans “with respect to undocumented migrants, or between migrants and nationals,
provided that this differential treatment is reasonable, objective, proportionate and
does not harm human rights.” Juridical Conditions and Rights of Undocumented
Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC–18/03, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18 ¶
118–19 (Sept. 17, 2003); see also Recommended Principles and Guidelines, supra
note 2.
383
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Constitutional Court of Colombia’s ruling in Sentencia C–470 of
2016, 386 which held that a formal complaint was not mandatory for
victims of human trafficking to access protective measures due to
the verifiable risks (revictimization, fear of retaliation from criminal
organizations, and stigmatization), but also disregarding the fact that
irregular migrants are the most vulnerable. 387 That requirement in
itself, makes Venezuelan women and girls afraid to report their victimization for fear of being deported. 388 Unfortunately, this is a legitimate fear among irregular migrants, as cases of deportation of
human trafficking victims have been previously documented
throughout country. 389
IT’S ABOUT THE BUDGET
Colombia’s budget for combating human trafficking has been
modest, given the enormity of human trafficking activities. The U.S.
State Department’s 2021 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report on Colombia shows that in 2019 (the most recent statistics reported), authorities appropriated a total of 2.1 billion Colombian pesos
($616,370) for the implementation of anti–trafficking efforts, including 855.68 million Colombian pesos ($250,600) for technical
See generally Sentencia C–470/16, CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL REPUBLICA
(Aug. 21, 2016), www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2016/
C–470–16.htm.
387
Capriles, supra note 277.
388
Devon Cone and Melanie Teff, Searching for Safety: Confronting Sexual
Exploitation and Trafficking of Venezuelan Women and Girls, REFUGEE
INTERNATIONAL 9 (Aug. 2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e
4b01d9450dd53f5/t/5d472cc87370400001f5dc52/1564945609233/Venezuela+T
rafficking+Report+–+August+2019+–+FINAL.pdf; see also Selene Soto and
Ana Margarita González, La desprotección de las mujeres venezolanas víctimas
de trata de personas, MOVILIDAD HUMANA VENEZOLANA (Sept. 2, 2019), www.
movhuve.org/blog/2019/09/02/la–desproteccion–de–las–mujeres–venezolanas–
victimas–de–trata–de–personas/.
389
The U.S. Department of State in its 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report
documented a case in which 23 Venezuelan women and girls were not identified
as victims of trafficking. Since they did not want to testify out of fear of reprisals
and their lack of trust in the justice system, they were penalized for doing so after
deportation proceedings commenced, contravening the Constitutional Court of
Colombia’s ruling in Sentencia C–470 of 2016. See 2019 Trafficking in Persons
Report, supra note 348.
386

DE COLOMBIA,

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER–AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

95

assistance and anti–trafficking training provided by international
partners. 390
The modest level of funds budgeted to such a massive problem
is regrettable and raises the issue of appropriation of resources destined for the implementation and compliance of Law 985 of 2005.
There is little transparency on how funds are allocated or managed,
and resistance to reporting is contrary to the government’s legal duty
to account for public resources. The action plans developed are not
known, and this makes it even more difficult to understand how Colombia is implementing public policy and whether the policies are
effective and efficient. 391 Moreover, Colombia is a centralized government with the lion’s share of resources remaining close to the
seat of power in Bogotá. Imagine the conditions out in the territories
where resources are always stretched very thin. 392
There is also no certainty of the allocation of resources from year
to year. Although there is the Transparency Law 393 and the legal
duty to render accounts, it is a constant among government entities
not to provide more detailed information than necessary on budget
management, especially within the Ministry of the Interior that has
under its responsibility the special account determined by Law 985
of 2005. What we do see is that rather than focusing greater funding
on human trafficking training for law enforcement and the judicial
system, resources are being allocated mainly to awareness–raising
activities and negotiating agreements with international non–

2021 Trafficking in Persons Report, supra note 268.
See also IV Balance de la implementación de las políticas anti–trata en
Colombia, supra note 313, at 35.
392
See Luz E. Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin
America, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 345, 359 (2000) (Allocation of resources nationwide and waste of funding is an endemic problem without a solution so long as
public corruption remains prevalent in Colombian government. It is not unusual
for regional prosecutors and local investigators to work on outdated equipment or
never receive follow–up training on new technology to maintain competency. Even in the larger cities where technology has been updated and made
available to government officials, there is an acute lack of interest to utilize new
resources, due in large measure to the lack of consistent, motivated, and progressive continuing education. During an interview with a judge several years ago, he
pointed to a computer behind his desk and said he had never so much as turned it
on.).
393
L. 1712 of 2014, Diario Oficial No. 49.084, March 6, 2014 (Colom.).
390
391
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government organizations. 394 One might argue that doing so is “easier” than concentrating on the difficult tasks of implementing, managing, and sustaining a nationwide training and competency regime
for those on the front lines of combating human trafficking.
Another failure in execution arises from the meager or nonexistent budget allocation for actions to combat trafficking at the regional
and local levels. Few departments, districts, and municipal governments assign a budget to combat human trafficking. 395 Also, each
territorial committee, as described earlier, does only what it considers pertinent in the fight against trafficking, 396 and the sense of the
committees seems to be that they are not responsible for implementing and paying for the national strategy to combat human trafficking. Rather, they view their financial obligation from a security and
criminal prosecution approach rather than a victim–centered approach (victim protection and assistance).
COLOMBIA’S INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
Colombia carries a duty under international law to “ensure respect for the protection of the rights of [Venezuelan] migrants [and
refugees] and intensify their efforts to fight trafficking.” 397 The government has an obligation to interpret and apply the Palermo Protocol “in a way that is not discriminatory to persons on the ground that
they are victims of trafficking in persons. The interpretation and application of those measures shall be consistent with internationally
recognized principles of nondiscrimination.” 398
See also IV Balance de la implementación de las políticas anti–trata en
Colombia, supra note 313.
395
Id. at 8.
396
Id.
397
U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking: Report of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/2002/68/Add. 1 (2002), www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/Traffickingen.pdf (Trafficking in persons is “a particularly abusive
form of migration. In the Millennium Declaration, States resolved to take
measures to ensure respect for the protection of the rights of migrants and to intensify their efforts to fight trafficking.”)
398
G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Jan. 8, 2001).
394
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Colombia also carries a duty under international law to protect
all individuals living within its borders. Despite its best of intentions, Venezuelans of all sexual orientations and genders face grave
risks in Colombia, including hyper–sexualization that results in a
dynamic of harassment, sexual exploitation, human trafficking, and
survival sex. 399 While many Colombians support migrants’ access
to essential services such as health and education, others believe
Venezuelans undercut “employment for natives and burden the
economy” and are contributors to a “host of problems, including rising crime, unemployment, and the spread of COVID–19.” 400 In a
post–conflict nation with an unstable economy due to high unemployment, insecurity, overstretched public services, post–peace
agreement debts, 401 and the unexpected disaster of the COVID–19
pandemic, assigning funds for migrants has aggravated long–simmering anxieties about migrant inflow and deepened xenophobia
felt by some Colombians and Venezuelans toward each other. 402
Capriles, supra note 277.
John Otis, Large Venezuelan Migration Sparks Xenophobia Backlash in
Colombia, NPR, (Dec. 29, 2020, 10:02 AM), www.npr.org/2020/12/29/94954886
5/large–venezuelan–migration–sparks–xenophobic–backlash–in–colombia (CO
VID–19 strained already scarce city budgets and the national government left local officials “on their own to address the flood of impoverished, sick, and desperate Venezuelan migrants.” The reaction and message from citizens and “powerful
government officials” was that “Venezuelan migrants are no longer welcome.”).
401
Jérôme Duval, Gaviria Ocampo: “Cerca del 40% del presupuesto de Colombia se destina a guerra y deuda”, EL SALTO (Jan. 30, 2018, 4:21 PM),
www.elsaltodiario.com/colombia/entrevista–gaviria–ocampo–cerca–40–presupu
esto–colombia–destina–guerra–deuda (The need for resources for the post–conflict must include money dedicated to guarantee other investments for the well–
being of the population and the development of the country. However, doing so
will likely cause the external debt in the next 10 years to grow to an estimated
$100 billion USD.); see also Implementar el acuerdo de paz necesitaría una
nueva reforma tributaria: Fedesarrollo, SEMANA (Jan. 23, 2018),
www.semana.com/economia/articulo/costos–del–proceso–de–paz–y–el–posconf
licto/554526/ (In the next 15 years, Colombia must invest at least 129.5 billion
pesos to implement the peace agreement, allocating: $110.6 billion in rural reform, $4.3 billion in political participation, $1.9 billion to end of the conflict, $8.3
billion in illicit drugs, and $4.3 billion in reparation to victims.).
402
Sergio Guzmán and Juan Camilo Ponce, Hate against Venezuelans in Colombia is a ticking time bomb, GLOBAL AMERICANS, (Nov. 10, 2020), https://theglobalamericans.org/2020/11/hate–against–venezuelans–in–colombia–is–a–ticking–time–bomb/ (Many Colombians see Venezuelan migrants as a
399
400
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The Colombian government recognized the tensions and took
steps to alleviate common misconceptions about migrants. Agencies
developed a communications campaign, promoting the idea that regularizing the status of migrants will boost the country’s GDP growth
because most migrants are willing and able to work and make a positive impact on their host communities, “generating new skills, networks, business models and entrepreneurship.” 403 Nonetheless, one
big challenge remains how to fund the sustenance and integration of
Venezuelan migrants into the civil society—assuming they will not
be returning to Venezuela until a drastic change in that government
occurs.
According to the Brookings Institution, in 2020 the estimated
funding available from the international community to support a single Venezuelan migrant in Colombia was a meager $265 USD, compared to the funding available for a Syrian refugee at $3,150 USD. 404
In an attempt to bridge this gap, the Colombian government has lobbied with its international partners to contribute to meeting the funding requirements of the Temporary Protection Statute (TPS) for
Venezuelan Migrants through migrant relief platforms called the
Regional Migrant and Refugee Responsive Plan (RMRP) and the
Interagency Group for Mixed Migratory Flows (GIFMM).” 405 Yet,
the effectiveness of these international cooperation efforts will be
measured in the years to come during the TPS implementation process.

problem. Sixty–nine percent view them “unfavorably” and a source of unemployment and a drain of scarce social resources.)
403
Private sector is key to increase employment opportunities for migrants
and refugees, INTER–AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (Mar. 19, 2021),
www.iadb.org/en/news/private–sector–key–increase–employment–opportunities
–migrants–and–refugees.
404
Dana Bahar and Meagan Dooley, Venezuela refugees and their receiving
communities need funding, not sympathy: February 2021 update, BROOKINGS
(Feb. 26, 2021), www.brookings.edu/blog/up–front/2021/02/26/venezuelan–refugees–and–their–receiving–communities–need–funding–not–sympathy/.
405
See generally REGIONAL REFUGEE AND MIGRANT RESPONSE PLAN FOR
REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS FROM VENEZUELA, RESPONSE FOR VENEZUELANS
(2019), www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/press_release/file/rmrp_venez
uela_2019_onlineversion_final.pdf.
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Colombia also has a duty to exercise due diligence to prevent
human rights violations by private persons. 406 As a host country for
migration from Venezuela, Colombia should prevent, mitigate, and
punish the corruption that facilitates human trafficking, especially
between the countries. 407 For example, traffickers rely on the collusion of corrupt actors all along the trafficking chain, including border guards who are bribed, immigration officials who process false
documents and visas, business people and landlords, hotel operators,
and transporters that move victims along the trafficking networks. 408
Traffickers also bribe law enforcement and local authorities to
overlook trafficking crimes, and in some cases, police, prosecutors,
and judges have direct links to human trafficking networks and actively prevent or stall investigations or manipulate charges to be
dropped. 409 In one instance, public officials were linked to a transnational sex trafficking case involving collusion with the police department and the Attorney General’s Office in Cartagena, where
child sex trafficking and child sex tourism are rampant. Those officials engaged in protecting the operations by “notifying traffickers
of upcoming raids,” and falsifying “documentation for underage
victims who were later exploited in Mexico and Spain.” In addition,
a Colombian navy captain was implicated in pimping, prostitution.
and trafficking more than 250 girls and adolescents, mainly from
Venezuela. 410 He was so emboldened by a perceived level of

Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4, ¶ 172 (July 29, 1988).
407
2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, supra note 348 (Although the government made significant progress on three cases reported during the year, corruption
and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns. “In
2018, authorities opened investigations into three police officers; one for his alleged role in a child sex trafficking ring and the other two for accepting bribes to
overlook an extensive sex trafficking ring operating in Cartagena. At the end of
the reporting period, one case was in the trial phase and officials associated with
second case were indicted.”).
408
See Anastasia Moloney, Colombian authorities bust child sex trafficking
ring in tourist city, REUTERS (July 31, 2018, 3:35 AM), www.reuters.com/article
/us–colombia–humantrafficking/colombian–authorities–bust–child–sex–trafficki
ng–ring–in–tourist–city–idUSKBN1KL0XT (discussing hotel owners being arrested as members of a sex trafficking ring operating in Cartagena).
409
Id.
410
Id.
406
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impunity that he forced minors to have a tattoo bearing his name, a
trait indicative of ownership and sexual slavery. 411
Judicial leniency toward public officials involved in sex trafficking has also been uncovered and takes the form of handing out “disciplinary measures in lieu of prison time, a response that was not
commensurate with the severity of the crime and hindered efforts to
combat trafficking.” 412 In such instances, it is the victims who are
penalized “for crimes their traffickers compelled them to commit.” 413
Finding effective ways to prevent, mitigate and punish corruption can serve to sever key parts of the trafficking chain and help to
create new momentum for anti–trafficking efforts. In 2020, the Ministry of the Interior and Migración Colombia teamed up to provide
both migrants and Colombian citizens with a free smartphone application called LibertApp to help combat human trafficking and aid in
crime prevention. Through the application, citizens and migrants
can report a case of suspected trafficking, misconduct by officials,
or generate a panic report which is sent, along with the user’s personal and location data, to the Anti–Human Trafficking Operational
Center (COAT) of the Ministry of the Interior, which manages and
coordinates human trafficking investigations. The app also provides
a public awareness component by which users can access detailed
information on human trafficking and can find a directory with the
contact information of the different consulates in different parts of
the world. 414 After only two weeks of releasing the app, its use resulted in the arrest of two Colombians for human trafficking of 15
women, including a 16–year–old Venezuelan. 415 This is a promising
Id.
2021 Trafficking in Persons Report, supra note 268.
413
Id.
414
See generally LibertApp – OIM / Migración Colombia, CANNEDHEAD
(2020) www.cannedhead.com/projects/libertapp (describing the LibertApp developed jointly with the IOM and the Colombian government); see also Con LibertApp, Cualquier Persona Puede Denunciar la Trata de Personas en Colombia,
ORGANIZACIÓN INTERNACIONAL PARA LAS MIGRACIONES MISIÓN EN COLOMBIA
(Sept. 8, 2020), https://colombia.iom.int/news/con–libertapp–cualquier–persona–
puede–denunciar–la–trata–de–personas–en–colombia.
415
Con LibertApp, Cualquier Persona Puede Denunciar la Trata de Personas
en Colombia, supra note 414 (Upon rescuing the Venezuelan minor, she was processed through the Family Police Station of the Maní municipality for the restitution of her rights.).
411
412
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development in combating human trafficking at the ground level.
Still, it remains up to the authorities, their competency, their training, and resolve to uphold Colombian law to decide what to do with
the intelligence generated by this kind of technology.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Colombia is required to extend protection of the fundamental
human rights to Venezuelan migrants and refugees, without any discrimination owing to their regular or irregular residence. 416 Consequently, it must respect and ensure the principle of equality and non–
discrimination—not to discriminate or tolerate discriminatory situations that prejudice migrants or refugees. 417 Under the due diligence standard, the government is also responsible for injury to aliens when “a violation of . . . rights . . . has occurred with the support or the acquiescence of the Government, [or when] the State has
allowed the act to take place without taking measures to prevent it
or to punish those responsible.” 418
Migration crises are among the most delicate issues that demonstrate the difficult social, economic, and political conditions we
must currently face. The constant violation of human rights because
of forced displacement leads to a humanitarian emergency with
global impact, and requires the coordinated intervention of every
country, given that all States will be involved at a certain point. Even
though they might not be directly responsible for crimes and human
rights abuses, nations like Colombia do play a role as hosts to
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 397, Art. 1 (“The States Parties
to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein
and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise
of those rights and freedoms.”).
417
See generally Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights
and Human Trafficking, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, 51–73 (July 2002), www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/C
ommentary_Human_Trafficking_en.pdf (detailing analysis of the applicability of
human rights to special groups, including IDPs and people with disabilities. Venezuelan migrants are entitled to basic human rights, and depending on their status,
to the additional rights applicable to women, children, migrants, migrant workers,
and refugees); see also Anne T. Gallagher, The International Law of Human Trafficking, 12 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
418
Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 406.
416
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victims and, therefore, they are responsible for their well–being
once they land within their territory seeking refugee status or asylum.
In this sense, a coordinated plan to address the violence, abuses,
and human trafficking dangers faced by migrants, including Venezuelan migrants and refugees, is needed in Colombia. Governments
should work multilaterally to create conditions that ameliorate the
migration process of refugees between countries. This point is evidenced in the Venezuelan migration crisis, since there has not been
a common plan of action, thereby resulting in disparate approaches
and leads to misinformation for the victims, who then ignore any
mechanisms that do provide effective assistance.
Migrants, like those caminantes crossing by foot from Venezuela to Colombia, are especially vulnerable—they can often be
subjected to human rights violations by criminals, including organized criminal organizations and illegal armed groups, for example,
who take advantage of migrants’ uncertain legal status and their urgent need to survive at any cost. Taking responsibility under International Law, host countries must address these understandings
within their public policies, so they can be successfully applied, especially regarding the Venezuelan crisis and its profound impact in
Latin America.
But—Colombia is still in a post–conflict stage with its internal
problems, ongoing human rights concerns, and criminality on many
levels while attempting to implement the mandate laid out over five
years ago in the Peace Agreement. With time, Colombia can
strengthen its local institutions, and with continuous support from
international organizations and nations, particularly within the
Americas, it can emerge from so many years of conflict and establish effective policies that protect the rights of all people who seek
security and protection in their lives.

